chore(ci): ajoute la surveillance docker du frontend a dependabot

feat(backend): expose GET /api/v1/sensors/status

.dockerignore

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Dépendances (réinstallées dans l'image)
+node_modules/
+vendor/
+__pycache__/
+*.pyc
+
+# Git et IDE
+.git/
+.gitignore
+.vscode/
+.idea/
+*.swp
+
+# Fichiers de build locaux
+dist/
+build/
+*.log
+
+# Secrets et config locale (CRITIQUE : risque d'exfiltration)
+.env
+.env.local
+*.pem
+*.key
+secrets/
+.npmrc
+.pypirc
+kubeconfig

.editorconfig

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+root = true
+
+[*]
+charset = utf-8
+end_of_line = lf
+insert_final_newline = true
+trim_trailing_whitespace = true
+indent_style = space
+indent_size = 2
+
+[*.py]
+indent_size = 4
+max_line_length = 100
+
+[*.{tf,tfvars}]
+indent_size = 2
+
+[Makefile]
+indent_style = tab
+
+[*.md]
+trim_trailing_whitespace = false

.env.example

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# Variables lues par docker-compose.yml à la racine.
+# Le backend lancé hors conteneur (`make dev`) lit apps/backend/.env, pas ce fichier.
+
+POSTGRES_USER=enervision
+POSTGRES_PASSWORD=change_me
+POSTGRES_DB=enervision
+# 5432 est souvent déjà pris par une autre base du poste.
+POSTGRES_PORT=5433
+# `basic` renvoie des statistiques d'usage à Timescale.
+TIMESCALEDB_TELEMETRY=off
+
+APP_ENV=local
+APP_DEBUG=false
+APP_LOG_LEVEL=INFO
+# L'API refuse de démarrer tant que cette valeur reste un exemple ou fait moins de
+# 32 caractères. Générer la vôtre : python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(48))"
+APP_SECRET_KEY=change_me
+APP_CORS_ORIGINS=http://localhost:4200
+BACKEND_PORT=8000

.github/dependabot.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+version: 2
+updates:
+  # Frontend — npm
+  - package-ecosystem: "npm"
+    directory: "/apps/frontend"
+    schedule:
+      interval: "weekly"
+    open-pull-requests-limit: 5
+    groups:
+      frontend-dependencies:
+        patterns:
+          - "*"
+
+  # Backend — uv (lit pyproject.toml / uv.lock)
+  - package-ecosystem: "uv"
+    directory: "/apps/backend"
+    schedule:
+      interval: "weekly"
+    open-pull-requests-limit: 5
+    groups:
+      backend-dependencies:
+        patterns:
+          - "*"
+
+  # Les workflows GitHub Actions eux-mêmes ont aussi des dépendances à jour
+  - package-ecosystem: "github-actions"
+    directory: "/"
+    schedule:
+      interval: "weekly"
+
+  # Si un Dockerfile existe pour le backend
+  - package-ecosystem: "docker"
+    directory: "/apps/backend"
+    schedule:
+      interval: "weekly"
+
+  - package-ecosystem: "docker"
+    directory: "/apps/frontend"
+    schedule:
+      interval: "weekly"

.github/workflows/backend.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+name: Backend
+
+# Piège : la version de Python vient de apps/backend/.python-version, et elle doit rester
+# en 3.14. Le code utilise le PEP 758, qu'un interpréteur 3.13 refuse de compiler.
+
+on:
+  push:
+    paths:
+      - "apps/backend/**"
+      - ".github/workflows/backend.yml"
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - "apps/backend/**"
+      - ".github/workflows/backend.yml"
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+concurrency:
+  group: backend-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  verification:
+    name: Lint, typage et tests
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    defaults:
+      run:
+        working-directory: apps/backend
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Récupère le dépôt
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Installe uv
+        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v5
+        with:
+          enable-cache: true
+          cache-dependency-glob: apps/backend/uv.lock
+
+      - name: Installe l'interpréteur déclaré par .python-version
+        run: uv python install
+
+      - name: Synchronise les dépendances sans dévier du verrou
+        run: uv sync --all-groups --frozen
+
+      - name: Vérifie le formatage
+        run: uv run ruff format --check .
+
+      - name: Analyse statique
+        run: uv run ruff check --output-format=github .
+
+      - name: Typage
+        run: uv run mypy app
+
+      # Le marqueur `integration` est exclu par défaut, donc aucune base n'est nécessaire ici.
+      - name: Tests et couverture
+        run: uv run pytest --cov-fail-under=85

.github/workflows/frontend.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+name: Frontend
+# Pipeline à choix multiple
+
+on:
+  # workflow_dispatch -> lancement manuel des jobs
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      job_choice:
+        required: true
+        description: "Choix du job"
+        type: choice
+        default: all
+        options:
+            - build
+            - sonarqube
+            - test
+            - all # lancer tous les jobs
+  push:
+    paths:
+      - "apps/frontend/**"
+      - ".github/workflows/frontend.yml"
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - "apps/frontend/**"
+      - ".github/workflows/frontend.yml"
+# Ordre de lancement des jobs
+# build -> test -> sonarqube -> deploy
+
+jobs:
+  build:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@v6
+        with:
+          node-version: 24
+          cache: npm
+          cache-dependency-path: apps/frontend/package-lock.json
+      
+      - run: npm ci 
+        working-directory: apps/frontend
+      - run: npm run build
+        working-directory: apps/frontend
+
+  test:  
+    needs: build
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@v6
+        with:
+          node-version: 24
+          cache: npm
+          cache-dependency-path: apps/frontend/package-lock.json
+      - run: npm ci 
+        working-directory: apps/frontend
+      - run: npm test -- --watch=false
+        working-directory: apps/frontend
+
+  sonarqube:
+    needs: [build, test]
+    name: SonarQube
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.3.1
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0  # Shallow clones should be disabled for a better relevancy of analysis
+      - name: SonarQube Scan
+        uses: SonarSource/sonarqube-scan-action@7006c4492b2e0ee0f816d36501671557c97f5995 # v8.1.0
+        env:
+          SONAR_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SONAR_TOKEN }}
+
+    
+  # deploy:
+  #   runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+  #   steps:
+  #   - run: echo "DEPLOY job is running"

.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+# Python
+__pycache__/
+*.py[cod]
+.venv/
+venv/
+.pytest_cache/
+.mypy_cache/
+.ruff_cache/
+.coverage
+coverage.xml
+htmlcov/
+test-results/
+dist/
+build/
+*.egg-info/
+
+# Node / Angular
+node_modules/
+.angular/
+apps/frontend/dist/
+apps/frontend/.angular/
+npm-debug.log*
+yarn-error.log*
+
+# Terraform
+.terraform/
+# .terraform.lock.hcl est versionne (pas ignore) pour figer les versions de provider entre contributeurs/CI
+*.tfstate
+*.tfstate.*
+*.tfplan
+crash.log
+override.tf
+override.tf.json
+*_override.tf
+*_override.tf.json
+*.tfvars
+!*.tfvars.example
+kubeconfig
+
+# Airflow
+etl/airflow/logs/
+airflow.db
+airflow-webserver.pid
+standalone_admin_password.txt
+
+# Environnement et secrets
+.env
+.env.*
+!.env.example
+*.pem
+*.key
+secrets/
+
+# Donnees locales
+data/
+*.sqlite3
+monitoring/grafana/data/
+monitoring/prometheus/data/
+
+# IDE et OS
+.idea/
+.vscode/
+*.swp
+.DS_Store
+Thumbs.db

.terraform.lock.hcl

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-# This file is maintained automatically by "terraform init".
-# Manual edits may be lost in future updates.
-
-provider "registry.terraform.io/kreuzwerker/docker" {
-  version     = "3.9.0"
-  constraints = "~> 3.0"
-  hashes = [
-    "h1:MmhVJBgNpE2Fbksv/XObZJncwm4th4mFE7Ai+6LiIy4=",
-    "zh:0ead8281830e9b9496651282235d9a139ba1b1b6ff79e395eb8c78658dc446b9",
-    "zh:0f17d37d8d3872df3fb75c68b5272e0c981343f53b506a9675b4405191edd3ef",
-    "zh:11d50b37323874427c6d2a08b737d3c7707c8301fdd236c94485cf2828d0b14b",
-    "zh:32f6f9b847446054e2db3d72886ef2f1d1aa51a6d0dac42340b07dad18e3f28f",
-    "zh:5ea5c67668b5dcbda560dc6104b788a9bfc974d52f02f7886889b77cc0e5d248",
-    "zh:5fb19a0b07edc344cd3ddeeb9cfb3d183089deb7a6a94a7b22a583aa1712596b",
-    "zh:602a7ece444e2a142ec5245abb98e7a1a990a68afae2df63b6c85ec084f0c5d7",
-    "zh:693dce278524ad8a6d6c9dd7a01bcd63bb85189639198f8d0b044ab0e5099401",
-    "zh:72e9911568103576c6a78fa38841cfd45eeb88ad22a2c649eb140a377a5b3c26",
-    "zh:956b62b6857cbb467b50158601f01b1203daa34cbd447dcc7f044c327e878b68",
-    "zh:9d372bac0d4479868b34485fb4966ba7bb525938f818b6a625f4977004ea83f9",
-    "zh:e06658a51427f9f53dbdb06263406fc1bc56d1a4fb5e7eb660d7cdfc22f596bd",
-    "zh:eee38dadf672b946419af25160eae7c03fc2afbb14f39f2f1d2a7404d647e2f7",
-  ]
-}

