feat: clean install (Gitea en dur, scan off) + durcissement sécurité entreprise

Gitea
- lien « Code source » hardcodé (REPO_SOURCE_URL) vers le dépôt, toujours visible
- retrait complet du réglage configurable (api.ts, route+store settings, SettingsView, i18n, help, tests)

Découverte des dépôts
- aucune racine de scan par défaut → pas de scan au premier démarrage (clean install)
- corrige la découverte des dépôts à l'INTÉRIEUR d'une racine qui est elle-même un repo
  (depth 0 = conteneur de scan, on descend ; depth > 0 = feuille)

Sécurité « enterprise-deployable »
- en-têtes HTTP durcis (CSP, X-Frame-Options, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, HSTS conditionnel, no-store API), header Server retiré
- permissions DB 0o600 / dossier de données 0o700 ; error handler sanitisé ; garde Content-Type sur les mutations
- chiffrement au repos AES-256-GCM des secrets (server_secret, clé privée VAPID) via SecretBox
- journal d'audit (migration #7) + endpoint /audit-logs + RGPD export/effacement + UI Réglages
- SECURITY.md, docs/ENTERPRISE_DEPLOYMENT.md, sections README EN/FR, SBOM CycloneDX en CI

CI
- pack-smoke packe depuis le contexte du package (cd packages/server) au lieu de « npm pack -w » :
  corrige l'embarquement de @arboretum/shared dans le tarball

Purge des données personnelles du dépôt public
- suppression de spikes/s4-discovery/result.json, reformulation du VERDICT
- chemin de test générique, anonymisation des 5 fixtures de dialogues

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -47,17 +47,14 @@ jobs:
       - name: Pack tarball
         run: |
           rm -rf /tmp/tarballs && mkdir -p /tmp/tarballs
-          # Le hook prepack (copy-web + vendor-shared + copy-meta) matérialise
+          # @arboretum/shared (dépendance runtime non publiée) est embarquée via bundleDependencies,
-          # @arboretum/shared comme VRAI dossier dans le node_modules du serveur —
+          # matérialisée par le hook prepack (copy-web + vendor-shared + copy-meta) comme VRAI dossier
-          # condition pour que npm l'embarque via bundleDependencies. Selon la version
+          # dans packages/server/node_modules/@arboretum/shared.
-          # de npm du runner, « npm pack -w » ne déclenche PAS toujours ce lifecycle
+          # On packe depuis le CONTEXTE DU PACKAGE (cd), PAS en mode workspace (-w) : « npm pack -w »
-          # (contrairement à « npm publish -w », qui lance bien prepack). On l'exécute
+          # résout @arboretum/shared via le symlink workspace hoisté de la racine et n'embarque donc
-          # donc explicitement, on vérifie la matérialisation, puis on packe avec
+          # PAS le dossier vendored local. « cd packages/server && npm pack » lance le lifecycle pack
-          # --ignore-scripts (prepack déjà fait, dossier physique présent → bundlé).
+          # complet et reproduit fidèlement « npm publish » (qui, lui, embarque correctement).
-          npm run prepack -w @johanleroy/git-arboretum
+          ( cd packages/server && npm pack --pack-destination /tmp/tarballs )
-          test -f packages/server/node_modules/@arboretum/shared/dist/index.js \
-            || { echo "ERREUR: prepack n'a pas matérialisé @arboretum/shared/dist/index.js"; exit 1; }
-          npm pack -w @johanleroy/git-arboretum --pack-destination /tmp/tarballs --ignore-scripts
           ls -l /tmp/tarballs
       - name: Assert @arboretum/shared is bundled in the tarball
         run: |

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -40,3 +40,10 @@ jobs:
           # Mapper le secret du registre (PAT Gitea write:package, ou le token auto
           # GITEA_TOKEN s'il a ce scope) sur NODE_AUTH_TOKEN lu par le .npmrc de setup-node.
           NODE_AUTH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
+      # SBOM (transparence supply-chain entreprise) : généré pour le paquet publié et exposé en artefact.
+      - name: Generate SBOM (CycloneDX)
+        run: npx --yes @cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm --omit dev --output-format JSON --output-file sbom.json -w @johanleroy/git-arboretum || npx --yes @cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm --omit dev --output-format JSON --output-file sbom.json
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: sbom
+          path: sbom.json

README.fr.md

@@ -209,9 +209,13 @@ Un terminal web, c'est de l'exécution de code à distance *par conception*. Les
 - Se bind sur `127.0.0.1` par défaut ; refuse les binds non-loopback sans flag explicite.
 - Authentifie **chaque** requête `/api/**` **et** chaque upgrade `/ws` avec des tokens révocables, et applique un **check `Origin` strict** (le cookie `SameSite=Strict` ne couvre pas les upgrades WebSocket — c'est le garde-fou anti cross-site hijacking).
 - Les tokens sont stockés **hashés** (sha256) et comparés en temps constant ; le bootstrap token n'est affiché qu'une seule fois. Le cookie de session est un payload signé HMAC, `HttpOnly` et `SameSite=Strict`, et reçoit automatiquement le flag `Secure` quand la requête arrive en HTTPS (p. ex. derrière Tailscale Serve). Le login est rate-limité avec backoff exponentiel.
+- Envoie des en-têtes HTTP durcis (CSP, `X-Frame-Options`, `nosniff`, `Referrer-Policy`, HSTS conditionnel, `no-store` sur l'API), restreint le dossier de données à `0o700` et la base à `0o600`, et **chiffre les secrets sensibles au repos** (AES-256-GCM).
+- Tient un **journal d'audit** des opérations sensibles et offre l'**export/effacement RGPD** des données (Réglages → Sécurité & conformité).
 
 Tailscale Serve est **la** façon d'atteindre Arboretum depuis d'autres appareils — pas seulement une recommandation : HTTPS valide, identité tailnet, aucun port ouvert. Le flag `--i-know-this-exposes-a-terminal` est une trappe de secours, pas un mode de déploiement ; n'exposez jamais Arboretum directement sur internet.
 
+Voir [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) pour le modèle de menace complet et [`docs/ENTERPRISE_DEPLOYMENT.md`](docs/ENTERPRISE_DEPLOYMENT.md) pour le durcissement en environnement réglementé.
+
 ## Ce qui le distingue
 
 | | Arboretum | GitKraken Agent Mode / Conductor / Nimbalyst | Happy / CloudCLI | Anthropic Remote Control |

README.md

@@ -209,9 +209,13 @@ A web terminal is remote code execution *by design*. Arboretum's guardrails are
 - Binds to `127.0.0.1` by default; refuses non-loopback binds without an explicit flag.
 - Authenticates **every** `/api/**` request **and** every `/ws` upgrade with revocable tokens, and applies a **strict `Origin` check** (the `SameSite=Strict` cookie does not cover WebSocket upgrades — this is the anti cross-site hijacking guard).
 - Tokens are stored **hashed** (sha256) and compared in constant time; the bootstrap token is shown only once. The session cookie is an HMAC-signed payload, `HttpOnly` and `SameSite=Strict`, and it automatically gains the `Secure` flag when the request arrives over HTTPS (e.g. behind Tailscale Serve). Login is rate-limited with exponential backoff.
+- Sends hardened HTTP headers (CSP, `X-Frame-Options`, `nosniff`, `Referrer-Policy`, conditional HSTS, `no-store` on the API), restricts the data directory to `0o700` and the database to `0o600`, and **encrypts sensitive secrets at rest** (AES-256-GCM).
+- Keeps an **audit log** of sensitive operations and offers **GDPR** data export/erasure (Settings → Security & compliance).
 
 Tailscale Serve is **the** way to reach Arboretum from other devices — not just a recommendation: valid HTTPS, tailnet identity, no open ports. The `--i-know-this-exposes-a-terminal` flag is an escape hatch, not a deployment mode; never expose Arboretum directly to the internet.
 
+See [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) for the full threat model and [`docs/ENTERPRISE_DEPLOYMENT.md`](docs/ENTERPRISE_DEPLOYMENT.md) for hardening in regulated environments.
+
 ## What makes it different
 
 | | Arboretum | GitKraken Agent Mode / Conductor / Nimbalyst | Happy / CloudCLI | Anthropic Remote Control |

SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+# Security Policy
+
+Arboretum is a self-hosted daemon that serves a web dashboard to drive git worktrees and the
+Claude Code sessions running on them. **A web terminal is remote code execution by design** — that
+is the product, not a bug. Arboretum's security model is therefore built on *structural* guards
+(loopback-only binding, authenticated access, strict Origin checks) far more than on cryptography
+alone.
+
+This document describes the threat model, the controls that are implemented, the deliberate
+trade-offs, and how to report a vulnerability. For hardening a deployment in a regulated
+environment, see [`docs/ENTERPRISE_DEPLOYMENT.md`](docs/ENTERPRISE_DEPLOYMENT.md).
+
+## Threat model
+
+- **Single-user by design.** Arboretum runs on the owner's machine and is meant for one operator.
+  There is no multi-tenant isolation and no RBAC — and none is claimed.
+- **Loopback by default.** The server binds `127.0.0.1`; `config.ts` *refuses* any non-loopback bind
+  unless you pass `--i-know-this-exposes-a-terminal`. Remote access is expected via **Tailscale Serve**
+  (TLS + tailnet identity), never by opening a port.
+- **The terminal is RCE.** Anyone who can authenticate can run code. The controls below exist to make
+  sure only the authenticated operator reaches it, and that the surrounding surface (cookies, headers,
+  data at rest) is hardened.
+
+## Implemented controls
+
+| Area | Control | Where |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Network | Loopback-only default; non-loopback refused without explicit flag | `packages/server/src/config.ts` |
+| AuthN | Global guard on **all** `/api/**` and `/ws` (only login is public, and rate-limited) | `packages/server/src/app.ts` |
+| AuthN | Tokens stored **hashed** (SHA-256), compared in constant time; bootstrap token shown once | `packages/server/src/auth/service.ts` |
+| Sessions | Cookie is an HMAC-SHA256 signed payload, `HttpOnly` + `SameSite=Strict`, `Secure` when HTTPS | `packages/server/src/routes/auth.ts` |
+| CSRF / WS | Strict `Origin` check on every `/api/**` and `/ws` request (anti cross-site WS hijacking) | `packages/server/src/app.ts` |
+| CSRF | Mutations carrying a body must be `application/json` | `packages/server/src/app.ts` |
+| Rate limit | Global login rate limit with exponential backoff (not per-IP — Tailscale fronts everything as 127.0.0.1) | `packages/server/src/auth/service.ts` |
+| HTTP headers | CSP, `X-Frame-Options: DENY`, `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`, conditional HSTS, `Cache-Control: no-store` on API; `Server` header stripped | `packages/server/src/app.ts` |
+| Injection | All SQL is parameterized; all git calls use `execFile` (no shell); path-traversal guards | `packages/server/src/**` |
+| Data at rest | DB file/dir forced to `0o600`/`0o700`; sensitive secrets (server secret, VAPID private key) encrypted with AES-256-GCM | `packages/server/src/db/index.ts`, `core/secret-box.ts` |
+| Audit | Persistent audit log of sensitive mutations (tokens, settings, secrets, push, groups) | `packages/server/src/core/audit-log.ts` |
+| Privacy | GDPR export (`/api/v1/data/export`) and erasure (`/api/v1/data/delete-my-data`) | `packages/server/src/routes/data.ts` |
+| Install | Runs as a **user** service (systemd user unit / launchd LaunchAgent), never root | `packages/server/src/cli/install.ts` |
+
+## Deliberate trade-offs
+
+- **Long-lived API tokens.** Tokens do not expire by age (CLI automation stability) but can be revoked
+  instantly, and `last_used_at` is tracked. Review and rotate tokens periodically.
+- **Encryption-at-rest key management.** With no `ARBORETUM_SECRET_KEY` set, the encryption key lives in
+  `dataDir/secret.key` (`0o600`) next to the database — this protects a leaked database *copy* (backup,
+  WAL) but not a full `dataDir` compromise. For strong protection, set `ARBORETUM_SECRET_KEY` and store it
+  separately from database backups. Full-DB SQLCipher is intentionally avoided (it breaks the `npx`
+  prebuilt portability).
+- **No multi-user model.** If you need multiple operators with isolation, Arboretum is not the right tool.
+
+## Reporting a vulnerability
+
+Please report security issues **privately** — do not open a public issue.
+
+- Email: **security@johanleroy.fr** (or `contact@johanleroy.fr`).
+- Include a description, affected version, and reproduction steps.
+- Expect an acknowledgement within **7 days** and a coordinated disclosure window of up to **90 days**.
+
+Thank you for helping keep Arboretum users safe.

