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feat: clean install (Gitea en dur, scan off) + durcissement sécurité entreprise

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Gitea
- lien « Code source » hardcodé (REPO_SOURCE_URL) vers le dépôt, toujours visible
- retrait complet du réglage configurable (api.ts, route+store settings, SettingsView, i18n, help, tests)

Découverte des dépôts
- aucune racine de scan par défaut → pas de scan au premier démarrage (clean install)
- corrige la découverte des dépôts à l'INTÉRIEUR d'une racine qui est elle-même un repo
  (depth 0 = conteneur de scan, on descend ; depth > 0 = feuille)

Sécurité « enterprise-deployable »
- en-têtes HTTP durcis (CSP, X-Frame-Options, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, HSTS conditionnel, no-store API), header Server retiré
- permissions DB 0o600 / dossier de données 0o700 ; error handler sanitisé ; garde Content-Type sur les mutations
- chiffrement au repos AES-256-GCM des secrets (server_secret, clé privée VAPID) via SecretBox
- journal d'audit (migration #7) + endpoint /audit-logs + RGPD export/effacement + UI Réglages
- SECURITY.md, docs/ENTERPRISE_DEPLOYMENT.md, sections README EN/FR, SBOM CycloneDX en CI

CI
- pack-smoke packe depuis le contexte du package (cd packages/server) au lieu de « npm pack -w » :
  corrige l'embarquement de @arboretum/shared dans le tarball

Purge des données personnelles du dépôt public
- suppression de spikes/s4-discovery/result.json, reformulation du VERDICT
- chemin de test générique, anonymisation des 5 fixtures de dialogues
This commit is contained in:
Johan Leroy
2026-06-18 16:44:25 +02:00
parent 755cba6b78
commit 33295a7aaf
41 changed files with 973 additions and 338 deletions
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README.md
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@@ -209,9 +209,13 @@ A web terminal is remote code execution *by design*. Arboretum's guardrails are
- Binds to `127.0.0.1` by default; refuses non-loopback binds without an explicit flag.
- Authenticates **every** `/api/**` request **and** every `/ws` upgrade with revocable tokens, and applies a **strict `Origin` check** (the `SameSite=Strict` cookie does not cover WebSocket upgrades — this is the anti cross-site hijacking guard).
- Tokens are stored **hashed** (sha256) and compared in constant time; the bootstrap token is shown only once. The session cookie is an HMAC-signed payload, `HttpOnly` and `SameSite=Strict`, and it automatically gains the `Secure` flag when the request arrives over HTTPS (e.g. behind Tailscale Serve). Login is rate-limited with exponential backoff.
- Sends hardened HTTP headers (CSP, `X-Frame-Options`, `nosniff`, `Referrer-Policy`, conditional HSTS, `no-store` on the API), restricts the data directory to `0o700` and the database to `0o600`, and **encrypts sensitive secrets at rest** (AES-256-GCM).
- Keeps an **audit log** of sensitive operations and offers **GDPR** data export/erasure (Settings → Security & compliance).
Tailscale Serve is **the** way to reach Arboretum from other devices — not just a recommendation: valid HTTPS, tailnet identity, no open ports. The `--i-know-this-exposes-a-terminal` flag is an escape hatch, not a deployment mode; never expose Arboretum directly to the internet.
See [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) for the full threat model and [`docs/ENTERPRISE_DEPLOYMENT.md`](docs/ENTERPRISE_DEPLOYMENT.md) for hardening in regulated environments.
## What makes it different
| | Arboretum | GitKraken Agent Mode / Conductor / Nimbalyst | Happy / CloudCLI | Anthropic Remote Control |