.terraform/providers/registry.terraform.io/kreuzwerker/docker/3.9.0/windows_386/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,870 +0,0 @@
-
-<a name="v3.9.0"></a>
-## [v3.9.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v3.8.0...v3.9.0) (2025-11-09)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Add file requested by hashicorp ([#813](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/813))
-* Prepare release v3.8.0 ([#806](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/806))
-
-### Feat
-
-* Implement caching of docker provider ([#808](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/808))
-
-### Fix
-
-* test attribute of docker_service healthcheck is not required ([#815](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/815))
-* docker_service label can be updated without recreate ([#814](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/814))
-
-
-<a name="v3.8.0"></a>
-## [v3.8.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v3.7.0...v3.8.0) (2025-10-08)
-
-### Feat
-
-* Add build attribute for docker_registry_image ([#805](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/805))
-* Add build option for additional contexts ([#798](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/798))
-* implement mac_address for networks_advanced ([#794](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/794))
-* Implement docker cluster volume ([#793](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/793))
-
-
-<a name="v3.7.0"></a>
-## [v3.7.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v3.6.2...v3.7.0) (2025-08-19)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v3.7.0 ([#774](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/774))
-
-### Feat
-
-* Implement memory_reservation and network_mode enhancements ([#773](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/773))
-* Implement cache_from and cache_to for docker_image ([#772](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/772))
-
-### Fix
-
-* Correctly get and set nanoCPUs for docker_container ([#771](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/771))
-
-
-<a name="v3.6.2"></a>
-## [v3.6.2](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v3.6.1...v3.6.2) (2025-06-13)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v3.6.2 ([#750](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/750))
-
-### Feat
-
-* Allow digest in image name ([#744](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/744))
-
-### Fix
-
-* Remove wrong buildkit version assignment ([#747](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/747))
-* Reading non existant volume should recreate ([#749](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/749))
-* Typo in cgroup_parent handling ([#746](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/746))
-
-
-<a name="v3.6.1"></a>
-## [v3.6.1](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v3.6.0...v3.6.1) (2025-06-05)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v3.6.1 ([#743](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/743))
-
-### Feat
-
-* allow to set the cgroup parent for container ([#609](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/609))
-
-
-<a name="v3.6.0"></a>
-## [v3.6.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v3.5.0...v3.6.0) (2025-05-25)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v3.6.0 ([#735](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/735))
-
-### Feat
-
-* Implement correct cpu scheduler settings ([#732](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/732))
-* Add implementaion of capabilities in docker servic ([#727](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/727))
-* implement Buildx builder resource ([#724](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/724))
-
-### Fix
-
-* Implement buildx fixes for general buildkit support and platform handling ([#734](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/734))
-* Make endpoint validation less strict ([#733](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/733))
-
-
-<a name="v3.5.0"></a>
-## [v3.5.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v3.4.0...v3.5.0) (2025-05-06)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v3.5.0 ([#721](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/721))
-
-### Feat
-
-* Implement using of buildx for docker_image ([#717](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/717))
-* Support registries that return empty auth scope [#646](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/646)
-* Implement registry_image_manifests data source ([#714](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/714))
-* Implement healthcheck start interval ([#713](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/713))
-
-
-<a name="v3.4.0"></a>
-## [v3.4.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v3.3.0...v3.4.0) (2025-04-25)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v3.4.0 ([#712](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/712))
-
-### Feat
-
-* Implement volume_options subpath ([#710](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/710))
-
-### Fix
-
-* Prevent recreation of image name is intentionally set to a fixed value ([#711](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/711))
-* Improve container wait handling ([#709](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/709))
-* Use auth_config block also for registry_image delete functionality ([#708](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/708))
-
-
-<a name="v3.3.0"></a>
-## [v3.3.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v3.2.0...v3.3.0) (2025-04-19)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v3.3.0 ([#705](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/705))
-* Update terraform-plugin-sdk/v2 dependency ([#699](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/699))
-* Update docker/docker and docker/cli to newest stable ([#695](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/695))
-
-### Feat
-
-* Implement support for docker context ([#704](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/704))
-* disable_docker_daemon_check for provider ([#703](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/703))
-* Implement tag triggers for docker_tag resource ([#702](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/702))
-* Implement auth_config for docker_registry_image ([#701](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/701))
-
-### Fix
-
-* Store correctly ports from server ([#698](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/698))
-
-
-<a name="v3.2.0"></a>
-## [v3.2.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v3.1.2...v3.2.0) (2025-04-16)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v3.2.0 ([#694](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/694))
-* Upgrade golangci-lint to next major version ([#686](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/686))
-
-### Docs
-
-* Consolidated update of docs from several PRs ([#691](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/691))
-
-### Feat
-
-* Implement upload permissions in docker_container resource ([#693](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/693))
-* Implement docker_image timeouts ([#692](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/692))
-* Add support for build-secrets ([#604](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/604))
-
-### Fix
-
-* Authentication to ECR public ([#690](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/690))
-
-
-<a name="v3.1.2"></a>
-## [v3.1.2](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v3.1.1...v3.1.2) (2025-04-15)
-
-### Chore
-
-* prepare release 3.1.2 ([#688](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/688))
-
-
-<a name="v3.1.1"></a>
-## [v3.1.1](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v3.1.0...v3.1.1) (2025-04-14)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release 3.1.1 ([#687](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/687))
-
-
-<a name="v3.1.0"></a>
-## [v3.1.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v3.0.2...v3.1.0) (2025-04-14)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release 3.1.0 ([#685](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/685))
-* update Go version to 1.22 for consistency across workflows, jo… ([#613](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/613))
-
-### Feat
-
-* support setting cpu shares ([#575](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/575))
-
-### Fix
-
-* Use build_args everywhere and update documentation ([#681](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/681))
-* Compress build context before sending it to Docker ([#461](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/461))
-* Set correct default network driver and fix a test ([#677](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/677))
-
-### Typo
-
-* s/presend/present/ ([#606](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/606))
-
-
-<a name="v3.0.2"></a>
-## [v3.0.2](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v3.0.1...v3.0.2) (2023-03-17)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v3.0.2
-
-### Docs
-
-* correct spelling of "networks_advanced" ([#517](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/517))
-
-### Fix
-
-* Implement proxy support. ([#529](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/529))
-
-
-<a name="v3.0.1"></a>
-## [v3.0.1](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v3.0.0...v3.0.1) (2023-01-13)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v3.0.1
-
-### Fix
-
-* Access health of container correctly. ([#506](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/506))
-
-
-<a name="v3.0.0"></a>
-## [v3.0.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.25.0...v3.0.0) (2023-01-13)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v3.0.0
-
-### Docs
-
-* Update documentation.
-* Add migration guide and update README ([#502](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/502))
-
-### Feat
-
-* Prepare v3 release ([#503](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/503))
-
-
-<a name="v2.25.0"></a>
-## [v2.25.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.24.0...v2.25.0) (2023-01-05)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v2.25.0
-
-### Docs
-
-* Add documentation of remote hosts. ([#498](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/498))
-
-### Feat
-
-* Migrate build block to `docker_image` ([#501](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/501))
-* Add platform attribute to docker_image resource ([#500](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/500))
-* Add sysctl implementation to container of docker_service. ([#499](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/499))
-
-
-<a name="v2.24.0"></a>
-## [v2.24.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.23.1...v2.24.0) (2022-12-23)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v2.24.0
-
-### Docs
-
-* Fix generated website.
-* Update command typo ([#487](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/487))
-
-### Feat
-
-* cgroupns support ([#497](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/497))
-* Add triggers attribute to docker_registry_image ([#496](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/496))
-* Support registries with disabled auth ([#494](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/494))
-* add IPAM options block for docker networks ([#491](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/491))
-
-### Fix
-
-* Pin data source specific tag test to older tag.
-
-### Tests
-
-* Add test for parsing auth headers.
-
-
-<a name="v2.23.1"></a>
-## [v2.23.1](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.23.0...v2.23.1) (2022-11-23)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v2.23.1
-
-### Fix
-
-* Update shasum of busybox:1.35.0 tag in test.
-* Handle Auth Header Scopes ([#482](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/482))
-* Set OS_ARCH from GOHOSTOS and GOHOSTARCH ([#477](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/477))
-
-
-<a name="v2.23.0"></a>
-## [v2.23.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.22.0...v2.23.0) (2022-11-02)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v2.23.0
-
-### Feat
-
-* wait container healthy state ([#467](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/467))
-* add docker logs data source ([#471](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/471))
-
-### Fix
-
-* Update shasum of busybox:1.35.0 tag in test.
-* Update shasum of busybox:1.35.0 tag
-* Correct provider name to match the public registry ([#462](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/462))
-
-
-<a name="v2.22.0"></a>
-## [v2.22.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.21.0...v2.22.0) (2022-09-20)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v2.22.0
-
-### Feat
-
-* Configurable timeout for docker_container resource stateChangeConf ([#454](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/454))
-
-### Fix
-
-* oauth authorization support for azurecr ([#451](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/451))
-
-
-<a name="v2.21.0"></a>
-## [v2.21.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.20.3...v2.21.0) (2022-09-05)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v2.21.0
-
-### Docs
-
-* Fix docker config example.
-
-### Feat
-
-* Add image_id attribute to docker_image resource. ([#450](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/450))
-* Update used goversion to 1.18. ([#449](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/449))
-
-### Fix
-
-* Replace deprecated .latest attribute with new image_id. ([#453](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/453))
-* Remove reading part of docker_tag resource. ([#448](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/448))
-* Fix repo_digest value for DockerImageDatasource test.
-
-
-<a name="v2.20.3"></a>
-## [v2.20.3](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.20.2...v2.20.3) (2022-08-31)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v2.20.3
-
-### Fix
-
-* Docker Registry Image data source use HEAD request to query image digest ([#433](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/433))
-* Adding Support for Windows Paths in Bash ([#438](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/438))
-
-
-<a name="v2.20.2"></a>
-## [v2.20.2](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.20.1...v2.20.2) (2022-08-10)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v2.20.2
-
-### Fix
-
-* Check the operating system for determining the default Docker socket ([#427](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/427))
-
-### Reverts
-
-* fix(deps): update module github.com/golangci/golangci-lint to v1.48.0 ([#423](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/423))
-
-
-<a name="v2.20.1"></a>
-## [v2.20.1](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.20.0...v2.20.1) (2022-08-10)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v2.20.1
-* Reduce time to setup AccTests ([#430](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/430))
-
-### Docs
-
-* Improve docker network usage documentation [skip-ci]
-
-### Feat
-
-* Implement triggers attribute for docker_image. ([#425](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/425))
-
-### Fix
-
-* Add ForceTrue to docker_image name attribute. ([#421](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/421))
-
-
-<a name="v2.20.0"></a>
-## [v2.20.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.19.0...v2.20.0) (2022-07-28)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v2.20.0
-* Fix release targets in Makefile.
-
-### Feat
-
-* Implementation of `docker_tag` resource. ([#418](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/418))
-* Implement support for insecure registries ([#414](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/414))
-
-
-<a name="v2.19.0"></a>
-## [v2.19.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.18.1...v2.19.0) (2022-07-15)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v2.19.0
-
-### Feat
-
-* Add gpu flag to docker_container resource ([#405](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/405))
-
-### Fix
-
-* Enable authentication to multiple registries again. ([#400](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/400))
-* ECR authentication ([#409](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/409))
-
-
-<a name="v2.18.1"></a>
-## [v2.18.1](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.18.0...v2.18.1) (2022-07-14)
-
-### Chore
-
-* Prepare release v2.18.1
-* Automate changelog generation [skip ci]
-
-### Fix
-
-* Improve searchLocalImages error handling. ([#407](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/407))
-* Throw errors when any part of docker config file handling goes wrong. ([#406](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/406))
-* Enables having a Dockerfile outside the context ([#402](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/402))
-
-
-<a name="v2.18.0"></a>
-## [v2.18.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.17.0...v2.18.0) (2022-07-11)
-
-### Chore
-
-* prepare release v2.18.0
-
-### Feat
-
-* add runtime, stop_signal and stop_timeout properties to the docker_container resource ([#364](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/364))
-
-### Fix
-
-* Correctly handle build files and context for docker_registry_image ([#398](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/398))
-* Switch to proper go tools mechanism to fix website-* workflows. ([#399](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/399))
-* compare relative paths when excluding, fixes kreuzwerker[#280](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/280) ([#397](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/397))
-
-
-<a name="v2.17.0"></a>
-## [v2.17.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.16.0...v2.17.0) (2022-06-23)
-
-### Chore
-
-* prepare release v2.17.0
-* Exclude examples directory from renovate.
-* remove the workflow to close stale issues and pull requests ([#371](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/371))
-
-### Fix
-
-* update go package files directly on master to fix build.
-* correct authentication for ghcr.io registry([#349](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/349))
-
-
-<a name="v2.16.0"></a>
-## [v2.16.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.15.0...v2.16.0) (2022-01-24)
-
-### Chore
-
-* prepare release v2.16.0
-
-### Docs
-
-* fix service options ([#337](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/337))
-* update registry_image.md ([#321](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/321))
-* fix r/registry_image truncated docs ([#304](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/304))
-
-### Feat
-
-* add parameter for SSH options ([#335](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/335))
-
-### Fix
-
-* pass container rm flag ([#322](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/322))
-* add nil check of DriverConfig ([#315](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/315))
-* fmt of go files for go 1.17
-
-
-<a name="v2.15.0"></a>
-## [v2.15.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.14.0...v2.15.0) (2021-08-11)
-
-### Chore
-
-* prepare release v2.15.0
-* re go gets terraform-plugin-docs
-
-### Docs
-
-* corrects authentication misspell. Closes [#264](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/264)
-
-### Feat
-
-* add container storage opts ([#258](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/258))
-
-### Fix
-
-* add current timestamp for file upload to container ([#259](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/259))
-
-
-<a name="v2.14.0"></a>
-## [v2.14.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.13.0...v2.14.0) (2021-07-09)
-
-### Chore
-
-* prepare release v2.14.0
-
-### Docs
-
-* update to absolute path for registry image context ([#246](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/246))
-* update readme with logos and subsections ([#235](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/235))
-
-### Feat
-
-* support terraform v1 ([#242](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/242))
-
-### Fix
-
-* Update the URL of the docker hub registry ([#230](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/230))
-
-
-<a name="v2.13.0"></a>
-## [v2.13.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.12.2...v2.13.0) (2021-06-22)
-
-### Chore
-
-* prepare release v2.13.0
-
-### Docs
-
-* fix a few typos ([#216](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/216))
-* fix typos in docker_image example usage ([#213](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/213))
-
-
-<a name="v2.12.2"></a>
-## [v2.12.2](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.12.1...v2.12.2) (2021-05-26)
-
-### Chore
-
-* prepare release v2.12.2
-
-
-<a name="v2.12.1"></a>
-## [v2.12.1](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.12.0...v2.12.1) (2021-05-26)
-
-### Chore
-
-* update changelog for v2.12.1
-
-### Fix
-
-* add service host flattener with space split ([#205](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/205))
-* service state upgradeV2 for empty auth
-
-
-<a name="v2.12.0"></a>
-## [v2.12.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.11.0...v2.12.0) (2021-05-23)
-
-### Chore
-
-* update changelog for v2.12.0
-* ignore dist folder
-* configure actions/stale ([#157](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/157))
-* add the guide about Terraform Configuration in Bug Report ([#139](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/139))
-* bump docker dependency to v20.10.5 ([#119](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/119))
-
-### Ci
-
-* run acceptance tests with multiple Terraform versions ([#129](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/129))
-
-### Docs
-
-* update for v2.12.0
-* add releasing steps
-* format `Guide of Bug report` ([#159](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/159))
-* add an example to build an image with docker_image ([#158](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/158))
-* add a guide about writing issues to CONTRIBUTING.md ([#149](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/149))
-* fix Github repository URL in README ([#136](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/136))
-
-### Feat
-
-* support darwin arm builds and golang 1.16 ([#140](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/140))
-* migrate to terraform-sdk v2 ([#102](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/102))
-
-### Fix
-
-* rewriting tar header fields ([#198](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/198))
-* test spaces for windows ([#190](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/190))
-* replace for loops with StateChangeConf ([#182](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/182))
-* skip sign on compile action
-* assign map to rawState when it is nil to prevent panic ([#180](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/180))
-* search local images with Docker image ID ([#151](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/151))
-* set "ForceNew: true" to labelSchema ([#152](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/152))
-
-
-<a name="v2.11.0"></a>
-## [v2.11.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.10.0...v2.11.0) (2021-01-22)
-
-### Chore
-
-* update changelog for v2.11.0
-* updates changelog for v2.10.0
-
-### Docs
-
-* fix legacy configuration style ([#126](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/126))
-
-### Feat
-
-* add properties -it (tty and stdin_opn) to docker container
-
-
-<a name="v2.10.0"></a>
-## [v2.10.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.9.0...v2.10.0) (2021-01-08)
-
-### Chore
-
-* updates changelog for 2.10.0
-* ignores testing folders
-* adds separate bug and ft req templates
-
-### Ci
-
-* bumps to docker version 20.10.1
-* pins workflows to ubuntu:20.04 image
-
-### Docs
-
-* add labels to arguments of docker_service ([#105](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/105))
-* cleans readme
-* adds coc and contributing
-
-### Feat
-
-* supports Docker plugin ([#35](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/35))
-* support max replicas of Docker Service Task Spec ([#112](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/112))
-* add force_remove option to r/image ([#104](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/104))
-* add local semantic commit validation ([#99](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/99))
-* add ability to lint/check of links in documentation locally ([#98](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/98))
-
-### Fix
-
-* set "latest" to tag when tag isn't specified ([#117](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/117))
-* image label for workflows
-* remove all azure cps
-
-### Pull Requests
-
-* Merge pull request [#38](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/38) from kreuzwerker/ci-ubuntu2004-workflow
-* Merge pull request [#36](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/36) from kreuzwerker/chore-gh-issue-tpl
-
-
-<a name="v2.9.0"></a>
-## [v2.9.0](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/compare/v2.8.0...v2.9.0) (2020-12-25)
-
-### Chore
-
-* updates changelog for 2.9.0
-* update changelog 2.8.0 release date
-* introduces golangci-lint ([#32](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/32))
-* fix changelog links
-
-### Ci
-
-* add gofmt's '-s' option
-* remove unneeded make tasks
-* fix test of website
-
-### Doc
-
-* devices is a block, not a boolean
-
-### Feat
-
-* adds support for OCI manifests ([#316](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/316))
-* adds security_opts to container config. ([#308](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/308))
-* adds support for init process injection for containers. ([#300](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/300))
-
-### Fix
-
-* changing mounts requires ForceNew ([#314](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/314))
-* allow healthcheck to be computed as container can specify ([#312](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/312))
-* treat null user as a no-op ([#318](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/318))
-* workdir null behavior ([#320](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/320))
-
-### Style
-
-* format with gofumpt
-
-### Pull Requests
-
-* Merge pull request [#33](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/33) from brandonros/patch-1
-* Merge pull request [#11](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/11) from suzuki-shunsuke/format-with-gofumpt
-* Merge pull request [#26](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/26) from kreuzwerker/ci/fix-website-ci
-* Merge pull request [#8](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/8) from dubo-dubon-duponey/patch1
-
-
-<a name="v2.8.0"></a>
-## v2.8.0 (2020-11-11)
-
-### Chore
-
-* updates changelog for 2.8.0
-* removes travis.yml
-* deactivates travis
-* removes vendor dir ([#298](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/298))
-* bump go 115 ([#297](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/297))
-* documentation updates ([#286](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/286))
-* updates link syntax ([#287](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/287))
-* fix typo ([#292](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/292))
-
-### Ci
-
-* reactivats all workflows
-* fix website
-* only run website workflow
-* exports gopath manually
-* fix absolute gopath for website
-* make website check separate workflow
-* fix workflow names
-* adds website test to unit test
-* adds acc test
-* adds compile
-* adds go version and goproxy env
-* enables unit tests for master branch
-* adds unit test workflow
-* adds goreleaser and gh action
-* bumps docker and ubuntu versions ([#241](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/241))
-* removes debug option from acc tests
-* skips test which is flaky only on travis
-
-### Deps
-
-* github.com/hashicorp/terraform[@sdk](https://github.com/sdk)-v0.11-with-go-modules Updated via: go get github.com/hashicorp/terraform[@sdk](https://github.com/sdk)-v0.11-with-go-modules and go mod tidy
-* use go modules for dep mgmt run go mod tidy remove govendor from makefile and travis config set appropriate env vars for go modules
-
-### Docker
-
-* improve validation of runtime constraints
-
-### Docs
-
-* update container.html.markdown ([#278](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/278))
-* update service.html.markdown ([#281](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/281))
-* update restart_policy for service. Closes [#228](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/228)
-* adds new label structure. Closes [#214](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/214)
-* update anchors with -1 suffix ([#178](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/178))
-* Fix misspelled words
-* Fix exported attribute name in docker_registry_image
-* Fix example for docker_registry_image ([#8308](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/8308))
-* provider/docker - network settings attrs
-
-### Feat
-
-* conditionally adding port binding ([#293](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/293)).
-* adds docker Image build feature ([#283](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/283))
-* adds complete support for Docker credential helpers ([#253](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/253))
-* Expose IPv6 properties as attributes
-* allow use of source file instead of content / content_base64 ([#240](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/240))
-* supports to update docker_container ([#236](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/236))
-* support to import some docker_container's attributes ([#234](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/234))
-* adds config file content as plain string ([#232](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/232))
-* make UID, GID, & mode for secrets and configs configurable ([#231](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/231))
-* adds import for resources ([#196](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/196))
-* add container ipc mode. ([#182](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/182))
-* adds container working dir ([#181](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/181))
-
-### Fix
-
-* ignores 'remove_volumes' on container import
-* duplicated buildImage function
-* port objects with the same internal port but different protocol trigger recreation of container ([#274](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/274))
-* panic to migrate schema of docker_container from v1 to v2 ([#271](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/271)). Closes [#264](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/264)
-* pins docker registry for tests to v2.7.0
-* prevent force recreate of container about some attributes ([#269](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/269))
-* service endpoint spec flattening
-* corrects IPAM config read on the data provider ([#229](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/229))
-* replica to 0 in current schema. Closes [#221](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/221)
-* label for network and volume after improt
-* binary upload as base 64 content ([#194](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/194))
-* service env truncation for multiple delimiters ([#193](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/193))
-* destroy_grace_seconds are considered ([#179](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/179))
-
-### Make
-
-* Add website + website-test targets
-
-### Provider
-
-* Ensured Go 1.11 in TravisCI and README provider: Run go fix provider: Run go fmt provider: Encode go version 1.11.5 to .go-version file
-* Require Go 1.11 in TravisCI and README provider: Run go fix provider: Run go fmt
-
-### Tests
-
-* Skip test if swap limit isn't available ([#136](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/136))
-* Simplify Dockerfile(s)
-
-### Vendor
-
-* github.com/hashicorp/terraform/...[@v0](https://github.com/v0).10.0
-* Ignore github.com/hashicorp/terraform/backend
-
-### Website
-
-* Docs sweep for lists & maps
-* note on docker
-* docker docs
-
-### Pull Requests
-
-* Merge pull request [#134](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/134) from terraform-providers/go-modules-2019-03-01
-* Merge pull request [#135](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/135) from terraform-providers/t-simplify-dockerfile
-* Merge pull request [#47](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/47) from captn3m0/docker-link-warning
-* Merge pull request [#60](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/60) from terraform-providers/f-make-website
-* Merge pull request [#23](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/23) from JamesLaverack/patch-1
-* Merge pull request [#18](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/18) from terraform-providers/vendor-tf-0.10
-* Merge pull request [#5046](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/5046) from tpounds/use-built-in-schema-string-hash
-* Merge pull request [#3761](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/3761) from ryane/f-provider-docker-improvements
-* Merge pull request [#3383](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/3383) from apparentlymart/docker-container-command-docs
-* Merge pull request [#1564](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/issues/1564) from nickryand/docker_links
-