docs/ENTERPRISE_DEPLOYMENT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+# Enterprise deployment guide
+
+This guide complements [`../SECURITY.md`](../SECURITY.md) with the operational steps a regulated or
+security-conscious organization needs to deploy Arboretum with confidence.
+
+## 1. Remote access: Tailscale Serve (recommended)
+
+Never open a public port. Keep the default `127.0.0.1` bind and put Arboretum behind Tailscale Serve:
+
+```bash
+# on the host running arboretum (default bind 127.0.0.1:7317)
+tailscale serve --bg 7317
+```
+
+This gives you TLS, a stable `*.ts.net` hostname, and tailnet identity. Then add that origin to the
+allow-list so the strict Origin check accepts it:
+
+```bash
+arboretum --allow-origin https://my-host.tailnet.ts.net
+```
+
+The `--i-know-this-exposes-a-terminal` flag exists only as an escape hatch for non-loopback binds; it
+is **never** a deployment mode and is never injected automatically by `arboretum install`.
+
+## 2. Encryption at rest
+
+Sensitive secrets (the HMAC server secret and the VAPID private key) are encrypted with AES-256-GCM
+before being stored in SQLite. Token values are never stored — only their SHA-256 hashes.
+
+For **strong** protection (key not co-located with the database), provide a passphrase via the
+environment instead of the on-disk key file:
+
+```bash
+ARBORETUM_SECRET_KEY='<a long random passphrase from your secrets manager>' arboretum
+```
+
+- Store this passphrase in your secrets manager / KMS, **separately** from database backups.
+- Without it, the key is auto-generated in `dataDir/secret.key` (`0o600`). This still protects a leaked
+  database copy, but not a full `dataDir` compromise.
+- Rotating the passphrase requires re-encrypting existing values; the simplest path is to revoke and
+  recreate the bootstrap token after rotation.
+
+## 3. Filesystem permissions
+
+On startup Arboretum forces `dataDir` to `0o700` and the database files (`*.db`, `-wal`, `-shm`) to
+`0o600`. Verify after first run:
+
+```bash
+stat -c '%a %n' ~/.local/share/arboretum ~/.local/share/arboretum/*.db
+# expect: 700 …/arboretum   and   600 …/arboretum.db
+```
+
+Keep `$HOME` private (standard `0o700`). If you relocate data with `--db` or `XDG_DATA_HOME`, make sure
+the target directory is not world-readable.
+
+## 4. Audit logging
+
+All sensitive mutations are recorded in an append-only `audit_logs` table: token create/revoke, login
+success/failure, settings changes, secret generation, push subscribe/unsubscribe, group CRUD, and data
+erasure. Query it via the API (paginated):
+
+```bash
+curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+  'http://127.0.0.1:7317/api/v1/audit-logs?limit=100'
+```
+
+The audit log never contains secret values — only non-sensitive metadata (ids, labels, counters). It is
+also visible in the dashboard under **Settings → Security & compliance**.
+
+## 5. GDPR (data subject requests)
+
+- **Export**: `GET /api/v1/data/export` returns every record tied to the authenticated token (token
+  metadata, push subscriptions, session history, settings) as JSON. Also available as a one-click
+  download in **Settings → Security & compliance**.
+- **Erasure**: `POST /api/v1/data/delete-my-data` is a two-step call — the first response returns a
+  `confirm` code that must be POSTed back to execute. It purges the token's push subscriptions and
+  revokes the token (unless it is the last active one).
+
+## 6. Backups & retention
+
+- Back up the SQLite database (`arboretum.db`) with the WAL checkpointed. Treat backups as sensitive.
+- If you use `ARBORETUM_SECRET_KEY`, back the key up **separately** — a database backup is useless (and
+  safe) without it, which is the point.
+- Session history is retained until the database is reset. To start clean, stop the service and remove
+  the database file.
+
+## 7. Logging hygiene
+
+The log level is controlled by `ARBORETUM_LOG` (default `info`). Do **not** run `debug`/`trace` in
+production: verbose levels may log request metadata. Keep `info` or higher.
+
+## 8. Supply chain
+
+Each published release ships with a CycloneDX SBOM (`sbom.json`) generated in CI, so you can scan the
+dependency tree for known vulnerabilities before deploying.

packages/server/src/app.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import Fastify, { type FastifyInstance, type FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
+import Fastify, { type FastifyError, type FastifyInstance, type FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
 import fastifyCookie from '@fastify/cookie';
 import fastifyWebsocket from '@fastify/websocket';
 import fastifyStatic from '@fastify/static';
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import { WorktreeManager } from './core/worktree-manager.js';
 import { RepoDiscoveryService } from './core/repo-discovery.js';
 import { GroupManager } from './core/group-manager.js';
 import { PushService } from './core/push-service.js';
+import { loadSecretBox } from './core/secret-box.js';
 import { registerAuthRoutes } from './routes/auth.js';
 import { registerSessionRoutes } from './routes/sessions.js';
 import { registerRepoRoutes } from './routes/repos.js';
@@ -22,7 +23,37 @@ import { registerWorktreeRoutes } from './routes/worktrees.js';
 import { registerPushRoutes } from './routes/push.js';
 import { registerSettingsRoutes } from './routes/settings.js';
 import { registerFsRoutes } from './routes/fs.js';
+import { registerAuditRoutes } from './routes/audit.js';
+import { registerDataRoutes } from './routes/data.js';
 import { registerWsGateway } from './ws/gateway.js';
+import { isHttpsRequest } from './routes/auth.js';
+
+// En-têtes de sécurité posés sur TOUTES les réponses (defense-in-depth + conformité scanners
+// entreprise). Le terminal web reste du RCE par conception : ces en-têtes durcissent la SPA et
+// le transport, ils ne remplacent pas le modèle loopback + auth + Origin.
+const SECURITY_HEADERS: Record<string, string> = {
+  'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff',
+  'X-Frame-Options': 'DENY',
+  'Referrer-Policy': 'no-referrer',
+  'Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy': 'same-origin',
+  'Permissions-Policy': 'geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=(), payment=()',
+  // CSP calibrée pour la SPA : Tailwind/xterm injectent du style inline ; le WebSocket impose
+  // ws:/wss: en connect-src ; le service worker push impose worker-src 'self'.
+  'Content-Security-Policy': [
+    "default-src 'self'",
+    "script-src 'self'",
+    "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
+    "img-src 'self' data:",
+    "font-src 'self' data:",
+    "connect-src 'self' ws: wss:",
+    "worker-src 'self'",
+    "manifest-src 'self'",
+    "frame-ancestors 'none'",
+    "base-uri 'self'",
+    "object-src 'none'",
+    "form-action 'self'",
+  ].join('; '),
+};
 
 declare module 'fastify' {
   interface FastifyRequest {
@@ -46,9 +77,11 @@ export interface AppBundle {
 
 export function buildApp(config: Config, db: Db, serverVersion: string): AppBundle {
   const app = Fastify({ logger: { level: process.env.ARBORETUM_LOG ?? 'info' } });
-  const auth = new AuthService(db);
+  // Chiffrement au repos des secrets (server_secret, clé privée VAPID) dans la base.
+  const box = loadSecretBox(config.dataDir);
+  const auth = new AuthService(db, box);
   const limiter = new LoginRateLimiter();
-  const push = new PushService(db, config.vapidContact);
+  const push = new PushService(db, config.vapidContact, undefined, box);
   const manager = new PtyManager(db, config.claudeSessionsDir, push);
   const discovery = new DiscoveryService({
     ptyManager: manager,
@@ -60,6 +93,43 @@ export function buildApp(config: Config, db: Db, serverVersion: string): AppBund
   const repoDiscovery = new RepoDiscoveryService(db, worktrees);
   const groups = new GroupManager(db);
 
+  // En-têtes de sécurité sur toute réponse + no-store sur les réponses sensibles (API/WS).
+  // onSend DOIT retourner le payload (sinon Fastify vide la réponse).
+  app.addHook('onSend', async (req, reply, payload) => {
+    reply.removeHeader('Server'); // anti-fingerprinting (no-op si absent)
+    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(SECURITY_HEADERS)) reply.header(k, v);
+    if (isHttpsRequest(req)) {
+      reply.header('Strict-Transport-Security', 'max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains');
+    }
+    if (req.url.startsWith('/api/') || req.url.startsWith('/ws')) {
+      reply.header('Cache-Control', 'no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, proxy-revalidate, max-age=0');
+    }
+    return payload;
+  });
+
+  // Garde CSRF defense-in-depth : une mutation porteuse d'un corps DOIT être en application/json
+  // (bloque les soumissions de formulaire cross-site en text/plain, que Fastify parserait sinon).
+  app.addHook('preHandler', async (req, reply) => {
+    if (!['POST', 'PATCH', 'PUT', 'DELETE'].includes(req.method)) return;
+    const len = req.headers['content-length'];
+    if (!len || len === '0') return; // pas de corps : rien à valider
+    const ct = (req.headers['content-type'] ?? '').toLowerCase();
+    if (!ct.startsWith('application/json')) {
+      return reply.status(415).send({ error: { code: 'UNSUPPORTED_MEDIA_TYPE', message: 'Content-Type must be application/json' } });
+    }
+  });
+
+  // Handler d'erreur : ne jamais fuiter de stack/chemin au client ; détail complet côté logs.
+  app.setErrorHandler((err: FastifyError, req, reply) => {
+    const status = err.statusCode && err.statusCode >= 400 && err.statusCode < 600 ? err.statusCode : 500;
+    if (status >= 500) {
+      req.log.error({ err }, 'unhandled error');
+      return reply.status(status).send({ error: { code: 'INTERNAL', message: 'Internal Server Error' } });
+    }
+    // erreurs client (4xx) : code générique, message court non sensible.
+    return reply.status(status).send({ error: { code: err.code ?? 'BAD_REQUEST', message: err.message } });
+  });
+
   void app.register(fastifyCookie);
   void app.register(fastifyWebsocket, {
     options: { maxPayload: 1024 * 1024 },
@@ -97,14 +167,16 @@ export function buildApp(config: Config, db: Db, serverVersion: string): AppBund
     }
   });
 
-  registerAuthRoutes(app, auth, limiter, serverVersion);
+  registerAuthRoutes(app, auth, limiter, serverVersion, db);
   registerSessionRoutes(app, manager, discovery);
   registerRepoRoutes(app, worktrees, db);
-  registerGroupRoutes(app, groups);
+  registerGroupRoutes(app, groups, db);
   registerWorktreeRoutes(app, worktrees);
-  registerPushRoutes(app, push);
+  registerPushRoutes(app, push, db);
   registerSettingsRoutes(app, db, config, serverVersion, push);
   registerFsRoutes(app);
+  registerAuditRoutes(app, db);
+  registerDataRoutes(app, db, auth);
   // La route websocket doit être déclarée APRÈS le chargement du plugin (contexte
   // encapsulé) — sinon le handler reçoit la signature REST (request, reply).
   void app.register(async (scoped) => {

packages/server/src/auth/service.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 import { createHash, createHmac, randomBytes, randomUUID, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
 import { type Db, getSetting, setSetting } from '../db/index.js';
+import type { SecretBox } from '../core/secret-box.js';
+import { recordAudit } from '../core/audit-log.js';
 
 const COOKIE_NAME = 'arb_session';
 const COOKIE_TTL_MS = 30 * 24 * 3600 * 1000;
@@ -12,11 +14,21 @@ export interface AuthContext {
 export class AuthService {
   private readonly secret: Buffer;
 
-  constructor(private readonly db: Db) {
+  constructor(
-    let secretHex = getSetting(db, 'server_secret');
+    private readonly db: Db,
-    if (!secretHex) {
+    box?: SecretBox,
+  ) {
+    // server_secret chiffré au repos quand un SecretBox est fourni (prod). Migration douce :
+    // une valeur en clair pré-existante est re-chiffrée à la lecture.
+    const stored = getSetting(db, 'server_secret');
+    let secretHex: string;
+    if (!stored) {
       secretHex = randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
-      setSetting(db, 'server_secret', secretHex);
+      setSetting(db, 'server_secret', box ? box.encrypt(secretHex) : secretHex);
+      recordAudit(db, { actor: 'system', action: 'secret.generate', resourceId: 'server_secret' });
+    } else {
+      secretHex = box ? box.decrypt(stored) : stored;
+      if (box && !box.isEncrypted(stored)) setSetting(db, 'server_secret', box.encrypt(secretHex));
     }
     this.secret = Buffer.from(secretHex, 'hex');
   }

packages/server/src/config.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import { parseArgs } from 'node:util';
 import { join } from 'node:path';
 import { homedir } from 'node:os';
-import { mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { chmodSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
 
 export interface Config {
   port: number;
@@ -53,6 +53,14 @@ export function loadConfig(argv = process.argv.slice(2)): Config {
 
   const dataDir = join(process.env.XDG_DATA_HOME ?? join(homedir(), '.local', 'share'), 'arboretum');
   mkdirSync(dataDir, { recursive: true });
+  // La DB contient des secrets (server_secret, clé privée VAPID, hashs de tokens) : le dossier de
+  // données ne doit jamais être lisible par d'autres utilisateurs du système. chmod best-effort
+  // (peut échouer sur certains FS Windows/montés ; le démarrage avertit alors sans bloquer).
+  try {
+    chmodSync(dataDir, 0o700);
+  } catch {
+    /* FS sans permissions POSIX : ignoré, cf. avertissement dans db.openDb */
+  }
   const claudeHome = values['claude-home'] ?? join(homedir(), '.claude');
   return {
     port: Number(values.port),

packages/server/src/core/audit-log.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+// Journal d'audit : trace persistante des opérations sensibles (création/révocation de tokens,
+// changements de réglages, génération de secrets, abonnements push, CRUD groupes). Exigence de
+// conformité entreprise (GDPR/SOX/ISO 27001). Règle ABSOLUE : ne JAMAIS journaliser un secret en
+// clair — `details` ne contient que des métadonnées non sensibles (ids, labels, compteurs).
+import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
+import type { AuditLogEntry } from '@arboretum/shared';
+import type { Db } from '../db/index.js';
+
+export type AuditResult = 'ok' | 'denied' | 'error';
+
+export interface AuditEntry {
+  /** tokenId de l'acteur, ou 'system' (opérations automatiques), ou 'anonymous' (avant auth). */
+  actor: string;
+  /** verbe.objet, ex. 'token.create', 'settings.update', 'login.failure'. */
+  action: string;
+  resourceId?: string | null;
+  details?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
+  result?: AuditResult;
+}
+
+/** Enregistre une entrée d'audit. Best-effort : une erreur d'écriture ne casse jamais l'opération métier. */
+export function recordAudit(db: Db, e: AuditEntry): void {
+  try {
+    db.prepare(
+      'INSERT INTO audit_logs (id, ts, actor, action, resource_id, details, result) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)',
+    ).run(
+      randomUUID(),
+      new Date().toISOString(),
+      e.actor,
+      e.action,
+      e.resourceId ?? null,
+      e.details ? JSON.stringify(e.details) : null,
+      e.result ?? 'ok',
+    );
+  } catch {
+    /* l'audit ne doit jamais faire échouer l'action auditée */
+  }
+}
+
+/** Liste paginée par date décroissante (curseur `before` = ts strictement inférieur). */
+export function listAudit(db: Db, opts: { limit: number; before?: string | null }): AuditLogEntry[] {
+  const limit = Math.min(Math.max(Math.trunc(opts.limit) || 50, 1), 200);
+  const rows = (
+    opts.before
+      ? db
+          .prepare(
+            'SELECT id, ts, actor, action, resource_id AS resourceId, details, result FROM audit_logs WHERE ts < ? ORDER BY ts DESC LIMIT ?',
+          )
+          .all(opts.before, limit)
+      : db
+          .prepare(
+            'SELECT id, ts, actor, action, resource_id AS resourceId, details, result FROM audit_logs ORDER BY ts DESC LIMIT ?',
+          )
+          .all(limit)
+  ) as Array<{ id: string; ts: string; actor: string; action: string; resourceId: string | null; details: string | null; result: string }>;
+  return rows.map((r) => ({ ...r, details: r.details ? safeParse(r.details) : null }));
+}
+
+function safeParse(s: string): unknown {
+  try {
+    return JSON.parse(s);
+  } catch {
+    return s;
+  }
+}

packages/server/src/core/push-service.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
 import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
 import { createRequire } from 'node:module';
 import { type Db, getSetting, setSetting } from '../db/index.js';
+import type { SecretBox } from './secret-box.js';
+import { recordAudit } from './audit-log.js';
 
 // web-push est publié en CommonJS : on le charge via require (verbatimModuleSyntax + NodeNext),
 // typé par l'import type — même pattern que @xterm/headless dans screen-reader.ts.
@@ -47,16 +49,22 @@ export class PushService {
     private readonly db: Db,
     private readonly contact: string = 'mailto:arboretum@localhost',
     sender?: PushSender,
+    box?: SecretBox,
   ) {
     this.send = sender ?? ((sub, payload, options) => webpush.sendNotification(sub, payload, options as Parameters<typeof webpush.sendNotification>[2]));
-    let pub = getSetting(db, 'vapid_public');
+    let pub = getSetting(db, 'vapid_public'); // clé publique : jamais chiffrée (sûre à exposer)
-    let priv = getSetting(db, 'vapid_private');
+    const storedPriv = getSetting(db, 'vapid_private');
+    let priv = storedPriv ? (box ? box.decrypt(storedPriv) : storedPriv) : null;
     if (!pub || !priv) {
       const keys = webpush.generateVAPIDKeys();
       pub = keys.publicKey;
       priv = keys.privateKey;
       setSetting(db, 'vapid_public', pub);
-      setSetting(db, 'vapid_private', priv);
+      setSetting(db, 'vapid_private', box ? box.encrypt(priv) : priv);
+      recordAudit(db, { actor: 'system', action: 'secret.generate', resourceId: 'vapid' });
+    } else if (box && storedPriv && !box.isEncrypted(storedPriv)) {
+      // migration douce : clé privée pré-existante en clair → re-chiffrée.
+      setSetting(db, 'vapid_private', box.encrypt(priv));
     }
     this.vapidPublic = pub;
     this.vapidPrivate = priv;

packages/server/src/core/repo-scanner.ts

@@ -37,7 +37,9 @@ interface Frame {
  * Parcours itératif (pile explicite, jamais de récursion non bornée) des `roots`.
  * Règles :
  *  - un dossier contenant `.git` (fichier OU dossier → couvre les worktrees liés) est un repo :
- *    on l'enregistre et on NE descend PAS dedans (sous-modules/worktrees imbriqués ignorés) ;
+ *    on l'enregistre ; en profondeur on NE descend PAS dedans (sous-modules/worktrees imbriqués
+ *    ignorés). EXCEPTION : une racine fournie (depth 0) qui est elle-même un repo est aussi un
+ *    conteneur — on l'enregistre ET on continue de descendre pour trouver les repos internes ;
  *  - on n'empile que les vrais sous-dossiers (`d.isDirectory()`), donc les symlinks ne sont PAS
  *    suivis (anti-cycle + anti-sortie de racine), et on saute dotdirs + excludeDirs ;
  *  - bornes : `maxDepth`, `maxRepos`, et un éventuel `signal` (timeout global) ;
@@ -68,10 +70,13 @@ export async function scanForRepos(
     if (seen.has(dir)) continue;
     seen.add(dir);
 
-    // un repo : on l'enregistre et on ne descend pas.
+    // Un dossier avec `.git` est un repo. En PROFONDEUR (depth > 0) c'est une feuille : on
+    // l'enregistre sans descendre (on n'ouvre pas les sous-modules/worktrees imbriqués). Mais une
+    // RACINE fournie explicitement (depth 0) est un CONTENEUR de scan : si elle est elle-même un
+    // repo on l'enregistre, puis on CONTINUE de descendre pour découvrir les dépôts qu'elle contient.
     if (existsSync(join(dir, '.git'))) {
       found.add(dir);
-      continue;
+      if (depth > 0) continue;
     }
     if (depth >= limits.maxDepth) continue;
 

packages/server/src/core/scan-settings.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 // Réglages de la découverte auto des repos, persistés dans la table `settings` (clé/valeur).
 // Frontière de sécurité : ces clés sont NON sensibles et n'entrent dans l'allow-list du PATCH
 // /api/v1/settings que via les validateurs ci-dessous. Aucun secret ne transite par ici.
-import { homedir } from 'node:os';
 import { getSetting } from '../db/index.js';
 import type { Db } from '../db/index.js';
 import { isSafeAbsolutePath } from './git.js';
@@ -15,12 +14,14 @@ export const DEFAULT_SCAN_INTERVAL_MIN = 5;
 export const MAX_SCAN_INTERVAL_MIN = 1440;
 export const MAX_SCAN_ROOTS = 16;
 
-/** Racines à scanner. Défaut : le home de l'utilisateur. Lecture tolérante (JSON malformé → défaut). */
+/**
+ * Racines à scanner. Défaut : AUCUNE racine → aucun scan (clean install).
+ * L'utilisateur ajoute ses racines via Réglages → Découverte. Lecture tolérante (JSON malformé → []).
+ */
 export function readScanRoots(db: Db): string[] {
   const raw = getSetting(db, SCAN_ROOTS_KEY);
-  if (!raw) return [homedir()];
+  if (!raw) return [];
-  const parsed = normalizeScanRoots(safeParse(raw));
+  return normalizeScanRoots(safeParse(raw)) ?? [];
-  return parsed && parsed.length > 0 ? parsed : [homedir()];
 }
 