.terraform/providers/registry.terraform.io/kreuzwerker/docker/3.9.0/windows_386/LICENSE

@@ -1,373 +0,0 @@
-Mozilla Public License Version 2.0
-==================================
-
-1. Definitions
---------------
-
-1.1. "Contributor"
-    means each individual or legal entity that creates, contributes to
-    the creation of, or owns Covered Software.
-
-1.2. "Contributor Version"
-    means the combination of the Contributions of others (if any) used
-    by a Contributor and that particular Contributor's Contribution.
-
-1.3. "Contribution"
-    means Covered Software of a particular Contributor.
-
-1.4. "Covered Software"
-    means Source Code Form to which the initial Contributor has attached
-    the notice in Exhibit A, the Executable Form of such Source Code
-    Form, and Modifications of such Source Code Form, in each case
-    including portions thereof.
-
-1.5. "Incompatible With Secondary Licenses"
-    means
-
-    (a) that the initial Contributor has attached the notice described
-        in Exhibit B to the Covered Software; or
-
-    (b) that the Covered Software was made available under the terms of
-        version 1.1 or earlier of the License, but not also under the
-        terms of a Secondary License.
-
-1.6. "Executable Form"
-    means any form of the work other than Source Code Form.
-
-1.7. "Larger Work"
-    means a work that combines Covered Software with other material, in
-    a separate file or files, that is not Covered Software.
-
-1.8. "License"
-    means this document.
-
-1.9. "Licensable"
-    means having the right to grant, to the maximum extent possible,
-    whether at the time of the initial grant or subsequently, any and
-    all of the rights conveyed by this License.
-
-1.10. "Modifications"
-    means any of the following:
-
-    (a) any file in Source Code Form that results from an addition to,
-        deletion from, or modification of the contents of Covered
-        Software; or
-
-    (b) any new file in Source Code Form that contains any Covered
-        Software.
-
-1.11. "Patent Claims" of a Contributor
-    means any patent claim(s), including without limitation, method,
-    process, and apparatus claims, in any patent Licensable by such
-    Contributor that would be infringed, but for the grant of the
-    License, by the making, using, selling, offering for sale, having
-    made, import, or transfer of either its Contributions or its
-    Contributor Version.
-
-1.12. "Secondary License"
-    means either the GNU General Public License, Version 2.0, the GNU
-    Lesser General Public License, Version 2.1, the GNU Affero General
-    Public License, Version 3.0, or any later versions of those
-    licenses.
-
-1.13. "Source Code Form"
-    means the form of the work preferred for making modifications.
-
-1.14. "You" (or "Your")
-    means an individual or a legal entity exercising rights under this
-    License. For legal entities, "You" includes any entity that
-    controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with You. For
-    purposes of this definition, "control" means (a) the power, direct
-    or indirect, to cause the direction or management of such entity,
-    whether by contract or otherwise, or (b) ownership of more than
-    fifty percent (50%) of the outstanding shares or beneficial
-    ownership of such entity.
-
-2. License Grants and Conditions
---------------------------------
-
-2.1. Grants
-
-Each Contributor hereby grants You a world-wide, royalty-free,
-non-exclusive license:
-
-(a) under intellectual property rights (other than patent or trademark)
-    Licensable by such Contributor to use, reproduce, make available,
-    modify, display, perform, distribute, and otherwise exploit its
-    Contributions, either on an unmodified basis, with Modifications, or
-    as part of a Larger Work; and
-
-(b) under Patent Claims of such Contributor to make, use, sell, offer
-    for sale, have made, import, and otherwise transfer either its
-    Contributions or its Contributor Version.
-
-2.2. Effective Date
-
-The licenses granted in Section 2.1 with respect to any Contribution
-become effective for each Contribution on the date the Contributor first
-distributes such Contribution.
-
-2.3. Limitations on Grant Scope
-
-The licenses granted in this Section 2 are the only rights granted under
-this License. No additional rights or licenses will be implied from the
-distribution or licensing of Covered Software under this License.
-Notwithstanding Section 2.1(b) above, no patent license is granted by a
-Contributor:
-
-(a) for any code that a Contributor has removed from Covered Software;
-    or
-
-(b) for infringements caused by: (i) Your and any other third party's
-    modifications of Covered Software, or (ii) the combination of its
-    Contributions with other software (except as part of its Contributor
-    Version); or
-
-(c) under Patent Claims infringed by Covered Software in the absence of
-    its Contributions.
-
-This License does not grant any rights in the trademarks, service marks,
-or logos of any Contributor (except as may be necessary to comply with
-the notice requirements in Section 3.4).
-
-2.4. Subsequent Licenses
-
-No Contributor makes additional grants as a result of Your choice to
-distribute the Covered Software under a subsequent version of this
-License (see Section 10.2) or under the terms of a Secondary License (if
-permitted under the terms of Section 3.3).
-
-2.5. Representation
-
-Each Contributor represents that the Contributor believes its
-Contributions are its original creation(s) or it has sufficient rights
-to grant the rights to its Contributions conveyed by this License.
-
-2.6. Fair Use
-
-This License is not intended to limit any rights You have under
-applicable copyright doctrines of fair use, fair dealing, or other
-equivalents.
-
-2.7. Conditions
-
-Sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 are conditions of the licenses granted
-in Section 2.1.
-
-3. Responsibilities
--------------------
-
-3.1. Distribution of Source Form
-
-All distribution of Covered Software in Source Code Form, including any
-Modifications that You create or to which You contribute, must be under
-the terms of this License. You must inform recipients that the Source
-Code Form of the Covered Software is governed by the terms of this
-License, and how they can obtain a copy of this License. You may not
-attempt to alter or restrict the recipients' rights in the Source Code
-Form.
-
-3.2. Distribution of Executable Form
-
-If You distribute Covered Software in Executable Form then:
-
-(a) such Covered Software must also be made available in Source Code
-    Form, as described in Section 3.1, and You must inform recipients of
-    the Executable Form how they can obtain a copy of such Source Code
-    Form by reasonable means in a timely manner, at a charge no more
-    than the cost of distribution to the recipient; and
-
-(b) You may distribute such Executable Form under the terms of this
-    License, or sublicense it under different terms, provided that the
-    license for the Executable Form does not attempt to limit or alter
-    the recipients' rights in the Source Code Form under this License.
-
-3.3. Distribution of a Larger Work
-
-You may create and distribute a Larger Work under terms of Your choice,
-provided that You also comply with the requirements of this License for
-the Covered Software. If the Larger Work is a combination of Covered
-Software with a work governed by one or more Secondary Licenses, and the
-Covered Software is not Incompatible With Secondary Licenses, this
-License permits You to additionally distribute such Covered Software
-under the terms of such Secondary License(s), so that the recipient of
-the Larger Work may, at their option, further distribute the Covered
-Software under the terms of either this License or such Secondary
-License(s).
-
-3.4. Notices
-
-You may not remove or alter the substance of any license notices
-(including copyright notices, patent notices, disclaimers of warranty,
-or limitations of liability) contained within the Source Code Form of
-the Covered Software, except that You may alter any license notices to
-the extent required to remedy known factual inaccuracies.
-
-3.5. Application of Additional Terms
-
-You may choose to offer, and to charge a fee for, warranty, support,
-indemnity or liability obligations to one or more recipients of Covered
-Software. However, You may do so only on Your own behalf, and not on
-behalf of any Contributor. You must make it absolutely clear that any
-such warranty, support, indemnity, or liability obligation is offered by
-You alone, and You hereby agree to indemnify every Contributor for any
-liability incurred by such Contributor as a result of warranty, support,
-indemnity or liability terms You offer. You may include additional
-disclaimers of warranty and limitations of liability specific to any
-jurisdiction.
-
-4. Inability to Comply Due to Statute or Regulation
----------------------------------------------------
-
-If it is impossible for You to comply with any of the terms of this
-License with respect to some or all of the Covered Software due to
-statute, judicial order, or regulation then You must: (a) comply with
-the terms of this License to the maximum extent possible; and (b)
-describe the limitations and the code they affect. Such description must
-be placed in a text file included with all distributions of the Covered
-Software under this License. Except to the extent prohibited by statute
-or regulation, such description must be sufficiently detailed for a
-recipient of ordinary skill to be able to understand it.
-
-5. Termination
---------------
-
-5.1. The rights granted under this License will terminate automatically
-if You fail to comply with any of its terms. However, if You become
-compliant, then the rights granted under this License from a particular
-Contributor are reinstated (a) provisionally, unless and until such
-Contributor explicitly and finally terminates Your grants, and (b) on an
-ongoing basis, if such Contributor fails to notify You of the
-non-compliance by some reasonable means prior to 60 days after You have
-come back into compliance. Moreover, Your grants from a particular
-Contributor are reinstated on an ongoing basis if such Contributor
-notifies You of the non-compliance by some reasonable means, this is the
-first time You have received notice of non-compliance with this License
-from such Contributor, and You become compliant prior to 30 days after
-Your receipt of the notice.
-
-5.2. If You initiate litigation against any entity by asserting a patent
-infringement claim (excluding declaratory judgment actions,
-counter-claims, and cross-claims) alleging that a Contributor Version
-directly or indirectly infringes any patent, then the rights granted to
-You by any and all Contributors for the Covered Software under Section
-2.1 of this License shall terminate.
-
-5.3. In the event of termination under Sections 5.1 or 5.2 above, all
-end user license agreements (excluding distributors and resellers) which
-have been validly granted by You or Your distributors under this License
-prior to termination shall survive termination.
-
-************************************************************************
-*                                                                      *
-*  6. Disclaimer of Warranty                                           *
-*  -------------------------                                           *
-*                                                                      *
-*  Covered Software is provided under this License on an "as is"       *
-*  basis, without warranty of any kind, either expressed, implied, or  *
-*  statutory, including, without limitation, warranties that the       *
-*  Covered Software is free of defects, merchantable, fit for a        *
-*  particular purpose or non-infringing. The entire risk as to the     *
-*  quality and performance of the Covered Software is with You.        *
-*  Should any Covered Software prove defective in any respect, You     *
-*  (not any Contributor) assume the cost of any necessary servicing,   *
-*  repair, or correction. This disclaimer of warranty constitutes an   *
-*  essential part of this License. No use of any Covered Software is   *
-*  authorized under this License except under this disclaimer.         *
-*                                                                      *
-************************************************************************
-
-************************************************************************
-*                                                                      *
-*  7. Limitation of Liability                                          *
-*  --------------------------                                          *
-*                                                                      *
-*  Under no circumstances and under no legal theory, whether tort      *
-*  (including negligence), contract, or otherwise, shall any           *
-*  Contributor, or anyone who distributes Covered Software as          *
-*  permitted above, be liable to You for any direct, indirect,         *
-*  special, incidental, or consequential damages of any character      *
-*  including, without limitation, damages for lost profits, loss of    *
-*  goodwill, work stoppage, computer failure or malfunction, or any    *
-*  and all other commercial damages or losses, even if such party      *
-*  shall have been informed of the possibility of such damages. This   *
-*  limitation of liability shall not apply to liability for death or   *
-*  personal injury resulting from such party's negligence to the       *
-*  extent applicable law prohibits such limitation. Some               *
-*  jurisdictions do not allow the exclusion or limitation of           *
-*  incidental or consequential damages, so this exclusion and          *
-*  limitation may not apply to You.                                    *
-*                                                                      *
-************************************************************************
-
-8. Litigation
--------------
-
-Any litigation relating to this License may be brought only in the
-courts of a jurisdiction where the defendant maintains its principal
-place of business and such litigation shall be governed by laws of that
-jurisdiction, without reference to its conflict-of-law provisions.
-Nothing in this Section shall prevent a party's ability to bring
-cross-claims or counter-claims.
-
-9. Miscellaneous
-----------------
-
-This License represents the complete agreement concerning the subject
-matter hereof. If any provision of this License is held to be
-unenforceable, such provision shall be reformed only to the extent
-necessary to make it enforceable. Any law or regulation which provides
-that the language of a contract shall be construed against the drafter
-shall not be used to construe this License against a Contributor.
-
-10. Versions of the License
----------------------------
-
-10.1. New Versions
-
-Mozilla Foundation is the license steward. Except as provided in Section
-10.3, no one other than the license steward has the right to modify or
-publish new versions of this License. Each version will be given a
-distinguishing version number.
-
-10.2. Effect of New Versions
-
-You may distribute the Covered Software under the terms of the version
-of the License under which You originally received the Covered Software,
-or under the terms of any subsequent version published by the license
-steward.
-
-10.3. Modified Versions
-
-If you create software not governed by this License, and you want to
-create a new license for such software, you may create and use a
-modified version of this License if you rename the license and remove
-any references to the name of the license steward (except to note that
-such modified license differs from this License).
-
-10.4. Distributing Source Code Form that is Incompatible With Secondary
-Licenses
-
-If You choose to distribute Source Code Form that is Incompatible With
-Secondary Licenses under the terms of this version of the License, the
-notice described in Exhibit B of this License must be attached.
-
-Exhibit A - Source Code Form License Notice
--------------------------------------------
-
-  This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-  License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-  file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-
-If it is not possible or desirable to put the notice in a particular
-file, then You may include the notice in a location (such as a LICENSE
-file in a relevant directory) where a recipient would be likely to look
-for such a notice.
-
-You may add additional accurate notices of copyright ownership.
-
-Exhibit B - "Incompatible With Secondary Licenses" Notice
----------------------------------------------------------
-
-  This Source Code Form is "Incompatible With Secondary Licenses", as
-  defined by the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0.