 /** Intervalle périodique en minutes (0 = désactivé). Défaut DEFAULT_SCAN_INTERVAL_MIN. */

packages/server/src/core/secret-box.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+// Chiffrement au repos des secrets applicatifs (server_secret HMAC, clé privée VAPID) stockés dans
+// la table `settings`. node:sqlite (DatabaseSync) ne supporte pas sqlcipher → on chiffre au niveau
+// applicatif les VALEURS sensibles, en AES-256-GCM (authentifié), avant insertion.
+//
+// Gestion de clé (par ordre de priorité) :
+//   1. ARBORETUM_SECRET_KEY (variable d'env) → vraie protection : la clé ne vit pas sur le disque,
+//      donc une fuite de la base seule (backup, WAL) ne révèle pas les secrets ;
+//   2. sinon, fichier clé `dataDir/secret.key` (0o600), généré au 1er démarrage. Protection partielle :
+//      couvre la fuite de la base seule, PAS celle du dossier de données complet (clé + base ensemble).
+// Compromis assumé et documenté (docs/ENTERPRISE_DEPLOYMENT.md) : pour une protection forte, fournir
+// ARBORETUM_SECRET_KEY et sauvegarder cette clé séparément des backups de la base.
+import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes, scryptSync } from 'node:crypto';
+import { chmodSync, existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+
+const PREFIX = 'v1:'; // versionne le format ; absence de préfixe = valeur en clair (legacy → migration douce)
+const SCRYPT_SALT = 'arboretum-secret-box-v1'; // sel fixe : l'entropie vient de la passphrase fournie
+
+export class SecretBox {
+  constructor(private readonly key: Buffer) {}
+
+  /** Chiffre en `v1:<iv>:<tag>:<ciphertext>` (hex). */
+  encrypt(plaintext: string): string {
+    const iv = randomBytes(12);
+    const cipher = createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', this.key, iv);
+    const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
+    const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
+    return `${PREFIX}${iv.toString('hex')}:${tag.toString('hex')}:${ct.toString('hex')}`;
+  }
+
+  /** Déchiffre une valeur `v1:` ; une valeur sans préfixe est retournée telle quelle (clair legacy). */
+  decrypt(stored: string): string {
+    if (!this.isEncrypted(stored)) return stored;
+    const [, ivHex, tagHex, ctHex] = stored.split(':');
+    if (!ivHex || !tagHex || !ctHex) throw new Error('secret-box: format chiffré invalide');
+    const decipher = createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', this.key, Buffer.from(ivHex, 'hex'));
+    decipher.setAuthTag(Buffer.from(tagHex, 'hex'));
+    return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(Buffer.from(ctHex, 'hex')), decipher.final()]).toString('utf8');
+  }
+
+  isEncrypted(stored: string): boolean {
+    return stored.startsWith(PREFIX);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Construit le SecretBox de production : clé dérivée d'ARBORETUM_SECRET_KEY si fournie, sinon
+ * d'un fichier clé `dataDir/secret.key` (0o600) généré au besoin.
+ */
+export function loadSecretBox(dataDir: string): SecretBox {
+  const passphrase = process.env.ARBORETUM_SECRET_KEY;
+  if (passphrase && passphrase.length > 0) {
+    return new SecretBox(scryptSync(passphrase, SCRYPT_SALT, 32));
+  }
+  const keyPath = join(dataDir, 'secret.key');
+  let keyHex: string;
+  if (existsSync(keyPath)) {
+    keyHex = readFileSync(keyPath, 'utf8').trim();
+  } else {
+    keyHex = randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
+    writeFileSync(keyPath, keyHex + '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
+  }
+  try {
+    chmodSync(keyPath, 0o600);
+  } catch {
+    /* FS sans permissions POSIX : ignoré */
+  }
+  return new SecretBox(Buffer.from(keyHex, 'hex'));
+}

packages/server/src/db/index.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { DatabaseSync } from 'node:sqlite';
+import { chmodSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';
 
 const MIGRATIONS: Array<{ id: number; sql: string }> = [
   {
@@ -99,6 +100,24 @@ const MIGRATIONS: Array<{ id: number; sql: string }> = [
     id: 6,
     sql: `ALTER TABLE repos ADD COLUMN hidden INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0;`,
   },
+  {
+    // Journal d'audit (conformité entreprise : GDPR/SOX/ISO 27001). Trace les mutations
+    // sensibles (tokens, réglages, secrets, abonnements push, groupes). Ne contient JAMAIS
+    // de secret en clair — `details` est un JSON de métadonnées non sensibles.
+    id: 7,
+    sql: `
+      CREATE TABLE audit_logs (
+        id          TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+        ts          TEXT NOT NULL,
+        actor       TEXT NOT NULL,
+        action      TEXT NOT NULL,
+        resource_id TEXT,
+        details     TEXT,
+        result      TEXT NOT NULL
+      );
+      CREATE INDEX idx_audit_ts ON audit_logs(ts);
+    `,
+  },
 ];
 
 export type Db = DatabaseSync;
@@ -107,10 +126,27 @@ export function openDb(path: string): Db {
   const db = new DatabaseSync(path);
   db.exec('PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL');
   db.exec('PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON');
+  hardenDbPermissions(path);
   migrate(db);
   return db;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Restreint la base (et ses fichiers WAL/SHM) à 0o600 — proprio uniquement. La base contient des
+ * secrets (server_secret, clé privée VAPID, hashs de tokens) : elle ne doit jamais être lisible par
+ * d'autres utilisateurs du système. Best-effort : ignoré sur les FS sans permissions POSIX.
+ */
+function hardenDbPermissions(path: string): void {
+  if (path === ':memory:') return;
+  for (const p of [path, `${path}-wal`, `${path}-shm`]) {
+    try {
+      if (existsSync(p)) chmodSync(p, 0o600);
+    } catch {
+      /* FS sans permissions POSIX (Windows / montage) : ignoré */
+    }
+  }
+}
+
 function migrate(db: DatabaseSync): void {
   db.exec('CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS schema_migrations (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, applied_at TEXT NOT NULL)');
   const applied = new Set(

packages/server/src/routes/audit.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+// Consultation du journal d'audit (onglet Réglages / outils de conformité). Lecture seule, sous
+// l'auth globale. Pagination par curseur `before` (ts décroissant).
+import type { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
+import type { AuditLogsResponse } from '@arboretum/shared';
+import type { Db } from '../db/index.js';
+import { listAudit } from '../core/audit-log.js';
+
+export function registerAuditRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, db: Db): void {
+  app.get('/api/v1/audit-logs', async (req): Promise<AuditLogsResponse> => {
+    const q = req.query as { limit?: string; before?: string };
+    const limit = Math.min(Math.max(Math.trunc(Number(q.limit) || 50), 1), 200);
+    const entries = listAudit(db, { limit, before: q.before ?? null });
+    // s'il reste potentiellement des entrées (page pleine), expose le curseur suivant.
+    const nextBefore = entries.length === limit ? entries[entries.length - 1]!.ts : null;
+    return { entries, nextBefore };
+  });
+}

packages/server/src/routes/auth.ts

@@ -8,11 +8,13 @@ import type {
   TokensListResponse,
 } from '@arboretum/shared';
 import type { AuthService, LoginRateLimiter } from '../auth/service.js';
+import type { Db } from '../db/index.js';
+import { recordAudit } from '../core/audit-log.js';
 
 // Tailscale Serve / un reverse-proxy TLS posent x-forwarded-proto. On ne sert jamais
 // en TLS direct : `secure` n'est posé que derrière un front HTTPS, jamais en localhost http
 // (sinon le navigateur refuserait le cookie sur http://127.0.0.1 et le login local casserait).
-function isHttpsRequest(req: FastifyRequest): boolean {
+export function isHttpsRequest(req: FastifyRequest): boolean {
   const xfp = req.headers['x-forwarded-proto'];
   const proto = (Array.isArray(xfp) ? xfp[0] : xfp)?.split(',')[0]?.trim();
   return proto === 'https';
@@ -23,6 +25,7 @@ export function registerAuthRoutes(
   auth: AuthService,
   limiter: LoginRateLimiter,
   serverVersion: string,
+  db: Db,
 ): void {
   app.post('/api/v1/auth/login', { config: { public: true } }, async (req, reply) => {
     const wait = limiter.check();
@@ -33,9 +36,11 @@ export function registerAuthRoutes(
     const ctx = typeof body?.token === 'string' ? auth.verifyRawToken(body.token) : null;
     if (!ctx) {
       limiter.recordFailure();
+      recordAudit(db, { actor: 'anonymous', action: 'login.failure', result: 'denied' });
       return reply.status(401).send({ error: { code: 'BAD_TOKEN', message: 'Invalid token' } });
     }
     limiter.recordSuccess();
+    recordAudit(db, { actor: ctx.tokenId, action: 'login.success' });
     void reply.setCookie(auth.cookieName, auth.issueCookie(ctx), {
       path: '/',
       httpOnly: true,
@@ -78,18 +83,22 @@ export function registerAuthRoutes(
       return reply.status(400).send({ error: { code: 'BAD_REQUEST', message: 'label must be 1–64 characters' } });
     }
     const { id, token } = auth.createTokenRecord(label);
+    recordAudit(db, { actor: req.authContext?.tokenId ?? 'unknown', action: 'token.create', resourceId: id, details: { label } });
     return reply.status(201).send({ id, label, token } satisfies CreateTokenResponse);
   });
 
   app.delete('/api/v1/auth/tokens/:id', async (req, reply) => {
     const { id } = req.params as { id: string };
     const result = auth.revokeToken(id);
+    const actor = req.authContext?.tokenId ?? 'unknown';
     if (result === 'not_found') {
       return reply.status(404).send({ error: { code: 'NOT_FOUND', message: 'No active token with this id' } });
     }
     if (result === 'last') {
+      recordAudit(db, { actor, action: 'token.revoke', resourceId: id, result: 'denied', details: { reason: 'last_active_token' } });
       return reply.status(409).send({ error: { code: 'LAST_TOKEN', message: 'Cannot revoke the last active token' } });
     }
+    recordAudit(db, { actor, action: 'token.revoke', resourceId: id });
     // 200 + corps JSON (pas 204) : le mini-client REST du front parse toujours la réponse.
     return reply.send({ ok: true });
   });

packages/server/src/routes/data.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+// RGPD (droits d'accès & d'effacement) : export et suppression des données rattachées au token
+// authentifié. Modèle mono-utilisateur → le détenteur du token EST le sujet des données. Sous l'auth
+// globale. La suppression se fait en deux temps (code de confirmation) pour éviter les clics accidentels.
+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+import type { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
+import type { DataExportResponse, DeleteMyDataRequest, DeleteMyDataResponse } from '@arboretum/shared';
+import type { Db } from '../db/index.js';
+import type { AuthService } from '../auth/service.js';
+import { readScanIntervalMin, readScanRoots } from '../core/scan-settings.js';
+import { recordAudit } from '../core/audit-log.js';
+
+export function registerDataRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, db: Db, auth: AuthService): void {
+  app.get('/api/v1/data/export', async (req): Promise<DataExportResponse> => {
+    const current = req.authContext!.tokenId;
+    const tokens = auth.listTokens().map((t) => ({ ...t, current: t.id === current }));
+    const pushSubscriptions = db
+      .prepare(
+        'SELECT endpoint, user_agent AS userAgent, created_at AS createdAt, last_ok_at AS lastOkAt FROM push_subscriptions WHERE token_id = ?',
+      )
+      .all(current) as DataExportResponse['pushSubscriptions'];
+    const sessions = db
+      .prepare(
+        'SELECT id, cwd, command, title, created_at AS createdAt, ended_at AS endedAt, exit_code AS exitCode FROM sessions ORDER BY created_at',
+      )
+      .all() as DataExportResponse['sessions'];
+    return {
+      exportedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+      tokens,
+      pushSubscriptions,
+      sessions,
+      settings: { scanRoots: readScanRoots(db), scanIntervalMin: readScanIntervalMin(db) },
+    };
+  });
+
+  app.post('/api/v1/data/delete-my-data', async (req, reply) => {
+    const current = req.authContext!.tokenId;
+    // code déterministe lié au token (sans état serveur) : renvoyé au 1er appel, exigé au 2nd.
+    const code = createHash('sha256').update(`delete:${current}`).digest('hex').slice(0, 12);
+    const body = (req.body as DeleteMyDataRequest | null) ?? {};
+    const subsCount = (db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM push_subscriptions WHERE token_id = ?').get(current) as { n: number }).n;
+
+    if (body.confirm !== code) {
+      const res: DeleteMyDataResponse = { status: 'pending', confirm: code, summary: { pushSubscriptions: subsCount, tokenRevoked: false } };
+      return reply.send(res);
+    }
+
+    db.prepare('DELETE FROM push_subscriptions WHERE token_id = ?').run(current);
+    // révoque le token courant (sauf si c'est le dernier actif → garde anti lock-out conservée).
+    const revoked = auth.revokeToken(current) === 'ok';
+    recordAudit(db, { actor: current, action: 'data.delete', details: { pushSubscriptions: subsCount, tokenRevoked: revoked } });
+    const res: DeleteMyDataResponse = { status: 'done', summary: { pushSubscriptions: subsCount, tokenRevoked: revoked } };
+    return reply.send(res);
+  });
+}

packages/server/src/routes/groups.ts

@@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ import type {
   UpdateGroupRequest,
 } from '@arboretum/shared';
 import type { GroupManager } from '../core/group-manager.js';
+import type { Db } from '../db/index.js';
+import { recordAudit } from '../core/audit-log.js';
 import { sendManagerError } from './repos.js';
 
-export function registerGroupRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, gm: GroupManager): void {
+export function registerGroupRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, gm: GroupManager, db: Db): void {
   app.get('/api/v1/groups', async (): Promise<GroupsListResponse> => ({ groups: gm.listGroups() }));
 
   app.get('/api/v1/groups/:id', async (req, reply) => {
@@ -33,6 +35,7 @@ export function registerGroupRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, gm: GroupManager): voi
         ...(body.color !== undefined ? { color: body.color } : {}),
         ...(Array.isArray(body.repoIds) ? { repoIds: body.repoIds } : {}),
       });
+      recordAudit(db, { actor: req.authContext?.tokenId ?? 'unknown', action: 'group.create', resourceId: group.id, details: { label: group.label } });
       return reply.status(201).send({ group } satisfies GroupResponse);
     } catch (err) {
       return sendManagerError(reply, err);
@@ -48,6 +51,7 @@ export function registerGroupRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, gm: GroupManager): voi
         ...(body.description !== undefined ? { description: body.description } : {}),
         ...(body.color !== undefined ? { color: body.color } : {}),
       });
+      recordAudit(db, { actor: req.authContext?.tokenId ?? 'unknown', action: 'group.update', resourceId: id });
       return reply.send({ group } satisfies GroupResponse);
     } catch (err) {
       return sendManagerError(reply, err);
@@ -59,6 +63,7 @@ export function registerGroupRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, gm: GroupManager): voi
     if (!gm.deleteGroup(id)) {
       return reply.status(404).send({ error: { code: 'NOT_FOUND', message: 'No group with this id' } });
     }
+    recordAudit(db, { actor: req.authContext?.tokenId ?? 'unknown', action: 'group.delete', resourceId: id });
     return reply.send({ ok: true });
   });
 

packages/server/src/routes/push.ts

@@ -3,8 +3,10 @@
 import type { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
 import type { PushSubscribeRequest, PushUnsubscribeRequest, VapidKeyResponse } from '@arboretum/shared';
 import type { PushService } from '../core/push-service.js';
+import type { Db } from '../db/index.js';
+import { recordAudit } from '../core/audit-log.js';
 
-export function registerPushRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, push: PushService): void {
+export function registerPushRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, push: PushService, db: Db): void {
   app.get('/api/v1/push/vapid-public-key', async (): Promise<VapidKeyResponse> => ({ key: push.publicKey() }));
 
   app.post('/api/v1/push/subscribe', async (req, reply) => {
@@ -15,6 +17,7 @@ export function registerPushRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, push: PushService): voi
     // garanti non-null : la route est protégée par le preValidation global.
     const tokenId = req.authContext!.tokenId;
     push.subscribe(tokenId, { endpoint: body.endpoint, keys: { p256dh: body.keys.p256dh, auth: body.keys.auth } }, req.headers['user-agent'] ?? null);
+    recordAudit(db, { actor: tokenId, action: 'push.subscribe' });
     return reply.status(201).send({ ok: true });
   });
 
@@ -24,6 +27,7 @@ export function registerPushRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, push: PushService): voi
       return reply.status(400).send({ error: { code: 'BAD_REQUEST', message: 'endpoint is required' } });
     }
     push.unsubscribe(body.endpoint);
+    recordAudit(db, { actor: req.authContext?.tokenId ?? 'unknown', action: 'push.unsubscribe' });
     return reply.send({ ok: true });
   });
 

packages/server/src/routes/settings.ts

@@ -4,8 +4,9 @@
 import type { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
 import type { ServerInfo, SettingsResponse, UpdateSettingsRequest } from '@arboretum/shared';
 import type { Config } from '../config.js';
-import { type Db, getSetting, setSetting } from '../db/index.js';
+import { type Db, setSetting } from '../db/index.js';
 import type { PushService } from '../core/push-service.js';
+import { recordAudit } from '../core/audit-log.js';
 import {
   SCAN_INTERVAL_KEY,
   SCAN_ROOTS_KEY,
@@ -15,23 +16,7 @@ import {
   readScanRoots,
 } from '../core/scan-settings.js';
 
-// Clés de `settings` modifiables via l'API (allow-list stricte). Les secrets ne figurent JAMAIS ici.
+// Réglages modifiables via l'API (allow-list stricte). Les secrets ne figurent JAMAIS ici.
-const GITEA_URL_KEY = 'gitea_url';
-
-/** Valide/normalise une URL Gitea : http(s) uniquement (anti-XSS sur le href de l'icône). */
-function normalizeGiteaUrl(raw: string): string | null {
-  const trimmed = raw.trim();
-  if (trimmed === '') return null;
-  let url: URL;
-  try {
-    url = new URL(trimmed);
-  } catch {
-    return null;
-  }
-  if (url.protocol !== 'http:' && url.protocol !== 'https:') return null;
-  return url.toString();
-}
-
 export function registerSettingsRoutes(
   app: FastifyInstance,
   db: Db,
@@ -39,8 +24,6 @@ export function registerSettingsRoutes(
   serverVersion: string,
   push: PushService,
 ): void {
-  // '' (effacé) est normalisé en null côté réponse.
-  const readGiteaUrl = (): string | null => getSetting(db, GITEA_URL_KEY) || null;
   const serverInfo = (): ServerInfo => ({
     version: serverVersion,
     port: config.port,
@@ -52,7 +35,6 @@ export function registerSettingsRoutes(
   });
   const snapshot = (): SettingsResponse => ({
     settings: {
-      giteaUrl: readGiteaUrl(),
       scanRoots: readScanRoots(db),
       scanIntervalMin: readScanIntervalMin(db),
     },
@@ -63,20 +45,6 @@ export function registerSettingsRoutes(
 
   app.patch('/api/v1/settings', async (req, reply) => {
     const body = (req.body as Partial<UpdateSettingsRequest> | null) ?? {};
-    if ('giteaUrl' in body) {
-      const v = body.giteaUrl;
-      if (v === null || v === '') {
-        setSetting(db, GITEA_URL_KEY, ''); // effacement
-      } else if (typeof v === 'string') {
-        const normalized = normalizeGiteaUrl(v);
-        if (!normalized) {
-          return reply.status(400).send({ error: { code: 'BAD_REQUEST', message: 'giteaUrl must be a valid http(s) URL' } });
-        }
-        setSetting(db, GITEA_URL_KEY, normalized);
-      } else {
-        return reply.status(400).send({ error: { code: 'BAD_REQUEST', message: 'giteaUrl must be a string or null' } });
-      }
-    }
     if ('scanRoots' in body) {
       const roots = normalizeScanRoots(body.scanRoots);
       if (!roots) {
@@ -91,6 +59,11 @@ export function registerSettingsRoutes(
       }
       setSetting(db, SCAN_INTERVAL_KEY, String(interval));
     }
+    recordAudit(db, {
+      actor: req.authContext?.tokenId ?? 'unknown',
+      action: 'settings.update',
+      details: { keys: Object.keys(body) },
+    });
     return reply.send(snapshot());
   });
 }

packages/server/test/audit-data-routes.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+// Lot 5 — sécurité enterprise : en-têtes de sécurité, journal d'audit, RGPD (export/suppression),
+// garde Content-Type. Vérifie le câblage de bout en bout via buildApp + token bootstrap.
+import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+import { buildApp, type AppBundle } from '../src/app.js';
+import { openDb, type Db } from '../src/db/index.js';
+import type { Config } from '../src/config.js';
+import type { AuditLogsResponse, DataExportResponse, DeleteMyDataResponse } from '@arboretum/shared';
+
+vi.mock('node:child_process', () => ({ execFileSync: () => '/usr/bin/claude\n' }));
+vi.mock('@homebridge/node-pty-prebuilt-multiarch', () => {
+  class FakePty {
+    pid = 424242;
+    write = vi.fn();
+    resize = vi.fn();
+    pause = vi.fn();
+    resume = vi.fn();
+    kill = vi.fn();
+    onData(): { dispose: () => void } {
+      return { dispose: () => {} };
+    }
+    onExit(): { dispose: () => void } {
+      return { dispose: () => {} };
+    }
+  }
+  return { default: { spawn: (): FakePty => new FakePty() } };
+});
+
+process.env.ARBORETUM_LOG = 'silent';
+
+let dir: string;
+let bundle: AppBundle;
+let db: Db;
+let token: string;
+const auth = (): { authorization: string } => ({ authorization: `Bearer ${token}` });
+
+beforeAll(() => {
+  dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'arboretum-audit-'));
+  const dbPath = join(dir, 'audit.db');
+  db = openDb(dbPath);
+  const config: Config = {
+    port: 9998,
+    bind: '127.0.0.1',
+    dbPath,
+    dataDir: dir,
+    allowedOrigins: ['https://host.tailnet.ts.net'],
+    printToken: false,
+    claudeProjectsDir: join(dir, 'claude', 'projects'),
+    claudeSessionsDir: join(dir, 'claude', 'sessions'),
+    vapidContact: 'mailto:test@localhost',
+    autoDiscover: false,
+  };
+  bundle = buildApp(config, db, '1.2.3-test');
+  const t = bundle.auth.ensureBootstrapToken();
+  if (!t) throw new Error('bootstrap token attendu');
+  token = t;
+});
+
+afterAll(async () => {
+  await bundle.app.close();
+  db.close();
+  rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+});
+
+describe('En-têtes de sécurité', () => {
+  it('pose les en-têtes durs + no-store sur /api, sans header Server', async () => {
+    const res = await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/auth/me', headers: auth() });
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers['x-content-type-options']).toBe('nosniff');
+    expect(res.headers['x-frame-options']).toBe('DENY');
+    expect(res.headers['referrer-policy']).toBe('no-referrer');
+    expect(res.headers['content-security-policy']).toContain("default-src 'self'");
+    expect(res.headers['content-security-policy']).toContain("frame-ancestors 'none'");
+    expect(String(res.headers['cache-control'])).toContain('no-store');
+    expect(res.headers['server']).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('pose HSTS uniquement derrière HTTPS (x-forwarded-proto)', async () => {
+    const http = await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/auth/me', headers: auth() });
+    expect(http.headers['strict-transport-security']).toBeUndefined();
+    const https = await bundle.app.inject({
+      method: 'GET',
+      url: '/api/v1/auth/me',
+      headers: { ...auth(), 'x-forwarded-proto': 'https' },
+    });
+    expect(String(https.headers['strict-transport-security'])).toContain('max-age=');
+  });
+
+  it('rejette une mutation avec corps non-JSON (415)', async () => {
+    const res = await bundle.app.inject({
+      method: 'POST',
+      url: '/api/v1/auth/tokens',
+      headers: { ...auth(), 'content-type': 'text/plain' },
+      payload: 'label=pwned',
+    });
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(415);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('Journal d’audit', () => {
+  it('journalise la création de token et l’expose via GET /audit-logs', async () => {
+    const create = await bundle.app.inject({
+      method: 'POST',
+      url: '/api/v1/auth/tokens',
+      headers: auth(),
+      payload: { label: 'ci-extra' },
+    });
+    expect(create.statusCode).toBe(201);
+
+    const res = await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/audit-logs', headers: auth() });
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
+    const body = res.json() as AuditLogsResponse;
+    const actions = body.entries.map((e) => e.action);
+    expect(actions).toContain('token.create');
+    expect(actions).toContain('secret.generate'); // généré au bootstrap (system)
+    // aucune VALEUR secrète en clair : pas de chaîne hex de 64 caractères (server_secret / clé).
+    // (les ids sont des UUID avec tirets → non concernés ; 'server_secret' est un nom de ressource.)
+    expect(res.body).not.toMatch(/[a-f0-9]{64}/i);
+  });
+
+  it('journalise les échecs de login (actor anonymous)', async () => {
+    await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'POST', url: '/api/v1/auth/login', payload: { token: 'arb_invalid_xxx' } });
+    const res = await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/audit-logs?limit=200', headers: auth() });
+    const body = res.json() as AuditLogsResponse;
+    expect(body.entries.some((e) => e.action === 'login.failure' && e.actor === 'anonymous')).toBe(true);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('RGPD', () => {
+  it('exporte les données du token authentifié', async () => {
+    const res = await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/data/export', headers: auth() });
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
+    const body = res.json() as DataExportResponse;
+    expect(Array.isArray(body.tokens)).toBe(true);
+    expect(body.tokens.some((t) => t.current)).toBe(true);
+    expect(Array.isArray(body.pushSubscriptions)).toBe(true);
+    expect(Array.isArray(body.sessions)).toBe(true);
+    expect(body.settings).toHaveProperty('scanRoots');
+  });
+
+  it('supprime en deux temps (pending → confirm → done) et révoque le token', async () => {
+    const pending = await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'POST', url: '/api/v1/data/delete-my-data', headers: auth(), payload: {} });
+    const p = pending.json() as DeleteMyDataResponse;
+    expect(p.status).toBe('pending');
+    expect(p.confirm).toBeTruthy();
+
+    // un 2e token existe (créé plus haut) → révoquer le token courant est autorisé.
+    const done = await bundle.app.inject({
+      method: 'POST',
+      url: '/api/v1/data/delete-my-data',
+      headers: auth(),
+      payload: { confirm: p.confirm },
+    });
+    const d = done.json() as DeleteMyDataResponse;
+    expect(d.status).toBe('done');
+    expect(d.summary.tokenRevoked).toBe(true);
+
+    // le token courant est désormais révoqué → 401.
+    const after = await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/auth/me', headers: auth() });
+    expect(after.statusCode).toBe(401);
+  });
+});