.terraform/providers/registry.terraform.io/kreuzwerker/docker/3.9.0/windows_386/README.md

@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-<a href="https://docker.com">
-    <img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/master/assets/docker-logo.png" alt="Docker logo" title="Docker" align="right" height="100" />
-</a>
-<a href="https://terraform.io">
-    <img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/master/assets/terraform-logo.png" alt="Terraform logo" title="Terraform" align="right" height="100" />
-</a>
-<a href="https://kreuzwerker.de">
-    <img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/master/assets/xw-logo.png" alt="Kreuzwerker logo" title="Kreuzwerker" align="right" height="100" />
-</a>
-
-# Terraform Provider for Docker
-
-[![Release](https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker)](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/releases)
-[![Installs](https://img.shields.io/badge/dynamic/json?logo=terraform&label=installs&query=$.data.attributes.downloads&url=https%3A%2F%2Fregistry.terraform.io%2Fv2%2Fproviders%2F713)](https://registry.terraform.io/providers/kreuzwerker/docker)
-[![Registry](https://img.shields.io/badge/registry-doc%40latest-lightgrey?logo=terraform)](https://registry.terraform.io/providers/kreuzwerker/docker/latest/docs)
-[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue.svg)](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/blob/main/LICENSE)  
-[![Go Status](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/workflows/Acc%20Tests/badge.svg)](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/actions)
-[![Lint Status](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/workflows/golangci-lint/badge.svg)](https://github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker/actions)
-[![Go Report Card](https://goreportcard.com/badge/github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker)](https://goreportcard.com/report/github.com/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker)  
-
-## Documentation
-
-The documentation for the provider is available on the [Terraform Registry](https://registry.terraform.io/providers/kreuzwerker/docker/latest/docs).
-
-Do you want to migrate from `v2.x` to `v3.x`? Please read the [migration guide](docs/v2_v3_migration.md)
-
-## Example usage
-
-Take a look at the examples in the [documentation](https://registry.terraform.io/providers/kreuzwerker/docker/3.9.0/docs) of the registry
-or use the following example:
-
-
-```hcl
-# Set the required provider and versions
-terraform {
-  required_providers {
-    # We recommend pinning to the specific version of the Docker Provider you're using
-    # since new versions are released frequently
-    docker = {
-      source  = "kreuzwerker/docker"
-      version = "3.9.0"
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-# Configure the docker provider
-provider "docker" {
-}
-
-# Create a docker image resource
-# -> docker pull nginx:latest
-resource "docker_image" "nginx" {
-  name         = "nginx:latest"
-  keep_locally = true
-}
-
-# Create a docker container resource
-# -> same as 'docker run --name nginx -p8080:80 -d nginx:latest'
-resource "docker_container" "nginx" {
-  name    = "nginx"
-  image   = docker_image.nginx.image_id
-
-  ports {
-    external = 8080
-    internal = 80
-  }
-}
-
-# Or create a service resource
-# -> same as 'docker service create -d -p 8081:80 --name nginx-service --replicas 2 nginx:latest'
-resource "docker_service" "nginx_service" {
-  name = "nginx-service"
-  task_spec {
-    container_spec {
-      image = docker_image.nginx.repo_digest
-    }
-  }
-
-  mode {
-    replicated {
-      replicas = 2
-    }
-  }
-
-  endpoint_spec {
-    ports {
-      published_port = 8081
-      target_port    = 80
-    }
-  }
-}
-```
-
-## Building The Provider
-
-[Go](https://golang.org/doc/install) 1.18.x (to build the provider plugin)
-
-
-```sh
-$ git clone git@github.com:kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker
-$ make build
-```
-
-## Contributing
-
-The Terraform Docker Provider is the work of many of contributors. We appreciate your help!
-
-To contribute, please read the contribution guidelines: [Contributing to Terraform - Docker Provider](CONTRIBUTING.md)
-
-## License
-
-The Terraform Provider Docker is available to everyone under the terms of the Mozilla Public License Version 2.0. [Take a look the LICENSE file](LICENSE).
-
-
-## Stargazers over time
-
-[![Stargazers over time](https://starchart.cc/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker.svg)](https://starchart.cc/kreuzwerker/terraform-provider-docker)

Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+BACKEND := apps/backend
+FRONTEND := apps/frontend
+
+.DEFAULT_GOAL := help
+.PHONY: help install install-backend install-frontend dev dev-backend dev-frontend \
+        lint format typecheck test test-cov test-integration check \
+        openapi docker-build db-up db-down db-reset db-logs db-psql migrate bootstrap-admin
+
+help: ## Liste les cibles disponibles
+	@grep -E '^[a-zA-Z_-]+:.*?## .*$$' $(MAKEFILE_LIST) | awk 'BEGIN {FS = ":.*?## "}; {printf "  \033[36m%-16s\033[0m %s\n", $$1, $$2}'
+
+install: install-backend install-frontend ## Installe les dépendances backend et frontend
+
+install-backend: ## Installe les dépendances du backend
+	cd $(BACKEND) && uv sync --all-groups
+
+install-frontend: ## Installe les dépendances du frontend
+	cd $(FRONTEND) && npm ci
+
+dev: ## Lance toute la stack (backend + frontend) en rechargement à chaud
+	@trap 'kill 0' EXIT INT TERM; \
+	$(MAKE) --no-print-directory dev-backend & \
+	$(MAKE) --no-print-directory dev-frontend & \
+	wait
+
+dev-backend: ## Lance l'API seule en rechargement à chaud
+	@echo "backend  -> http://localhost:8000 (docs sur /docs)"
+	cd $(BACKEND) && uv run uvicorn app.main:create_app --factory --reload --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000
+
+dev-frontend: ## Lance le frontend seul en rechargement à chaud
+	@echo "frontend -> http://localhost:4200"
+	cd $(FRONTEND) && npm start
+
+lint: ## Analyse statique du backend
+	cd $(BACKEND) && uv run ruff check .
+
+format: ## Formate et corrige le backend
+	cd $(BACKEND) && uv run ruff format . && uv run ruff check --fix .
+
+typecheck: ## Vérifie le typage du backend
+	cd $(BACKEND) && uv run mypy app
+
+test: ## Exécute les tests backend ne demandant pas de base
+	cd $(BACKEND) && uv run pytest --cov-fail-under=85
+
+test-cov: ## Rapports de couverture HTML et XML, plus les résultats au format JUnit
+	cd $(BACKEND) && uv run pytest --cov-fail-under=85 --cov-report=html \
+		--cov-report=xml --junitxml=test-results/junit.xml
+
+test-integration: ## Exécute les tests exigeant une base joignable
+	cd $(BACKEND) && uv run pytest -m integration
+
+check: lint typecheck test ## Chaîne de vérification complète
+
+openapi: ## Régénère apps/backend/openapi.json depuis les routes déclarées
+	cd $(BACKEND) && uv run python -m app.cli export-openapi
+
+docker-build: ## Construit l'image du backend
+	docker build -t enervision-backend:local $(BACKEND)
+
+db-up: ## Démarre la base PostgreSQL TimescaleDB
+	docker compose up -d db
+
+db-down: ## Arrête la base en conservant ses données
+	docker compose stop db
+
+db-reset: ## Détruit la base et rejoue db/init
+	docker compose down -v && docker compose up -d db
+
+db-logs: ## Suit les journaux de la base
+	docker compose logs -f db
+
+db-psql: ## Ouvre une session psql sur la base applicative
+	docker compose exec db psql -U $${POSTGRES_USER:-enervision} -d $${POSTGRES_DB:-enervision}
+
+migrate: ## Applique les migrations Alembic
+	cd $(BACKEND) && uv run alembic upgrade head
+
+bootstrap-admin: ## Crée le premier administrateur, mot de passe saisi au clavier
+	cd $(BACKEND) && uv run python -m app.cli create-admin --email $${EMAIL:?EMAIL=... requis}