packages/server/test/fixtures/dialogs/ask2.raw

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 ClaudeCode'llbeabletoread,edit,andexecutefileshere.
 
 
-
+
 ]8;id=zaxmda;https://code.claude.com/docs/en/securitySecurity guide]8;;
 
 
@@ -321,13 +321,13 @@
 [?25h[?2026l[?2026h[?25l
 Simrin(2s · thinking with xhigh effort)
 
-
+
 
 
 
 
 [?25h[?2026l[?2026h[?25l
-thinking with xhigh effort
+thinking with xhigh effort
 
 
 
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@
 
 
 [?25h[?2026l[?2026h[?25l
-thinking with xhigh effort
+thinking with xhigh effort
 
 
 
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@
 
 
 [?25h[?2026l[?2026h[?25l
-57thinking with xhigh effort
+57thinking with xhigh effort
 
 
 
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@
 
 esctointerruptYou'veused96%ofyoursessionlimit·resets7pm(America/Lima)·/usage-creditstorequestmore
 
-[?25h[?2026l[?2026h[?25l
+[?25h[?2026l[?2026h[?25l
 nn
-
+
 

packages/server/test/fixtures/dialogs/deny-esc2.raw

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 ClaudeCode'llbeabletoread,edit,andexecutefileshere.
 
 
-
+
 ]8;id=zaxmda;https://code.claude.com/docs/en/securitySecurity guide]8;;
 
 
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@
 4thought for 1s)
 
 
-
+
 
 
 

packages/server/test/fixtures/dialogs/perm-bash2.raw

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 ClaudeCode'llbeabletoread,edit,andexecutefileshere.
 
 
-
+
 ]8;id=zaxmda;https://code.claude.com/docs/en/securitySecurity guide]8;;
 
 

packages/server/test/fixtures/dialogs/perm-write2.raw

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 ClaudeCode'llbeabletoread,edit,andexecutefileshere.
 
 
-
+
 ]8;id=zaxmda;https://code.claude.com/docs/en/securitySecurity guide]8;;
 
 
@@ -218,13 +218,13 @@
 
 
 
-[?25h[?2026l[?2026h[?25l
+[?25h[?2026l[?2026h[?25l
 ✻
 
 
 
 
-
+
 
 [?25h[?2026l[?2026h[?25l
 ✽
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@
 
 
 
-[?25h[?2026l[?2026h[?25l
+[?25h[?2026l[?2026h[?25l
 (1s · thinking with xhigh effort)
 
 
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@
 
 
 [?25h[?2026l[?2026h[?25l
-on2thinking with xhigh effort
+on2thinking with xhigh effort
 
 
 
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@
 ❯ 
 
 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
+
 esctointerruptYou'veused91%ofyoursessionlimit·resets7pm(America/Lima)·/usage-creditstorequestmore
 
 [?25h[?2026l[?2026h[?25l
@@ -430,16 +430,16 @@
 [?25h[?2026l[?2026h[?25l
 *ng
 
-
+
 
 
-
+
 
 [?25h[?2026l[?2026h[?25l
 …
 
 
-
+
 
 
 

packages/server/test/fixtures/dialogs/trust.raw

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 ClaudeCode'llbeabletoread,edit,andexecutefileshere.
 
 
-
+
 ]8;id=zaxmda;https://code.claude.com/docs/en/securitySecurity guide]8;;
 
 

packages/server/test/jsonl-discovery.test.ts

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ function writeJsonl(projectsDir: string, cwd: string, sid: string, lines: object
 describe('munge', () => {
   it('reproduit le nom de dossier ~/.claude/projects', () => {
     expect(munge('/home/x/My Project!')).toBe('-home-x-My-Project-');
-    expect(munge('/home/johan/WebstormProjects/arboretum')).toBe('-home-johan-WebstormProjects-arboretum');
+    expect(munge('/home/user/projects/demo')).toBe('-home-user-projects-demo');
   });
 });
 

packages/server/test/repo-scanner.test.ts

@@ -38,6 +38,16 @@ describe('scanForRepos', () => {
     expect(paths).toEqual([join(root, 'a')]);
   });
 
+  it('descend dans une racine qui est elle-même un repo (workspace + sous-repos)', async () => {
+    const root = tmpRoot();
+    makeRepo(root); // la racine fournie contient elle-même un .git (cas WebstormProjects)
+    makeRepo(root, 'a');
+    makeRepo(root, 'b');
+    const { paths } = await scanForRepos([root], limits);
+    // la racine ET ses dépôts internes sont découverts (la racine n'arrête pas le scan)
+    expect([...paths].sort()).toEqual([root, join(root, 'a'), join(root, 'b')].sort());
+  });
+
   it('ignore node_modules et les dotdirs', async () => {
     const root = tmpRoot();
     makeRepo(root, 'node_modules', 'pkg');

packages/server/test/secret-box.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
+import { SecretBox } from '../src/core/secret-box.js';
+
+const box = (): SecretBox => new SecretBox(randomBytes(32));
+
+describe('SecretBox', () => {
+  it('chiffre puis déchiffre (round-trip)', () => {
+    const b = box();
+    const secret = 'deadbeef'.repeat(8);
+    const enc = b.encrypt(secret);
+    expect(enc.startsWith('v1:')).toBe(true);
+    expect(enc).not.toContain(secret); // le clair n'apparaît pas
+    expect(b.decrypt(enc)).toBe(secret);
+  });
+
+  it('produit un chiffré différent à chaque fois (IV aléatoire)', () => {
+    const b = box();
+    expect(b.encrypt('x')).not.toBe(b.encrypt('x'));
+  });
+
+  it('retourne tel quel une valeur en clair (legacy) et la détecte', () => {
+    const b = box();
+    expect(b.isEncrypted('plain-secret')).toBe(false);
+    expect(b.decrypt('plain-secret')).toBe('plain-secret');
+    expect(b.isEncrypted(b.encrypt('x'))).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('échoue si la clé ne correspond pas (GCM authentifié)', () => {
+    const enc = box().encrypt('secret');
+    expect(() => box().decrypt(enc)).toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it('échoue sur un format chiffré corrompu', () => {
+    expect(() => box().decrypt('v1:zzz')).toThrow();
+  });
+});

packages/server/test/settings-routes.test.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 // Routes Réglages : GET expose la config non sensible (jamais les secrets), PATCH n'écrit que
-// l'allow-list et valide l'URL Gitea (http/https only, anti-XSS).
+// l'allow-list (découverte des dépôts) et ignore toute clé hors allow-list.
 import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
 import { join } from 'node:path';
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ afterAll(async () => {
 });
 
 describe('GET /api/v1/settings', () => {
-  it('renvoie la config serveur non sensible et giteaUrl null par défaut', async () => {
+  it('renvoie la config serveur non sensible et aucune racine de scan par défaut', async () => {
     const res = await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/settings', headers: auth() });
     expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
     const body = res.json() as SettingsResponse;
@@ -74,10 +74,8 @@ describe('GET /api/v1/settings', () => {
     expect(body.server.bind).toBe('127.0.0.1');
     expect(body.server.allowedOrigins).toEqual(['https://host.tailnet.ts.net']);
     expect(body.server.vapidPublicKey).toBeTruthy(); // clé publique = sûre à exposer
-    expect(body.settings.giteaUrl).toBeNull();
+    // défauts de découverte : AUCUNE racine (clean install → pas de scan) + intervalle 5 min
-    // défauts de découverte : home (1 racine) + intervalle 5 min
+    expect(body.settings.scanRoots).toEqual([]);
-    expect(Array.isArray(body.settings.scanRoots)).toBe(true);
-    expect(body.settings.scanRoots).toHaveLength(1);
     expect(body.settings.scanIntervalMin).toBe(5);
   });
 
@@ -93,29 +91,7 @@ describe('GET /api/v1/settings', () => {
   });
 });
 
-describe('PATCH /api/v1/settings', () => {
+describe('PATCH /api/v1/settings — sécurité', () => {
-  it('enregistre une URL Gitea valide et la renvoie', async () => {
-    const res = await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'PATCH', url: '/api/v1/settings', headers: auth(), payload: { giteaUrl: 'https://git.lidge.fr' } });
-    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
-    expect((res.json() as SettingsResponse).settings.giteaUrl).toBe('https://git.lidge.fr/');
-    // persisté
-    const get = await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/v1/settings', headers: auth() });
-    expect((get.json() as SettingsResponse).settings.giteaUrl).toBe('https://git.lidge.fr/');
-  });
-
-  it('efface l’URL avec null ou chaîne vide', async () => {
-    await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'PATCH', url: '/api/v1/settings', headers: auth(), payload: { giteaUrl: 'https://git.lidge.fr' } });
-    const res = await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'PATCH', url: '/api/v1/settings', headers: auth(), payload: { giteaUrl: null } });
-    expect((res.json() as SettingsResponse).settings.giteaUrl).toBeNull();
-  });
-
-  it('rejette une URL non http(s) — anti-XSS (400)', async () => {
-    const res = await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'PATCH', url: '/api/v1/settings', headers: auth(), payload: { giteaUrl: 'javascript:alert(1)' } });
-    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
-    const notUrl = await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'PATCH', url: '/api/v1/settings', headers: auth(), payload: { giteaUrl: 'pas une url' } });
-    expect(notUrl.statusCode).toBe(400);
-  });
-
   it('ignore toute clé hors allow-list (ne touche pas aux secrets)', async () => {
     const before = getSetting(db, 'server_secret');
     await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'PATCH', url: '/api/v1/settings', headers: auth(), payload: { server_secret: 'pwned', vapid_private: 'pwned' } });
@@ -124,7 +100,7 @@ describe('PATCH /api/v1/settings', () => {
   });
 