README.md

@@ -1 +1,104 @@
-# ProjetPiscine_EnerVision
+# EnerVision
+
+Monorepo de la plateforme EnerVision : collecte, stockage, analyse et restitution de
+series temporelles energetiques, deployee sur une machine on-premise.
+
+## Jalons
+
+| Jalon | Intitulé |
+|-------|----------------------------------------------------------|
+| J1    | Valider la préparation de l'environnement et du repo     |
+| J2    | Valider le périmètre retenu et les choix technologiques  |
+| J3    | Valider l'architecture et la gestion de la sécurité      |
+| J4    | Valider la robustesse et assurer les livrables           |
+
+Ce que la documentation apporte à chacun : [docs/architecture/00-vue-ensemble.md](docs/architecture/00-vue-ensemble.md).
+
+## Stack cible
+
+| Domaine    | Technologie                         | Emplacement         | Etat          |
+|------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|
+| Backend    | FastAPI, Python 3.14                | `apps/backend`      | Initialise    |
+| Frontend   | Angular 22, Node 24 LTS             | `apps/frontend`     | Tableau de bord |
+| Base       | PostgreSQL 17 + TimescaleDB         | `db`                | Initialise    |
+| ETL        | Apache Airflow                      | `etl/airflow`       | A initialiser |
+| Infra      | Terraform (k3s single-node)         | `infra/terraform`   | Initialise    |
+| CI/CD      | GitHub Actions                      | `.github/workflows` | Backend en place |
+| Monitoring | Prometheus, Grafana, Alertmanager   | `monitoring`        | A initialiser |
+
+Le backend, la base et l'infrastructure (Terraform/k3s) sont initialises a ce stade. Le frontend
+sert un tableau de bord sur `/dashboard`, dont les données proviennent de fixtures : les endpoints
+correspondants restent à écrire côté API. Les autres dossiers portent l'arborescence et un README
+de cadrage, leur contenu fait l'objet d'un ticket dedie.
+
+L'etat detaille de chaque brique et les vues d'architecture sont dans
+[docs/architecture](docs/architecture/README.md).
+
+## Arborescence
+
+```
+.
+├── apps/
+│   ├── backend/        API FastAPI
+│   └── frontend/       Application Angular
+├── db/
+│   ├── init/           Bootstrap PostgreSQL + TimescaleDB
+│   ├── migrations/     Migrations SQL versionnees
+│   └── seeds/          Jeux de donnees de reference
+├── etl/airflow/
+│   ├── dags/           DAGs d'ingestion et d'agregation
+│   ├── plugins/        Operateurs et hooks maison
+│   ├── include/        Requetes SQL et ressources des DAGs
+│   └── tests/          Tests d'integrite des DAGs
+├── infra/terraform/
+│   ├── modules/        Modules reutilisables
+│   └── environments/   Racines Terraform, une par environnement
+├── monitoring/
+│   ├── prometheus/     Collecte et regles d'alerte
+│   ├── grafana/        Provisioning et dashboards
+│   └── alertmanager/   Routage des alertes
+├── docs/               ADR et vues d'architecture
+└── scripts/            Outillage local
+```
+
+## Demarrage
+
+Prerequis : uv, Docker, Node 24 LTS (npm fourni). Le poste doit disposer de Python 3.14, que
+`uv` installe seul.
+
+```bash
+cp .env.example .env                               # variables de docker-compose
+cp apps/backend/.env.example apps/backend/.env     # variables du backend hors conteneur
+
+make db-up     # PostgreSQL + TimescaleDB, publie sur le port 5433
+make install   # dependances du backend et du frontend
+make migrate   # applique les migrations Alembic
+make dev       # backend sur http://localhost:8000 (docs sur /docs), frontend sur http://localhost:4200
+make check     # lint + typage + tests
+```
+
+`make help` liste les cibles disponibles.
+
+Deux fichiers d'environnement, deux usages : `.env` a la racine alimente `docker-compose.yml`,
+`apps/backend/.env` alimente le backend lance sur le poste. Le port 5433 est publie plutot que
+5432, souvent deja pris par une autre base.
+
+La boucle de developpement est `make db-up` puis `make dev` : seule la base tourne en
+conteneur, le backend et le frontend tournent tous les deux sur le poste, lances ensemble par
+`make dev` (logs entrelaces dans le meme terminal, Ctrl+C arrete les deux). `make dev-backend`
+et `make dev-frontend` restent disponibles pour lancer un seul des deux. Le service `backend`
+du `docker-compose.yml` sert la stack complete et la recette, et n'embarque pas le source, donc
+toute modification y demande un `docker compose up -d --build backend`.
+
+Verifier que la base repond et que l'extension est chargee :
+
+```bash
+curl -s localhost:8000/api/v1/health/ready
+```
+
+## Conventions
+
+- Branches : `feat/`, `fix/`, `chore/`, `docs/`, `test/` suivi d'un libelle court.
+- Commits : Conventional Commits, portee = dossier de premier niveau concerne.
+- Toute decision structurante donne lieu a un ADR dans `docs/adr`.
+- Toute PR qui change un composant met a jour sa vue dans `docs/architecture`, dans la meme PR.

apps/backend/.dockerignore

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+.venv/
+__pycache__/
+*.py[cod]
+.pytest_cache/
+.mypy_cache/
+.ruff_cache/
+.coverage
+coverage.xml
+htmlcov/
+.env
+.env.*
+!.env.example
+tests/
+Dockerfile
+.dockerignore
+README.md

apps/backend/.env.example

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+APP_ENV=local
+APP_DEBUG=false
+APP_LOG_LEVEL=INFO
+
+# L'API refuse de démarrer tant que cette valeur reste un exemple ou fait moins de
+# 32 caractères. Générer la vôtre : python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(48))"
+APP_SECRET_KEY=change_me
+
+APP_CORS_ORIGINS=http://localhost:4200
+DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://enervision:change_me@localhost:5433/enervision

apps/backend/.python-version

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+3.14

apps/backend/Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+FROM python:3.14-slim AS builder
+
+COPY --from=ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.11.26 /uv /uvx /bin/
+
+ENV UV_COMPILE_BYTECODE=1 \
+    UV_LINK_MODE=copy \
+    UV_PYTHON_DOWNLOADS=never
+
+WORKDIR /app
+
+RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/uv \
+    --mount=type=bind,source=uv.lock,target=uv.lock \
+    --mount=type=bind,source=pyproject.toml,target=pyproject.toml \
+    uv sync --locked --no-install-project --no-dev
+
+COPY . /app
+
+RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/uv \
+    uv sync --locked --no-dev
+
+
+FROM python:3.14-slim AS runtime
+
+RUN groupadd --system --gid 1001 app \
+    && useradd --system --uid 1001 --gid app --create-home app
+
+ENV PATH="/app/.venv/bin:${PATH}" \
+    PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 \
+    PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
+
+WORKDIR /app
+
+COPY --from=builder --chown=app:app /app /app
+
+USER app
+
+EXPOSE 8000
+
+HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=15s --retries=3 \
+    CMD python -c "import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/v1/health/live')"
+
+CMD ["uvicorn", "app.main:create_app", "--factory", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8000"]

apps/backend/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+# Backend EnerVision
+
+API FastAPI exposant les series temporelles energetiques.
+
+| Element     | Choix                                      |
+|-------------|--------------------------------------------|
+| Python      | 3.14                                       |
+| Gestionnaire| uv (`uv.lock` fait foi)                    |
+| Framework   | FastAPI + Uvicorn                          |
+| Persistance | SQLAlchemy 2 async + asyncpg + Alembic     |
+| Lint/format | ruff                                       |
+| Typage      | mypy en mode strict                        |
+| Tests       | pytest + pytest-asyncio + httpx            |
+
+## Installation
+
+```bash
+cp .env.example .env
+uv sync --all-groups
+```
+
+`APP_SECRET_KEY` et `DATABASE_URL` n'ont pas de valeur par defaut : l'application refuse
+de demarrer sans elles.
+
+`DATABASE_URL` pointe sur `localhost:5433`, le port publie par le service `db` du
+`docker-compose.yml` racine. Demarrer la base depuis la racine avec `make db-up`.
+
+## Commandes
+
+Depuis la racine du monorepo, via le `Makefile` : `make install`, `make dev`, `make lint`,
+`make format`, `make typecheck`, `make test`, `make check`, `make openapi`, `make docker-build`.
+
+Directement depuis ce dossier :
+
+```bash
+uv run uvicorn app.main:create_app --factory --reload --port 8000
+uv run ruff check .          # lint
+uv run ruff format .         # format
+uv run mypy app              # typage strict
+uv run pytest                # tests + couverture
+uv run pytest -m integration # tests exigeant une base joignable
+uv run python -m app.cli export-openapi   # régénère openapi.json
+```
+
+`openapi.json` est versionné : `tests/api/test_openapi.py` échoue si le fichier ne correspond
+plus aux routes déclarées. Toute PR qui change une route le régénère dans le même commit.
+
+Les conventions de tests, les gabarits et le detail des marqueurs sont dans
+[`TESTING.md`](TESTING.md).
+
+`pytest` ecarte par defaut les tests marques `integration`, pour que `make check` reste
+jouable sans Docker. Ces tests visent la base `enervision_test`, creee par
+`db/init/110-test-database.sql` au premier demarrage du conteneur.
+
+L'application est exposee par une factory (`create_app`) et non par un objet module :
+aucune configuration n'est lue a l'import, ce qui rend les tests et les migrations
+independants de l'environnement.
+
+## Structure
+
+```
+app/
+├── api/
+│   ├── deps.py          Dépendances partagées : session, settings, principal, gardes de rôle
+│   ├── errors.py        Gestionnaires 422 et 500
+│   ├── middleware.py    En-têtes de sécurité
+│   ├── security.py      Garde du point /metrics
+│   └── v1/
+│       ├── router.py    Agrégation des routes de la version 1
+│       └── endpoints/   Un module par ressource exposée
+├── core/
+│   ├── config.py        Settings Pydantic, source unique de configuration
+│   ├── cookies.py       Attributs du cookie de rafraîchissement
+│   ├── hashing.py       Argon2id, poussé dans un fil sous limiteur
+│   ├── logging.py       Journalisation console en local, JSON en production
+│   ├── principal.py     L'identité que voit le code métier
+│   ├── roles.py         Rôles ordonnés
+│   └── security.py      Encodage et décodage des jetons d'accès
+├── db/
+│   ├── base.py          Base declarative SQLAlchemy
+│   └── session.py       Engine et sessions asynchrones
+├── models/              Modeles SQLAlchemy
+├── schemas/             Modeles Pydantic d'entree et de sortie
+├── repositories/        Acces aux donnees, une classe par agregat
+├── services/            Regles metier, orchestrent les repositories
+├── cli.py               Commandes hors HTTP, dont l'amorcage du premier admin
+└── main.py              Factory applicative
+tests/                   Miroir de app/
+alembic/                 Migrations du schema applicatif
+```
+
+Le sens de dependance est unique : `endpoints` vers `services` vers `repositories` vers
+`models`. Un endpoint ne touche jamais une session directement.
+
+## Routes
+
+| Route | Rôle | Accès |
+|---|---|---|
+| `/api/v1/health/live` | Sonde de vivacité, aucune dépendance externe | public |
+| `/api/v1/health/ready` | Sonde de disponibilité, vérifie la base et TimescaleDB | public |
+| `/api/v1/auth/login` | Ouvre une session | public |
+| `/api/v1/auth/refresh` | Fait tourner la session | cookie |
+| `/api/v1/auth/logout` | Ferme la session courante | cookie, idempotente |
+| `/api/v1/auth/logout-all` | Ferme toutes les sessions du compte | jeton |
+| `/api/v1/auth/password` | Change son propre mot de passe | jeton |
+| `/api/v1/auth/me` | Décrit le compte connecté | jeton |
+| `/api/v1/users` | Liste et crée des comptes | `admin` |
+| `/api/v1/users/{id}` | Change le rôle ou l'activation | `admin` |
+| `/api/v1/users/{id}/password-reset` | Réinitialise et ferme les sessions | `admin` |
+| `/api/v1/sites` | Liste les sites | `lecteur` |
+| `/api/v1/sites/{site_id}` | Décrit un site | `lecteur` |
+| `/api/v1/recommendations` | Liste les recommandations | `lecteur` |
+| `/api/v1/recommendations/{recommendation_id}` | Décrit une recommandation | `lecteur` |
+| `/metrics` | Métriques au format Prometheus | jeton si `APP_METRICS_TOKEN` |
+| `/docs`, `/openapi.json` | Documentation, fermée en `staging` et `prod` | public sinon |
+
+Le contrat détaillé pour le frontend est dans
+[`docs/architecture/31-contrat-authentification.md`](../../docs/architecture/31-contrat-authentification.md).
+
+## Premier administrateur
+
+Aucun compte n'existe après les migrations. Il s'en crée un en ligne de commande :
+
+```bash
+make bootstrap-admin EMAIL=prenom.nom@enervision.fr   # mot de passe saisi au clavier
+# ou, depuis apps/backend :
+uv run python -m app.cli create-admin --email prenom.nom@enervision.fr --generate
+```
+
+Le compte est créé avec `must_change_password`, donc la première connexion ne donne accès qu'à
+`/auth/me` et `/auth/password` jusqu'au changement. Le mot de passe ne transite jamais par
+`argv`, visible de tout `ps`, et aucune révision Alembic n'insère de compte : son empreinte
+resterait dans Git pour toujours.
+
+## Migrations
+
+```bash
+uv run alembic revision --autogenerate -m "libelle"
+uv run alembic upgrade head
+```
+
+L'URL de connexion vient de `DATABASE_URL`, pas de `alembic.ini`.
+
+La premiere revision ne cree aucune table : elle refuse de s'appliquer si l'extension
+TimescaleDB manque, ce qui arrive quand `db/init` n'a pas ete joue. Le DDL propre a
+TimescaleDB qui ne depend pas du schema applicatif vit dans `db/`, pas ici.
+
+## Image Docker
+
+Build multi-stage, dependances resolues par uv depuis `uv.lock`, execution sous un
+utilisateur non root, sonde de sante integree.
+
+```bash
+docker build -t enervision-backend:local .
+docker run --rm -p 8000:8000 --env-file .env enervision-backend:local
+```

apps/backend/TESTING.md

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+# Conventions de tests unitaires : Backend
+
+## Outil
+
+pytest, avec pytest-asyncio en mode `auto` : un `async def test_*` est collecte sans
+decorateur. Les appels HTTP passent par httpx sur `ASGITransport`, qui parle a
+l'application en memoire, sans serveur ni port ouvert.
+
+## Ou ecrire les tests
+
+`tests/` est le miroir de `app/` : un test de `app/services/consumption.py` va dans
+`tests/services/test_consumption.py`. Les paquets `core`, `db`, `services` et
+`repositories` existent deja, vides, pour cette raison.
+
+## Nommage
+
+- Fonctions en anglais : `test_<sujet>_<comportement>_when_<condition>`.
+- `ids=` de `parametrize` en francais : `ids=["erreur_sqlalchemy", "erreur_reseau"]`.
+- Pas de docstring : le nom porte l'intention.
+
+## Structure attendue (Arrange / Act / Assert)
+
+Une ligne vide separe les trois temps, sans commentaire pour les annoncer.
+
+```python
+async def test_readiness_returns_503_when_the_extension_is_missing(
+    fake_session: Callable[..., None], client: AsyncClient
+) -> None:
+    fake_session(result=None)
+
+    response = await client.get("/api/v1/health/ready")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 503
+    assert response.json()["detail"] == "Extension TimescaleDB absente"
+```
+
+## Ce qui doit etre teste en priorite
+
+Le sens de dependance du backend est `endpoints -> services -> repositories -> models`.
+
+| Couche | Ce qu'on teste |
+|---|---|
+| `services/` | La logique metier, cas nominal et cas d'erreur. C'est la priorite. |
+| `repositories/` | Chaque branche de decision, sous le marqueur `integration`. |
+| `endpoints/` | Le code de statut et la forme de la reponse, pas la logique metier. |
+| `schemas/` | Rien, sauf si le schema porte une validation ecrite a la main. |
+
+## Doubles
+
+On remplace une dependance FastAPI par `app.dependency_overrides`, jamais par
+`unittest.mock`. `tests/factories.py` fournit le necessaire.
+
+- `fake_session(result=...)` : la session repond `result`.
+- `fake_session(failure=...)` : la session leve l'exception.
+- `make_settings(**overrides)` : fabrique une `Settings`, dont les valeurs priment sur
+  l'environnement et sur `.env`. C'est le moyen de tester `create_app` en `prod`.
+
+## Gabarit : un endpoint
+
+```python
+from collections.abc import Callable
+
+from httpx import AsyncClient
+
+
+async def test_endpoint_returns_the_expected_payload(
+    fake_session: Callable[..., None], client: AsyncClient
+) -> None:
+    fake_session(result=42)
+
+    response = await client.get("/api/v1/...")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    assert response.json() == {"valeur": 42}
+```
+
+## Gabarit : un service avec repository factice
+
+Un service ne connait que son repository : on lui en passe un faux, sans base ni session.
+
+```python
+from app.services.consumption import ConsumptionService
+
+
+class FakeRepository:
+    async def total_for(self, site_id: int) -> float:
+        return 12.5
+
+
+async def test_service_converts_the_total_to_kilowatt_hours() -> None:
+    service = ConsumptionService(FakeRepository())
+
+    total = await service.total_kwh(site_id=1)
+
+    assert total == 12.5
+```
+
+## Gabarit : un repository sur la vraie base
+
+Un repository parle du SQL : le tester sur un double ne prouve rien. Il porte donc le
+marqueur `integration`, ecarte par defaut.
+
+```python
+import pytest
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.models.site import Site
+from app.repositories.site import SiteRepository
+
+
+@pytest.mark.integration
+async def test_repository_reads_back_what_it_wrote(session: AsyncSession) -> None:
+    repository = SiteRepository(session)
+
+    await repository.add(Site(name="Toulouse"))
+
+    assert await repository.by_name("Toulouse") is not None
+```
+
+## Marqueurs
+
+`integration` designe tout test exigeant une base joignable. `pytest` les ecarte par
+defaut, ce qui garde `make check` jouable sans Docker. Tout autre marqueur doit etre
+declare dans `pyproject.toml` : `--strict-markers` refuse les marqueurs inconnus.
+
+## Couverture
+
+Les branches sont mesurees, pas seulement les lignes. Le seuil de 85 % ne s'applique
+qu'aux cibles qui jouent toute la suite, `make test` et `make test-cov` : un fichier
+joue seul affiche sa couverture sans jamais echouer dessus. Le detail se lit dans
+`htmlcov/index.html` apres `make test-cov`.
+
+## Lancer les tests
+
+```bash
+make test                          # suite unitaire, sans base
+make test-cov                      # idem, plus les rapports HTML, XML et JUnit
+make db-up && make test-integration # tests exigeant une base, demande Docker
+make check                         # lint + typage + suite unitaire
+
+uv run pytest tests/api/test_health.py           # un seul fichier
+uv run pytest -k readiness                       # par motif de nom
+```
+
+## Trois fichiers à connaître avant de toucher à l'authentification
+
+`tests/api/test_route_protection.py` interroge réellement chaque route sans identifiant et
+échoue si l'une d'elles répond autre chose qu'un 401 ou un 403. Il n'inspecte pas l'arbre de
+dépendances : celui-ci n'est accessible que par l'API privée de FastAPI, et surtout une route
+peut porter la bonne dépendance tout en répondant quand même. **Rendre une route publique impose
+donc de modifier la liste `ROUTES_PUBLIQUES` de ce fichier**, ce qui apparaît en clair dans la
+diff d'une pull request.
+
+`tests/services/test_auth.py` donne au faux hacheur un **compteur d'appels**. C'est ce qui rend
+possibles les deux assertions qui prouvent la conception, et qu'aucune autre forme de test
+n'atteint :
+
+- adresse inconnue → le compteur vaut 1, donc le haché leurre a bien été vérifié et il n'y a pas
+  d'oracle temporel ;
+- limite de débit atteinte → le compteur vaut 0, donc la limite est évaluée avant Argon2.
+
+`tests/api/test_parcours_authentification.py` joue six parcours complets contre la vraie base,
+sous le marqueur `integration`, sans serveur ni port ouvert. C'est là que se démontrent
+l'atomicité de la rotation, la mort de la famille au rejeu d'un cookie déjà tourné, et la
+révocation immédiate d'un compte désactivé.
+
+## Deux pièges d'écriture de test
+
+**Lire les attributs avant le `rollback`.** Un `session.rollback()` périme les attributs chargés,
+et les relire déclenche une entrée-sortie hors du contexte greenlet, donc un `MissingGreenlet`.
+On capture la valeur dans une variable locale avant d'annuler.
+
+**`audit_log` ne se nettoie pas.** La table est en ajout seul, garanti par déclencheur : un test
+ne peut pas effacer ce qu'il y écrit, et les lignes d'une exécution précédente sont encore là.
+Chaque test filtre donc sur son propre `target_id` plutôt que de supposer une table vide.

apps/backend/alembic.ini

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+# A generic, single database configuration.
+
+[alembic]
+# path to migration scripts.
+# this is typically a path given in POSIX (e.g. forward slashes)
+# format, relative to the token %(here)s which refers to the location of this
+# ini file
+script_location = %(here)s/alembic
+
+# template used to generate migration file names; The default value is %%(rev)s_%%(slug)s
+# Uncomment the line below if you want the files to be prepended with date and time
+# see https://alembic.sqlalchemy.org/en/latest/tutorial.html#editing-the-ini-file
+# for all available tokens
+# file_template = %%(year)d_%%(month).2d_%%(day).2d_%%(hour).2d%%(minute).2d-%%(rev)s_%%(slug)s
+# Or organize into date-based subdirectories (requires recursive_version_locations = true)
+# file_template = %%(year)d/%%(month).2d/%%(day).2d_%%(hour).2d%%(minute).2d_%%(second).2d_%%(rev)s_%%(slug)s
+
+# sys.path path, will be prepended to sys.path if present.
+# defaults to the current working directory.  for multiple paths, the path separator
+# is defined by "path_separator" below.
+prepend_sys_path = .
+
+# timezone to use when rendering the date within the migration file
+# as well as the filename.
+# If specified, requires the tzdata library which can be installed by adding
+# `alembic[tz]` to the pip requirements.
+# string value is passed to ZoneInfo()
+# leave blank for localtime
+# timezone =
+
+# max length of characters to apply to the "slug" field
+# truncate_slug_length = 40
+
+# set to 'true' to run the environment during
+# the 'revision' command, regardless of autogenerate
+# revision_environment = false
+
+# set to 'true' to allow .pyc and .pyo files without
+# a source .py file to be detected as revisions in the
+# versions/ directory
+# sourceless = false
+
+# version location specification; This defaults
+# to <script_location>/versions.  When using multiple version
+# directories, initial revisions must be specified with --version-path.
+# The path separator used here should be the separator specified by "path_separator"
+# below.
+# version_locations = %(here)s/bar:%(here)s/bat:%(here)s/alembic/versions
+
+# path_separator; This indicates what character is used to split lists of file
+# paths, including version_locations and prepend_sys_path within configparser
+# files such as alembic.ini.
+# The default rendered in new alembic.ini files is "os", which uses os.pathsep
+# to provide os-dependent path splitting.
+#
+# Note that in order to support legacy alembic.ini files, this default does NOT
+# take place if path_separator is not present in alembic.ini.  If this
+# option is omitted entirely, fallback logic is as follows:
+#
+# 1. Parsing of the version_locations option falls back to using the legacy
+#    "version_path_separator" key, which if absent then falls back to the legacy
+#    behavior of splitting on spaces and/or commas.
+# 2. Parsing of the prepend_sys_path option falls back to the legacy
+#    behavior of splitting on spaces, commas, or colons.
+#
+# Valid values for path_separator are:
+#
+# path_separator = :
+# path_separator = ;
+# path_separator = space
+# path_separator = newline
+#
+# Use os.pathsep. Default configuration used for new projects.
+path_separator = os
+
+
+# set to 'true' to search source files recursively
+# in each "version_locations" directory
+# new in Alembic version 1.10
+# recursive_version_locations = false
+
+# the output encoding used when revision files
+# are written from script.py.mako
+# output_encoding = utf-8
+
+# database URL.  This is consumed by the user-maintained env.py script only.
+# other means of configuring database URLs may be customized within the env.py
+# file.
+# L'URL est injectee par alembic/env.py depuis app.core.config.
+sqlalchemy.url =
+
+
+[post_write_hooks]
+# post_write_hooks defines scripts or Python functions that are run
+# on newly generated revision scripts.  See the documentation for further
+# detail and examples
+
+# format using "black" - use the console_scripts runner, against the "black" entrypoint
+# hooks = black
+# black.type = console_scripts
+# black.entrypoint = black
+# black.options = -l 79 REVISION_SCRIPT_FILENAME
+
+# lint with attempts to fix using "ruff" - use the module runner, against the "ruff" module
+# hooks = ruff
+# ruff.type = module
+# ruff.module = ruff
+# ruff.options = check --fix REVISION_SCRIPT_FILENAME
+
+# Alternatively, use the exec runner to execute a binary found on your PATH
+# hooks = ruff
+# ruff.type = exec
+# ruff.executable = ruff
+# ruff.options = check --fix REVISION_SCRIPT_FILENAME
+
+# Logging configuration.  This is also consumed by the user-maintained
+# env.py script only.
+[loggers]
+keys = root,sqlalchemy,alembic
+
+[handlers]
+keys = console
+
+[formatters]
+keys = generic
+
+[logger_root]
+level = WARNING
+handlers = console
+qualname =
+
+[logger_sqlalchemy]
+level = WARNING
+handlers =
+qualname = sqlalchemy.engine
+
+[logger_alembic]
+level = INFO
+handlers =
+qualname = alembic
+
+[handler_console]
+class = StreamHandler
+args = (sys.stderr,)
+level = NOTSET
+formatter = generic
+
+[formatter_generic]
+format = %(levelname)-5.5s [%(name)s] %(message)s
+datefmt = %H:%M:%S

apps/backend/alembic/README

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Generic single-database configuration with an async dbapi.

apps/backend/alembic/env.py

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+import asyncio
+from logging.config import fileConfig
+
+from alembic import context
+from sqlalchemy import pool
+from sqlalchemy.engine import Connection
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import async_engine_from_config
+
+import app.models  # noqa: F401
+from app.core.config import get_settings
+from app.db.base import Base
+
+# this is the Alembic Config object, which provides
+# access to the values within the .ini file in use.
+config = context.config
+
+# Interpret the config file for Python logging.
+# This line sets up loggers basically.
+if config.config_file_name is not None:
+    fileConfig(config.config_file_name)
+
+config.set_main_option("sqlalchemy.url", get_settings().database_url.replace("%", "%%"))
+
+target_metadata = Base.metadata
+
+# other values from the config, defined by the needs of env.py,
+# can be acquired:
+# my_important_option = config.get_main_option("my_important_option")
+# ... etc.
+
+
+def run_migrations_offline() -> None:
+    """Run migrations in 'offline' mode.
+
+    This configures the context with just a URL
+    and not an Engine, though an Engine is acceptable
+    here as well.  By skipping the Engine creation
+    we don't even need a DBAPI to be available.
+
+    Calls to context.execute() here emit the given string to the
+    script output.
+
+    """
+    url = config.get_main_option("sqlalchemy.url")
+    context.configure(
+        url=url,
+        target_metadata=target_metadata,
+        literal_binds=True,
+        dialect_opts={"paramstyle": "named"},
+    )
+
+    with context.begin_transaction():
+        context.run_migrations()
+
+
+def do_run_migrations(connection: Connection) -> None:
+    context.configure(connection=connection, target_metadata=target_metadata)
+
+    with context.begin_transaction():
+        context.run_migrations()
+
+
+async def run_async_migrations() -> None:
+    """In this scenario we need to create an Engine
+    and associate a connection with the context.
+
+    """
+
+    connectable = async_engine_from_config(
+        config.get_section(config.config_ini_section, {}),
+        prefix="sqlalchemy.",
+        poolclass=pool.NullPool,
+    )
+
+    async with connectable.connect() as connection:
+        await connection.run_sync(do_run_migrations)
+
+    await connectable.dispose()
+
+
+def run_migrations_online() -> None:
+    """Run migrations in 'online' mode."""
+
+    asyncio.run(run_async_migrations())
+
+
+if context.is_offline_mode():
+    run_migrations_offline()
+else:
+    run_migrations_online()