   it('sans authentification → 401', async () => {
-    const res = await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'PATCH', url: '/api/v1/settings', payload: { giteaUrl: 'https://x.example' } });
+    const res = await bundle.app.inject({ method: 'PATCH', url: '/api/v1/settings', payload: { scanRoots: ['/home/u/work'] } });
     expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
   });
 });

packages/shared/src/api.ts

@@ -199,8 +199,7 @@ export interface ServerInfo {
 export interface SettingsResponse {
   /** réglages modifiables à chaud (allow-list serveur — jamais les secrets). */
   settings: {
-    giteaUrl: string | null;
+    /** racines absolues scannées pour la découverte auto des repos (défaut : aucune → pas de scan). */
-    /** racines absolues scannées pour la découverte auto des repos (défaut : home). */
     scanRoots: string[];
     /** intervalle du re-scan périodique en minutes ; 0 = périodique désactivé. */
     scanIntervalMin: number;
@@ -208,10 +207,48 @@ export interface SettingsResponse {
   server: ServerInfo;
 }
 export interface UpdateSettingsRequest {
-  /** URL de l'instance Gitea (http/https) ; null ou '' pour effacer. */
-  giteaUrl?: string | null;
   /** racines absolues à scanner (chemins normalisés, ≤ 16) ; remplace la liste. */
   scanRoots?: string[];
   /** intervalle du re-scan périodique en minutes (0–1440 ; 0 désactive). */
   scanIntervalMin?: number;
 }
+
+// ---- Journal d'audit (conformité entreprise) ----
+export interface AuditLogEntry {
+  id: string;
+  /** horodatage ISO 8601 */
+  ts: string;
+  /** tokenId de l'acteur, 'system' (auto) ou 'anonymous' (avant auth) */
+  actor: string;
+  /** verbe.objet, ex. 'token.create', 'settings.update' */
+  action: string;
+  resourceId: string | null;
+  /** métadonnées non sensibles (jamais de secret) */
+  details: unknown;
+  result: string;
+}
+export interface AuditLogsResponse {
+  entries: AuditLogEntry[];
+  /** curseur de pagination (ts à passer en `before`) ; null si fin de liste. */
+  nextBefore: string | null;
+}
+
+// ---- RGPD : export / suppression des données liées au token authentifié ----
+export interface DataExportResponse {
+  exportedAt: string;
+  tokens: Array<{ id: string; label: string; createdAt: string; lastUsedAt: string | null; current: boolean }>;
+  pushSubscriptions: Array<{ endpoint: string; userAgent: string | null; createdAt: string; lastOkAt: string | null }>;
+  sessions: Array<{ id: string; cwd: string; command: string; title: string | null; createdAt: string; endedAt: string | null; exitCode: number | null }>;
+  settings: { scanRoots: string[]; scanIntervalMin: number };
+}
+export interface DeleteMyDataRequest {
+  /** code de confirmation renvoyé par un premier appel sans `confirm` ; doit être renvoyé pour exécuter. */
+  confirm?: string;
+}
+export interface DeleteMyDataResponse {
+  /** 'pending' = confirmation requise (renvoie `confirm`) ; 'done' = suppression effectuée. */
+  status: 'pending' | 'done';
+  confirm?: string;
+  /** récapitulatif de ce qui sera/a été supprimé. */
+  summary: { pushSubscriptions: number; tokenRevoked: boolean };
+}

packages/web/src/composables/useNav.ts

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ import { useRoute, type RouteLocationRaw } from 'vue-router';
 import { useI18n } from 'vue-i18n';
 import { Boxes, GitBranch, LifeBuoy, Settings, TerminalSquare } from '@lucide/vue';
 import { useSessionsStore } from '../stores/sessions';
-import { useSettingsStore } from '../stores/settings';
 import GiteaIcon from '../components/ui/GiteaIcon.vue';
+import { REPO_SOURCE_URL } from '../lib/constants';
 
 export interface NavEntry {
   key: string;
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ export function useNav() {
   const { t } = useI18n();
   const route = useRoute();
   const sessions = useSessionsStore();
-  const settings = useSettingsStore();
 
   // sessions vivantes bloquées sur un dialogue (le cœur de la supervision mobile).
   const waitingCount = computed(
@@ -37,17 +36,12 @@ export function useNav() {
     { key: 'groups', to: { name: 'groups' }, icon: Boxes, label: t('nav.groups'), match: ['groups', 'group'], badge: 0 },
   ]);
 
-  // Onglets secondaires : réglages, aide, et lien externe Gitea (uniquement si l'URL est configurée).
+  // Onglets secondaires : réglages, aide, et lien externe « Code source » (en dur, toujours présent).
-  const secondary = computed<NavEntry[]>(() => {
+  const secondary = computed<NavEntry[]>(() => [
-    const items: NavEntry[] = [
+    { key: 'settings', to: { name: 'settings' }, icon: Settings, label: t('nav.settings'), match: ['settings'], badge: 0 },
-      { key: 'settings', to: { name: 'settings' }, icon: Settings, label: t('nav.settings'), match: ['settings'], badge: 0 },
+    { key: 'help', to: { name: 'help' }, icon: LifeBuoy, label: t('nav.help'), match: ['help'], badge: 0 },
-      { key: 'help', to: { name: 'help' }, icon: LifeBuoy, label: t('nav.help'), match: ['help'], badge: 0 },
+    { key: 'gitea', href: REPO_SOURCE_URL, icon: GiteaIcon, label: t('nav.gitea'), match: [], badge: 0 },
-    ];
+  ]);
-    if (settings.giteaUrl) {
-      items.push({ key: 'gitea', href: settings.giteaUrl, icon: GiteaIcon, label: t('nav.gitea'), match: [], badge: 0 });
-    }
-    return items;
-  });
 
   const isActive = (match: string[]): boolean => match.includes(String(route.name));
 

packages/web/src/i18n/en.ts

@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ export default {
     settings: 'Settings',
     help: 'Help',
     more: 'More',
-    gitea: 'Open Gitea',
+    gitea: 'Source code',
     waiting: 'waiting',
   },
   controls: {
@@ -333,14 +333,16 @@ export default {
     confirmRevoke: 'Confirm revoke',
     tokenRevoked: 'Token revoked',
     lastTokenError: 'You cannot revoke the last active token — create another one first.',
-    // Intégrations
-    integrations: 'Integrations',
-    gitea: 'Gitea',
-    giteaUrlLabel: 'Gitea instance URL',
-    giteaUrlPlaceholder: 'https://git.example.com',
-    giteaUrlHint: 'Adds a shortcut icon to the navigation. Leave empty to hide it.',
     save: 'Save',
     saved: 'Saved',
+    // Sécurité & conformité
+    compliance: 'Security & compliance',
+    complianceHint: 'Export or erase the data tied to your token (GDPR), and review the audit log of sensitive operations.',
+    exportData: 'Export my data',
+    refreshAudit: 'Audit log',
+    deleteData: 'Erase my data',
+    deleteConfirm: 'Erase the data tied to your token (push subscriptions) and revoke this token? This cannot be undone.',
+    deleteDone: 'Your data has been erased.',
     // Découverte des dépôts
     discovery: 'Repository discovery',
     discoveryHint: 'Arboretum scans these folders for git repositories and registers them automatically. Hidden repos are kept and never re-added.',

packages/web/src/i18n/fr.ts

@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ const fr: typeof en = {
     settings: 'Réglages',
     help: 'Aide',
     more: 'Plus',
-    gitea: 'Ouvrir Gitea',
+    gitea: 'Code source',
     waiting: 'en attente',
   },
   controls: {
@@ -336,14 +336,16 @@ const fr: typeof en = {
     confirmRevoke: 'Confirmer la révocation',
     tokenRevoked: 'Jeton révoqué',
     lastTokenError: 'Impossible de révoquer le dernier jeton actif — créez-en un autre d’abord.',
-    // Intégrations
-    integrations: 'Intégrations',
-    gitea: 'Gitea',
-    giteaUrlLabel: 'URL de l’instance Gitea',
-    giteaUrlPlaceholder: 'https://git.exemple.com',
-    giteaUrlHint: 'Ajoute une icône de raccourci dans la navigation. Laissez vide pour la masquer.',
     save: 'Enregistrer',
     saved: 'Enregistré',
+    // Sécurité & conformité
+    compliance: 'Sécurité & conformité',
+    complianceHint: 'Exportez ou effacez les données liées à votre jeton (RGPD), et consultez le journal d’audit des opérations sensibles.',
+    exportData: 'Exporter mes données',
+    refreshAudit: 'Journal d’audit',
+    deleteData: 'Effacer mes données',
+    deleteConfirm: 'Effacer les données liées à votre jeton (abonnements push) et révoquer ce jeton ? Action irréversible.',
+    deleteDone: 'Vos données ont été effacées.',
     // Découverte des dépôts
     discovery: 'Découverte des dépôts',
     discoveryHint: 'Arboretum scanne ces dossiers à la recherche de dépôts git et les enregistre automatiquement. Les dépôts masqués sont conservés et jamais ré-ajoutés.',

packages/web/src/lib/constants.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+// Constantes globales du front.
+
+/**
+ * Lien « Code source » affiché en permanence dans la navigation secondaire.
+ * En dur (pas un réglage) : pointe vers le dépôt source d'Arboretum, identique pour
+ * tous les utilisateurs de la solution.
+ */
+export const REPO_SOURCE_URL = 'https://git.lidge.fr/johanleroy/arboretum';

packages/web/src/stores/settings.ts

@@ -3,11 +3,10 @@ import { ref } from 'vue';
 import type { ServerInfo, SettingsResponse, UpdateSettingsRequest } from '@arboretum/shared';
 import { api } from '../lib/api';
 
-// Réglages serveur + intégrations. `giteaUrl` alimente l'item de nav Gitea (affiché si défini).
+// Réglages serveur (découverte des dépôts, infos serveur).
 // Les préférences purement client (langue) restent gérées par l'i18n/localStorage.
 export const useSettingsStore = defineStore('settings', () => {
   const server = ref<ServerInfo | null>(null);
-  const giteaUrl = ref<string | null>(null);
   const scanRoots = ref<string[]>([]);
   const scanIntervalMin = ref(0);
   const loaded = ref(false);
@@ -15,7 +14,6 @@ export const useSettingsStore = defineStore('settings', () => {
 
   function apply(res: SettingsResponse): void {
     server.value = res.server;
-    giteaUrl.value = res.settings.giteaUrl;
     scanRoots.value = res.settings.scanRoots;
     scanIntervalMin.value = res.settings.scanIntervalMin;
     loaded.value = true;
@@ -34,5 +32,5 @@ export const useSettingsStore = defineStore('settings', () => {
     }
   }
 
-  return { server, giteaUrl, scanRoots, scanIntervalMin, loaded, saving, fetch, save };
+  return { server, scanRoots, scanIntervalMin, loaded, saving, fetch, save };
 });

packages/web/src/views/SettingsView.vue

@@ -102,25 +102,6 @@
       </ul>
     </section>
 
-    <!-- Intégrations : Gitea -->
-    <section class="card flex flex-col gap-3">
-      <h2 class="flex items-center gap-2 text-sm font-semibold text-zinc-100">
-        <Puzzle :size="16" /> {{ t('settings.integrations') }}
-      </h2>
-      <form class="flex flex-col gap-2" @submit.prevent="saveGitea">
-        <label class="flex flex-col gap-1">
-          <span class="text-xs text-zinc-400">{{ t('settings.giteaUrlLabel') }}</span>
-          <div class="flex flex-wrap items-center gap-2">
-            <input v-model="giteaInput" type="url" class="input min-w-48 flex-1" :placeholder="t('settings.giteaUrlPlaceholder')" />
-            <BaseButton type="submit" variant="primary" :loading="settings.saving" :disabled="!giteaDirty">
-              {{ t('settings.save') }}
-            </BaseButton>
-          </div>
-        </label>
-        <p class="text-xs text-zinc-500">{{ t('settings.giteaUrlHint') }}</p>
-      </form>
-    </section>
-
     <!-- Découverte des dépôts -->
     <section class="card flex flex-col gap-3">
       <h2 class="flex items-center gap-2 text-sm font-semibold text-zinc-100">
@@ -156,6 +137,26 @@
       </div>
     </section>
 