apps/backend/alembic/script.py.mako

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+"""${message}
+
+Revision ID: ${up_revision}
+Revises: ${down_revision | comma,n}
+Create Date: ${create_date}
+
+"""
+from typing import Sequence, Union
+
+from alembic import op
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+${imports if imports else ""}
+
+# revision identifiers, used by Alembic.
+revision: str = ${repr(up_revision)}
+down_revision: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = ${repr(down_revision)}
+branch_labels: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = ${repr(branch_labels)}
+depends_on: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = ${repr(depends_on)}
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    """Upgrade schema."""
+    ${upgrades if upgrades else "pass"}
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    """Downgrade schema."""
+    ${downgrades if downgrades else "pass"}

apps/backend/alembic/versions/517053a3c044_tentatives_de_connexion_et_journal_d_audit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+"""tentatives de connexion et journal d audit
+
+Revision ID: 517053a3c044
+Revises: b1a7c3d9e240
+Create Date: 2026-09-15 14:31:07.966180
+
+Deux tables aux vocations opposees. `login_attempt` est le compteur de la limitation
+de debit : son volume est pilote par l'attaquant, donc elle se purge. `audit_log` est
+en ajout seul, garanti par deux declencheurs.
+
+Le declencheur TRUNCATE n'est pas redondant : TRUNCATE ne passe pas par les
+declencheurs de ligne. Et RAISE EXCEPTION plutot qu'un RETURN NULL, qui annulerait
+l'operation silencieusement.
+"""
+
+from collections.abc import Sequence
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+from sqlalchemy.dialects import postgresql
+
+revision: str = "517053a3c044"
+down_revision: str | Sequence[str] | None = "b1a7c3d9e240"
+branch_labels: str | Sequence[str] | None = None
+depends_on: str | Sequence[str] | None = None
+
+FONCTION_AJOUT_SEUL = """
+CREATE FUNCTION audit_log_append_only() RETURNS trigger AS $$
+BEGIN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'audit_log est en ajout seul : % interdit', TG_OP;
+END
+$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
+"""
+
+DECLENCHEUR_LIGNE = """
+CREATE TRIGGER audit_log_no_update_delete
+    BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETE ON audit_log
+    FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION audit_log_append_only();
+"""
+
+DECLENCHEUR_TRUNCATE = """
+CREATE TRIGGER audit_log_no_truncate
+    BEFORE TRUNCATE ON audit_log
+    FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION audit_log_append_only();
+"""
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    op.create_table(
+        "login_attempt",
+        sa.Column("id", sa.BigInteger(), sa.Identity(always=True), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column(
+            "occurred_at",
+            sa.DateTime(timezone=True),
+            server_default=sa.text("now()"),
+            nullable=False,
+        ),
+        sa.Column("email_tried", sa.String(length=320), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("client_ip", postgresql.INET(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("outcome", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("user_id", sa.UUID(), nullable=True),
+        sa.CheckConstraint(
+            "outcome in ('success', 'bad_credentials', 'throttled', 'inactive')",
+            name="ck_login_attempt_outcome",
+        ),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id", name="pk_login_attempt"),
+    )
+    op.create_index(
+        "ix_login_attempt_email_date", "login_attempt", ["email_tried", "occurred_at"]
+    )
+    op.create_index("ix_login_attempt_ip_date", "login_attempt", ["client_ip", "occurred_at"])
+
+    op.create_table(
+        "audit_log",
+        sa.Column("id", sa.BigInteger(), sa.Identity(always=True), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column(
+            "occurred_at",
+            sa.DateTime(timezone=True),
+            server_default=sa.text("now()"),
+            nullable=False,
+        ),
+        sa.Column("actor_id", sa.UUID(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("actor_email", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("actor_role", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("action", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("target_type", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("target_id", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("outcome", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("client_ip", postgresql.INET(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("user_agent", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column(
+            "detail",
+            postgresql.JSONB(astext_type=sa.Text()),
+            server_default=sa.text("jsonb_build_object()"),
+            nullable=False,
+        ),
+        sa.CheckConstraint("outcome in ('success', 'failure')", name="ck_audit_log_outcome"),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id", name="pk_audit_log"),
+    )
+    op.create_index("ix_audit_log_date", "audit_log", ["occurred_at"])
+    op.create_index("ix_audit_log_action_date", "audit_log", ["action", "occurred_at"])
+
+    op.execute(FONCTION_AJOUT_SEUL)
+    op.execute(DECLENCHEUR_LIGNE)
+    op.execute(DECLENCHEUR_TRUNCATE)
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.execute("DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS audit_log_no_truncate ON audit_log;")
+    op.execute("DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS audit_log_no_update_delete ON audit_log;")
+    op.execute("DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS audit_log_append_only();")
+
+    op.drop_index("ix_audit_log_action_date", table_name="audit_log")
+    op.drop_index("ix_audit_log_date", table_name="audit_log")
+    op.drop_table("audit_log")
+
+    op.drop_index("ix_login_attempt_ip_date", table_name="login_attempt")
+    op.drop_index("ix_login_attempt_email_date", table_name="login_attempt")
+    op.drop_table("login_attempt")

apps/backend/alembic/versions/5353c0e4f094_socle_garde_extension_timescaledb.py

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+"""socle garde extension timescaledb
+
+Revision ID: 5353c0e4f094
+Revises:
+Create Date: 2026-09-14 14:17:17.556764
+
+Premiere revision du schema applicatif. Elle ne cree aucune table : elle etablit
+alembic_version et refuse de s'appliquer sur une base ou l'extension TimescaleDB
+manque, cas qui se produit quand db/init n'a pas ete joue.
+"""
+
+from collections.abc import Sequence
+
+from alembic import op
+
+revision: str = "5353c0e4f094"
+down_revision: str | Sequence[str] | None = None
+branch_labels: str | Sequence[str] | None = None
+depends_on: str | Sequence[str] | None = None
+
+GARDE_EXTENSION = """
+DO $$
+BEGIN
+    IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_extension WHERE extname = 'timescaledb') THEN
+        RAISE EXCEPTION 'extension timescaledb absente, voir db/init et db/README.md';
+    END IF;
+END
+$$;
+"""
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    op.execute(GARDE_EXTENSION)
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    pass

apps/backend/alembic/versions/821f71be74c0_jetons_de_rafraichissement.py

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+"""jetons de rafraichissement
+
+Revision ID: 821f71be74c0
+Revises: 517053a3c044
+Create Date: 2026-09-15 14:42:09.757949
+
+Le jeton lui-meme n'est jamais stocke : seule son empreinte SHA-256 l'est, dans
+`token_hash`. Un pg_dump qui fuiterait ne livrerait donc aucune session utilisable.
+
+L'index partiel `ix_refresh_token_vivants` sert la revocation en cascade et la
+recherche des sessions actives, qui ne regardent jamais les lignes deja tournees.
+"""
+
+from collections.abc import Sequence
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+from sqlalchemy.dialects import postgresql
+
+revision: str = "821f71be74c0"
+down_revision: str | Sequence[str] | None = "517053a3c044"
+branch_labels: str | Sequence[str] | None = None
+depends_on: str | Sequence[str] | None = None
+
+MOTIFS = "'logout', 'rotation', 'reuse_detected', 'password_change', 'admin'"
+JETONS_VIVANTS = "revoked_at is null and rotated_at is null"
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    op.create_table(
+        "refresh_token",
+        sa.Column(
+            "id", sa.UUID(), server_default=sa.text("gen_random_uuid()"), nullable=False
+        ),
+        sa.Column("family_id", sa.UUID(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("user_id", sa.UUID(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("token_hash", sa.LargeBinary(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column(
+            "issued_at",
+            sa.DateTime(timezone=True),
+            server_default=sa.text("now()"),
+            nullable=False,
+        ),
+        sa.Column("expires_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("rotated_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("revoked_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("revoked_reason", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("replaced_by", sa.UUID(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("client_ip", postgresql.INET(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("user_agent", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
+        sa.CheckConstraint(
+            f"revoked_reason is null or revoked_reason in ({MOTIFS})",
+            name="ck_refresh_token_revoked_reason",
+        ),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(
+            ["user_id"], ["app_user.id"], name="fk_refresh_token_user", ondelete="CASCADE"
+        ),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id", name="pk_refresh_token"),
+        sa.UniqueConstraint("token_hash", name="uq_refresh_token_hash"),
+    )
+    op.create_index("ix_refresh_token_family", "refresh_token", ["family_id"])
+    op.create_index("ix_refresh_token_user", "refresh_token", ["user_id"])
+    op.create_index(
+        "ix_refresh_token_vivants",
+        "refresh_token",
+        ["user_id"],
+        postgresql_where=JETONS_VIVANTS,
+    )
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.drop_index(
+        "ix_refresh_token_vivants", table_name="refresh_token", postgresql_where=JETONS_VIVANTS
+    )
+    op.drop_index("ix_refresh_token_user", table_name="refresh_token")
+    op.drop_index("ix_refresh_token_family", table_name="refresh_token")
+    op.drop_table("refresh_token")

apps/backend/alembic/versions/b1a7c3d9e240_comptes_applicatifs.py

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+"""comptes applicatifs
+
+Revision ID: b1a7c3d9e240
+Revises: 5353c0e4f094
+Create Date: 2026-09-15 14:40:00.000000
+
+Cree `app_user`, la table des comptes humains et de service. Le nom evite `user`,
+mot reserve de PostgreSQL. `gen_random_uuid()` est au coeur de PG17, aucune
+extension n'est necessaire.
+"""
+
+from collections.abc import Sequence
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+from sqlalchemy.dialects import postgresql
+
+revision: str = "b1a7c3d9e240"
+down_revision: str | Sequence[str] | None = "5353c0e4f094"
+branch_labels: str | Sequence[str] | None = None
+depends_on: str | Sequence[str] | None = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    op.create_table(
+        "app_user",
+        sa.Column(
+            "id",
+            postgresql.UUID(as_uuid=True),
+            server_default=sa.text("gen_random_uuid()"),
+            nullable=False,
+        ),
+        sa.Column("email", sa.String(length=320), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("password_hash", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("role", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("kind", sa.Text(), server_default=sa.text("'human'"), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("is_active", sa.Boolean(), server_default=sa.text("true"), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column(
+            "must_change_password", sa.Boolean(), server_default=sa.text("false"), nullable=False
+        ),
+        sa.Column(
+            "credentials_changed_at",
+            sa.DateTime(timezone=True),
+            server_default=sa.text("now()"),
+            nullable=False,
+        ),
+        sa.Column("last_login_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("full_name", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column(
+            "created_at",
+            sa.DateTime(timezone=True),
+            server_default=sa.text("now()"),
+            nullable=False,
+        ),
+        sa.Column(
+            "updated_at",
+            sa.DateTime(timezone=True),
+            server_default=sa.text("now()"),
+            nullable=False,
+        ),
+        sa.CheckConstraint("email = lower(email)", name="ck_app_user_email_minuscule"),
+        sa.CheckConstraint(
+            "role in ('lecteur', 'operateur', 'admin')", name="ck_app_user_role"
+        ),
+        sa.CheckConstraint("kind in ('human', 'service')", name="ck_app_user_kind"),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id", name="pk_app_user"),
+        sa.UniqueConstraint("email", name="uq_app_user_email"),
+    )
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.drop_table("app_user")