+    <!-- Sécurité & conformité -->
+    <section class="card flex flex-col gap-3">
+      <h2 class="flex items-center gap-2 text-sm font-semibold text-zinc-100">
+        <Shield :size="16" /> {{ t('settings.compliance') }}
+      </h2>
+      <p class="text-xs text-zinc-500">{{ t('settings.complianceHint') }}</p>
+      <div class="flex flex-wrap gap-2">
+        <BaseButton size="sm" :icon="Download" :loading="exporting" @click="exportData">{{ t('settings.exportData') }}</BaseButton>
+        <BaseButton variant="ghost" size="sm" :icon="RefreshCw" :loading="auditing" @click="loadAudit">{{ t('settings.refreshAudit') }}</BaseButton>
+        <BaseButton variant="ghost" size="sm" :icon="Trash2" @click="deleteMyData">{{ t('settings.deleteData') }}</BaseButton>
+      </div>
+      <ul v-if="audit.length" class="flex flex-col divide-y divide-zinc-800/80 text-xs">
+        <li v-for="e in audit" :key="e.id" class="flex items-center justify-between gap-3 py-1.5">
+          <span class="font-mono text-zinc-300">{{ e.action }}</span>
+          <span class="truncate text-zinc-500">{{ e.actor }}</span>
+          <span class="shrink-0 text-zinc-600">{{ new Date(e.ts).toLocaleString() }}</span>
+        </li>
+      </ul>
+    </section>
+
     <!-- Serveur (lecture seule) -->
     <section class="card flex flex-col gap-3">
       <h2 class="flex items-center gap-2 text-sm font-semibold text-zinc-100">
@@ -183,8 +184,16 @@
 <script setup lang="ts">
 import { computed, onMounted, ref } from 'vue';
 import { useI18n } from 'vue-i18n';
-import { Bell, BellOff, Check, Copy, FolderOpen, KeyRound, Plus, Puzzle, ScanSearch, Send, Server, Shield, SlidersHorizontal, Trash2, X } from '@lucide/vue';
+import { Bell, BellOff, Check, Copy, Download, FolderOpen, KeyRound, Plus, RefreshCw, ScanSearch, Send, Server, Shield, SlidersHorizontal, Trash2, X } from '@lucide/vue';
-import type { CreateTokenResponse, TokenInfo, TokensListResponse } from '@arboretum/shared';
+import type {
+  AuditLogEntry,
+  AuditLogsResponse,
+  CreateTokenResponse,
+  DataExportResponse,
+  DeleteMyDataResponse,
+  TokenInfo,
+  TokensListResponse,
+} from '@arboretum/shared';
 import { api, ApiError } from '../lib/api';
 import { useSettingsStore } from '../stores/settings';
 import { usePushStore } from '../stores/push';
@@ -272,19 +281,6 @@ async function copy(text: string, target?: 'new'): Promise<void> {
   }
 }
 
-// ---- Gitea ----
-const giteaInput = ref('');
-const giteaDirty = computed(() => giteaInput.value.trim() !== (settings.giteaUrl ?? ''));
-async function saveGitea(): Promise<void> {
-  try {
-    await settings.save({ giteaUrl: giteaInput.value.trim() || null });
-    giteaInput.value = settings.giteaUrl ?? '';
-    toasts.success(t('settings.saved'));
-  } catch (e) {
-    toasts.error(e);
-  }
-}
-
 // ---- Découverte des dépôts ----
 const rootsDraft = ref<string[]>([]);
 const intervalDraft = ref(0);
@@ -313,9 +309,55 @@ async function saveDiscovery(): Promise<void> {
   }
 }
 
+// ---- Sécurité & conformité (audit / RGPD) ----
+const audit = ref<AuditLogEntry[]>([]);
+const auditing = ref(false);
+const exporting = ref(false);
+
+async function loadAudit(): Promise<void> {
+  auditing.value = true;
+  try {
+    audit.value = (await api.get<AuditLogsResponse>('/api/v1/audit-logs?limit=20')).entries;
+  } catch (e) {
+    toasts.error(e);
+  } finally {
+    auditing.value = false;
+  }
+}
+
+async function exportData(): Promise<void> {
+  exporting.value = true;
+  try {
+    const data = await api.get<DataExportResponse>('/api/v1/data/export');
+    const blob = new Blob([JSON.stringify(data, null, 2)], { type: 'application/json' });
+    const url = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
+    const a = document.createElement('a');
+    a.href = url;
+    a.download = 'arboretum-data-export.json';
+    a.click();
+    URL.revokeObjectURL(url);
+  } catch (e) {
+    toasts.error(e);
+  } finally {
+    exporting.value = false;
+  }
+}
+
+async function deleteMyData(): Promise<void> {
+  if (!window.confirm(t('settings.deleteConfirm'))) return;
+  try {
+    const pending = await api.post<DeleteMyDataResponse>('/api/v1/data/delete-my-data', {});
+    if (pending.status !== 'pending' || !pending.confirm) return;
+    const done = await api.post<DeleteMyDataResponse>('/api/v1/data/delete-my-data', { confirm: pending.confirm });
+    toasts.success(t('settings.deleteDone'));
+    if (done.summary.tokenRevoked) window.location.reload(); // token courant révoqué → re-login
+  } catch (e) {
+    toasts.error(e);
+  }
+}
+
 onMounted(async () => {
   await Promise.all([loadTokens(), settings.loaded ? Promise.resolve() : settings.fetch()]);
-  giteaInput.value = settings.giteaUrl ?? '';
   syncDiscoveryDraft();
   void push.refresh();
 });

packages/web/src/views/help-content.ts

@@ -174,8 +174,8 @@ const en: HelpSection[] = [
     blurb: 'Shortcuts to the tools around your repos.',
     items: [
       {
-        title: 'Gitea',
+        title: 'Source code',
-        body: 'Set your Gitea instance URL in Settings → Integrations to add a one-click Gitea icon to the navigation. Leave it empty to hide the icon.',
+        body: 'The “Source code” icon in the navigation always links to the Arboretum source repository on Gitea.',
       },
     ],
   },
@@ -342,8 +342,8 @@ const fr: HelpSection[] = [
     blurb: 'Des raccourcis vers les outils autour de vos dépôts.',
     items: [
       {
-        title: 'Gitea',
+        title: 'Code source',
-        body: 'Renseignez l’URL de votre instance Gitea dans Réglages → Intégrations pour ajouter une icône Gitea en un clic dans la navigation. Laissez vide pour masquer l’icône.',
+        body: 'L’icône « Code source » de la navigation pointe toujours vers le dépôt source d’Arboretum sur Gitea.',
       },
     ],
   },

spikes/s4-discovery/VERDICT.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Spike S4 — Découverte JSONL + registre — VERDICT : ✅ GO
 
-Exécuté le 2026-06-11 sur la machine de Johan (CLI 2.1.170/2.1.173 actifs, transcripts 2.1.139 → 2.1.173). Script : `scan.mjs`, résultats bruts : `result.json`.
+Exécuté sur un poste de dev (CLI 2.1.170/2.1.173 actifs, transcripts 2.1.139 → 2.1.173). Script : `scan.mjs`.
 
 ## Critères Go
 

spikes/s4-discovery/result.json

@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
-{
- "scan": {
-  "files": 1318,
-  "bytes": 470368918,
-  "ok": 1316,
-  "noCwd": 2,
-  "noSessionId": 0,
-  "empty": 0,
-  "errors": 0,
-  "mb": "449",
-  "scanMs": "1368",
-  "okPct": "99.8 %"
- },
- "mungeValidation": {
-  "mungeMatch": 1316,
-  "mungeMismatch": 0,
-  "mismatchSamples": []
- },
- "lineTypes": {
-  "user": 1315,
-  "last-prompt": 1313,
-  "attachment": 1308,
-  "assistant": 1204,
-  "queue-operation": 1001,
-  "ai-title": 470,
-  "file-history-snapshot": 431,
-  "system": 398,
-  "permission-mode": 387,
-  "agent-name": 228,
-  "mode": 219,
-  "bridge-session": 6
- },
- "versions": {
-  "2.1.139": 16,
-  "2.1.140": 86,
-  "2.1.142": 19,
-  "2.1.143": 113,
-  "2.1.144": 58,
-  "2.1.145": 81,
-  "2.1.146": 43,
-  "2.1.150": 137,
-  "2.1.152": 59,
-  "2.1.153": 18,
-  "2.1.156": 80,
-  "2.1.159": 77,
-  "2.1.160": 58,
-  "2.1.161": 102,
-  "2.1.162": 60,
-  "2.1.163": 3,
-  "2.1.165": 20,
-  "2.1.166": 6,
-  "2.1.168": 83,
-  "2.1.169": 74,
-  "2.1.170": 90,
-  "2.1.173": 33
- },
- "registry": {
-  "count": 3,
-  "entries": [
-   {
-    "file": "1061541.json",
-    "pid": 1061541,
-    "sessionId": "026cc229-c1cd-4327-9c53-68406794e870",
-    "cwd": "/home/johan/WebstormProjects",
-    "status": "busy",
-    "waitingFor": null,
-    "kind": "interactive",
-    "version": "2.1.170",
-    "peerProtocol": 1,
-    "updatedAt": 1781192047718,
-    "alive": true,
-    "procStartOk": true
-   },
-   {
-    "file": "1701999.json",
-    "pid": 1701999,
-    "sessionId": "8733906c-832a-4e74-aab7-7d8b2f5eb9d2",
-    "cwd": "/home/johan/WebstormProjects",
-    "status": "idle",
-    "waitingFor": null,
-    "kind": "interactive",
-    "version": "2.1.173",
-    "peerProtocol": 1,
-    "updatedAt": 1781191339305,
-    "alive": true,
-    "procStartOk": true
-   },
-   {
-    "file": "597768.json",
-    "pid": 597768,
-    "sessionId": "95f8eaf3-feeb-4fbe-8848-fa7a994c8d7f",
-    "cwd": "/home/johan/WebstormProjects",
-    "status": "busy",
-    "waitingFor": null,
-    "kind": "interactive",
-    "version": "2.1.170",
-    "peerProtocol": 1,
-    "updatedAt": 1781192263383,
-    "alive": true,
-    "procStartOk": true
-   }
-  ]
- },
- "attachment": {
-  "inWebstormProjects": 573,
-  "outside": 743,
-  "topDirs": {
-   "(racine)": 323,
-   "beehelp_prospect": 133,
-   "techos_web": 31,
-   "beehelp_api": 27,
-   "techos_api": 23,
-   "beehelp_web": 15,
-   "teknoroot-simulator-web": 5,
-   "beehelp_claude_marketplace": 3,
-   "beehelp_lambdas": 2,
-   "teknoroot-simulator-api": 2,
-   "Beehelp_iac": 1,
-   "Techos_V1_outdated": 1,
-   "bee-tiptap-resolver": 1,
-   "beehelp_api-wt-qualiobee-docs": 1,
-   "beehelp_api-wt": 1
-  }
- },
- "failuresSample": [
-  {
-   "fp": "/home/johan/.claude/projects/-home-johan-WebstormProjects-beehelp-api/0811ca37-c488-45aa-8a9e-5ecd6c87dfeb.jsonl",
-   "why": "pas de cwd",
-   "types": [
-    "queue-operation"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "fp": "/home/johan/.claude/projects/-tmp/59e9a9f8-a5f2-4773-b1f6-72fa8b9514a9.jsonl",
-   "why": "pas de cwd",
-   "types": [
-    "queue-operation"
-   ]
-  }
- ]
-}