apps/backend/alembic/versions/e6d2026091501_create_data_schema.py

@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+"""Création des six tables Data et de l'hypertable reading.
+
+Revision ID: e6d2026091501
+Revises: 821f71be74c0
+"""
+
+from alembic import op
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from sqlalchemy.dialects import postgresql
+
+revision = "e6d2026091501"
+down_revision = "821f71be74c0"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    # ### commands auto generated by Alembic - please adjust! ###
+    op.create_table(
+        "dataset",
+        sa.Column("dataset_id", sa.BigInteger(), autoincrement=True, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("dataset_name", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("archive_sha256", sa.String(length=64), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("storage_uri", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("source_timezone", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column(
+            "metadata", postgresql.JSONB(none_as_null=True, astext_type=sa.Text()), nullable=False
+        ),
+        sa.CheckConstraint("dataset_id > 0", name="ck_dataset_positive_id"),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("dataset_id"),
+        sa.UniqueConstraint("archive_sha256", name="uq_dataset_archive_sha256"),
+    )
+    op.create_table(
+        "site",
+        sa.Column("site_id", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("site_name", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("site_type", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("location", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("capacity_kw", sa.Double(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("status", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("site_id"),
+    )
+    op.create_table(
+        "prediction",
+        sa.Column("prediction_id", sa.BigInteger(), autoincrement=True, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("site_id", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column(
+            "created_at",
+            sa.DateTime(timezone=True),
+            server_default=sa.text("now()"),
+            nullable=False,
+        ),
+        sa.Column("target_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("target_metric", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("period_minutes", sa.Integer(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("predicted_value", sa.Double(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("model_reference", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("status", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("failure_reason", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
+        sa.CheckConstraint(
+            "(status = 'available' AND predicted_value IS NOT NULL AND failure_reason IS NULL) OR (status IN ('insufficient_data', 'error') AND predicted_value IS NULL AND failure_reason IS NOT NULL)",
+            name="ck_prediction_status",
+        ),
+        sa.CheckConstraint(
+            "target_metric <> 'consumption_kwh' OR period_minutes IS NOT NULL",
+            name="ck_prediction_energy_period",
+        ),
+        sa.CheckConstraint(
+            "target_metric IN ('consumption_kwh', 'consumption_kw')", name="ck_prediction_metric"
+        ),
+        sa.CheckConstraint(
+            "period_minutes IS NULL OR period_minutes > 0", name="ck_prediction_period"
+        ),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(
+            ["site_id"], ["site.site_id"], name="fk_prediction_site", ondelete="RESTRICT"
+        ),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("prediction_id"),
+        sa.UniqueConstraint("prediction_id", "site_id", name="uq_prediction_id_site"),
+    )
+    op.create_index(
+        "ix_prediction_site_target", "prediction", ["site_id", "target_at"], unique=False
+    )
+    op.create_table(
+        "reading",
+        sa.Column("reading_id", sa.BigInteger(), autoincrement=True, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("site_id", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("timestamp", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("source", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("dataset_id", sa.BigInteger(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("consumption_kw", sa.Double(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("consumption_kwh", sa.Double(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("consumption_euros", sa.Numeric(precision=14, scale=2), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("voltage_v", sa.Double(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("current_a", sa.Double(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("power_factor", sa.Double(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("temperature_celsius", sa.Double(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("humidity_percent", sa.Double(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("solar_irradiance_wm2", sa.Double(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("is_working_hours", sa.Boolean(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("data_quality", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("null_reasons", postgresql.ARRAY(sa.Text()), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column(
+            "imputed_values", postgresql.JSONB(none_as_null=True, astext_type=sa.Text()), nullable=True
+        ),
+        sa.Column("imputation_method", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column(
+            "ingested_at",
+            sa.DateTime(timezone=True),
+            server_default=sa.text("now()"),
+            nullable=False,
+        ),
+        sa.Column(
+            "raw_data", postgresql.JSONB(none_as_null=True, astext_type=sa.Text()), nullable=False
+        ),
+        sa.CheckConstraint(
+            "(source = 'csv' AND dataset_id IS NOT NULL) OR (source IN ('api_current', 'api_history') AND dataset_id IS NULL)",
+            name="ck_reading_dataset_source",
+        ),
+        sa.CheckConstraint(
+            "data_quality IS NULL OR data_quality IN ('good', 'partial', 'degraded', 'critical')",
+            name="ck_reading_quality",
+        ),
+        sa.CheckConstraint(
+            "source IN ('csv', 'api_current', 'api_history')", name="ck_reading_source"
+        ),
+        sa.CheckConstraint(
+            "(imputed_values IS NULL AND imputation_method IS NULL) OR (imputed_values IS NOT NULL AND imputation_method IS NOT NULL)",
+            name="ck_reading_imputation",
+        ),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(
+            ["dataset_id"], ["dataset.dataset_id"], name="fk_reading_dataset", ondelete="RESTRICT"
+        ),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(
+            ["site_id"], ["site.site_id"], name="fk_reading_site", ondelete="RESTRICT"
+        ),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("reading_id", "timestamp"),
+    )
+    op.create_index("ix_reading_dataset_id", "reading", ["dataset_id"], unique=False)
+    op.create_index(
+        "ix_reading_site_timestamp", "reading", ["site_id", "timestamp"], unique=False
+    )
+    op.create_index(
+        "uq_reading_source",
+        "reading",
+        ["site_id", "timestamp", "source", sa.literal_column("coalesce(dataset_id, 0)")],
+        unique=True,
+    )
+    op.execute(
+        "SELECT create_hypertable('reading', by_range('timestamp'), create_default_indexes => FALSE)"
+    )
+    op.create_table(
+        "alert",
+        sa.Column("alert_id", sa.BigInteger(), autoincrement=True, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("source_alert_id", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("site_id", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("source", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("timestamp", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("type", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("severity", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("message", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("value", sa.Double(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("threshold", sa.Double(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("metric", sa.Text(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("prediction_id", sa.BigInteger(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column(
+            "raw_data", postgresql.JSONB(none_as_null=True, astext_type=sa.Text()), nullable=False
+        ),
+        sa.CheckConstraint(
+            "severity IN ('low', 'medium', 'high', 'critical')", name="ck_alert_severity"
+        ),
+        sa.CheckConstraint("source IN ('api_mock', 'enervision')", name="ck_alert_source"),
+        sa.CheckConstraint(
+            "type IN ('spike', 'threshold', 'anomaly', 'outage', 'sensor')", name="ck_alert_type"
+        ),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(
+            ["prediction_id", "site_id"],
+            ["prediction.prediction_id", "prediction.site_id"],
+            name="fk_alert_prediction_site",
+            ondelete="RESTRICT",
+        ),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(
+            ["site_id"], ["site.site_id"], name="fk_alert_site", ondelete="RESTRICT"
+        ),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("alert_id"),
+        sa.UniqueConstraint(
+            "source", "site_id", "source_alert_id", name="uq_alert_source_reference"
+        ),
+    )
+    op.create_index("ix_alert_site_timestamp", "alert", ["site_id", "timestamp"], unique=False)
+    op.create_table(
+        "recommendation",
+        sa.Column("recommendation_id", sa.BigInteger(), autoincrement=True, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("alert_id", sa.BigInteger(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("action", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("explanation", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("rule_reference", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column(
+            "created_at",
+            sa.DateTime(timezone=True),
+            server_default=sa.text("now()"),
+            nullable=False,
+        ),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(
+            ["alert_id"], ["alert.alert_id"], name="fk_recommendation_alert", ondelete="RESTRICT"
+        ),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("recommendation_id"),
+        sa.UniqueConstraint("alert_id", "rule_reference", name="uq_recommendation_alert_rule"),
+    )
+    # ### end Alembic commands ###
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.drop_table("recommendation")
+    op.drop_table("alert")
+    op.drop_table("reading")
+    op.drop_table("prediction")
+    op.drop_table("site")
+    op.drop_table("dataset")

apps/backend/app/api/deps.py

@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+# Piège : `get_current_principal()` relit le compte en base à chaque requête au lieu de faire
+# confiance aux claims. C'est le renoncement assumé à la propriété « sans état » : sur un seul
+# service et une seule base, elle n'achetait rien, et la lecture par clé primaire coûte moins
+# d'un pour cent du budget d'une requête. Ce qu'elle achète, c'est la révocation immédiate.
+# Piège : le `Principal` est construit depuis la ligne, jamais depuis le claim `role`. Un claim
+# périmé ne peut donc pas provoquer d'élévation de privilège.
+
+from collections.abc import Callable
+from datetime import timedelta
+from functools import lru_cache
+from typing import Annotated
+
+from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, Request, status
+from fastapi.security import HTTPAuthorizationCredentials, HTTPBearer
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.core.config import Settings, get_settings
+from app.core.hashing import Argon2Hasher, build_hasher
+from app.core.principal import Principal
+from app.core.roles import AccountKind, Role, has_at_least
+from app.core.security import TokenExpiredError, TokenInvalidError, TokenPolicy
+from app.core.security import decode_access_token as decode_token
+from app.db.session import get_session
+from app.repositories.alert import AlertRepository
+from app.repositories.audit_log import AuditLogRepository
+from app.repositories.login_attempt import LoginAttemptRepository
+from app.repositories.reading import ReadingRepository
+from app.repositories.recommendation import RecommendationRepository
+from app.repositories.refresh_token import RefreshTokenRepository
+from app.repositories.site import SiteRepository
+from app.repositories.user import UserRepository
+from app.services.alert import AlertService
+from app.services.auth import AuthService, LoginPolicy
+from app.services.recommendation import RecommendationService
+from app.services.sensor import SensorService
+from app.services.site import SiteService
+from app.services.stats import StatsService
+from app.services.user import UserService
+
+SessionDep = Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_session)]
+SettingsDep = Annotated[Settings, Depends(get_settings)]
+
+CODE_CHANGEMENT_REQUIS = "password_change_required"
+
+_porteur = HTTPBearer(auto_error=False, scheme_name="Jeton d'accès")
+CredentialsDep = Annotated[HTTPAuthorizationCredentials | None, Depends(_porteur)]
+
+
+def _non_authentifie(description: str) -> HTTPException:
+    return HTTPException(
+        status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+        detail="Authentification requise",
+        headers={"WWW-Authenticate": f'Bearer error="{description}"'},
+    )
+
+
+def get_token_policy(settings: SettingsDep) -> TokenPolicy:
+    return TokenPolicy(
+        secret=settings.secret_key.get_secret_value(),
+        issuer=settings.jwt_issuer,
+        audience=settings.jwt_audience,
+        access_ttl=timedelta(seconds=settings.access_token_ttl_seconds),
+    )
+
+
+# Construire un `Argon2Hasher` calcule un haché leurre, donc 17 ms : il est mis en cache sur
+# les paramètres plutôt que reconstruit à chaque requête.
+@lru_cache
+def _hasher_cache(
+    time_cost: int, memory_cost_kib: int, parallelism: int, max_concurrency: int
+) -> Argon2Hasher:
+    return build_hasher(
+        time_cost=time_cost,
+        memory_cost_kib=memory_cost_kib,
+        parallelism=parallelism,
+        max_concurrency=max_concurrency,
+    )
+
+
+def get_hasher(settings: SettingsDep) -> Argon2Hasher:
+    return _hasher_cache(
+        settings.argon2_time_cost,
+        settings.argon2_memory_cost_kib,
+        settings.argon2_parallelism,
+        settings.argon2_max_concurrency,
+    )
+
+
+def get_client_ip(request: Request, settings: SettingsDep) -> str | None:
+    # Derrière un proxy, `request.client.host` vaut l'IP du proxy : le compteur par IP
+    # deviendrait global, donc un déni de service auto-infligé. Le dernier élément est le seul
+    # qu'un proxy de confiance ait écrit, les précédents sont fournis par le client.
+    if settings.trust_proxy_headers:
+        transmis = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for")
+        if transmis:
+            return transmis.split(",")[-1].strip()
+    return request.client.host if request.client else None
+
+
+def get_auth_service(
+    session: SessionDep,
+    settings: SettingsDep,
+    hasher: Annotated[Argon2Hasher, Depends(get_hasher)],
+    token_policy: Annotated[TokenPolicy, Depends(get_token_policy)],
+) -> AuthService:
+    return AuthService(
+        users=UserRepository(session),
+        attempts=LoginAttemptRepository(session),
+        refresh_tokens=RefreshTokenRepository(session),
+        audit=AuditLogRepository(session),
+        hasher=hasher,
+        transaction=session,
+        token_policy=token_policy,
+        login_policy=LoginPolicy(
+            window_seconds=settings.login_window_seconds,
+            max_failures_per_identifier_and_ip=(settings.login_max_failures_per_identifier_and_ip),
+            max_failures_per_ip=settings.login_max_failures_per_ip,
+            max_failures_per_identifier=settings.login_max_failures_per_identifier,
+        ),
+        refresh_ttl=timedelta(seconds=settings.refresh_token_ttl_seconds),
+    )
+
+
+AuthServiceDep = Annotated[AuthService, Depends(get_auth_service)]
+
+
+def get_user_service(
+    session: SessionDep,
+    hasher: Annotated[Argon2Hasher, Depends(get_hasher)],
+) -> UserService:
+    return UserService(
+        users=UserRepository(session),
+        refresh_tokens=RefreshTokenRepository(session),
+        audit=AuditLogRepository(session),
+        hasher=hasher,
+        transaction=session,
+    )
+
+
+UserServiceDep = Annotated[UserService, Depends(get_user_service)]
+
+
+def get_site_service(session: SessionDep) -> SiteService:
+    return SiteService(sites=SiteRepository(session))
+
+
+SiteServiceDep = Annotated[SiteService, Depends(get_site_service)]
+
+
+def get_alert_service(session: SessionDep) -> AlertService:
+    return AlertService(alerts=AlertRepository(session))
+
+
+AlertServiceDep = Annotated[AlertService, Depends(get_alert_service)]
+
+
+def get_recommendation_service(session: SessionDep) -> RecommendationService:
+    return RecommendationService(recommendations=RecommendationRepository(session))
+
+
+RecommendationServiceDep = Annotated[RecommendationService, Depends(get_recommendation_service)]
+
+
+def get_stats_service(session: SessionDep) -> StatsService:
+    return StatsService(sites=SiteRepository(session), readings=ReadingRepository(session))
+
+
+StatsServiceDep = Annotated[StatsService, Depends(get_stats_service)]
+
+
+def get_sensor_service(session: SessionDep) -> SensorService:
+    return SensorService(sites=SiteRepository(session), readings=ReadingRepository(session))
+
+
+SensorServiceDep = Annotated[SensorService, Depends(get_sensor_service)]
+
+
+async def get_current_principal(
+    credentials: CredentialsDep,
+    session: SessionDep,
+    token_policy: Annotated[TokenPolicy, Depends(get_token_policy)],
+) -> Principal:
+    if credentials is None:
+        raise _non_authentifie("invalid_request")
+
+    try:
+        claims = decode_token(token_policy, credentials.credentials)
+    except TokenExpiredError as erreur:
+        raise _non_authentifie("expired") from erreur
+    except TokenInvalidError as erreur:
+        raise _non_authentifie("invalid_token") from erreur
+
+    compte = await UserRepository(session).get_by_id(claims.subject)
+    if compte is None or not compte.is_active:
+        raise _non_authentifie("invalid_token")
+    # Piège : `iat` est une date JWT, donc en secondes entières. Comparer sans tronquer le
+    # marqueur rejetterait tout jeton émis dans la même seconde que le changement, c'est-à-dire
+    # celui que `/auth/password` vient de rendre pour garder l'appareil courant connecté.
+    if int(claims.issued_at.timestamp()) < int(compte.credentials_changed_at.timestamp()):
+        raise _non_authentifie("token_stale")
+    if claims.role != compte.role:
+        raise _non_authentifie("token_stale")
+
+    return Principal(
+        id=compte.id,
+        email=compte.email,
+        role=Role(compte.role),
+        kind=AccountKind(compte.kind),
+        must_change_password=compte.must_change_password,
+    )
+
+
+CurrentPrincipalDep = Annotated[Principal, Depends(get_current_principal)]
+
+
+def require_role(minimum: Role) -> Callable[[Principal], Principal]:
+    def garde(principal: CurrentPrincipalDep) -> Principal:
+        if principal.must_change_password:
+            raise HTTPException(
+                status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail=CODE_CHANGEMENT_REQUIS
+            )
+        if not has_at_least(principal.role, minimum):
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="Droits insuffisants")
+        return principal
+
+    return garde
+
+
+LecteurDep = Annotated[Principal, Depends(require_role(Role.LECTEUR))]
+OperateurDep = Annotated[Principal, Depends(require_role(Role.OPERATEUR))]
+AdminDep = Annotated[Principal, Depends(require_role(Role.ADMIN))]
+
+
+def require_trusted_origin(request: Request, settings: SettingsDep) -> None:
+    # Un navigateur envoie toujours `Origin` sur une requête non sûre. Son absence signale un
+    # client hors navigateur, qui ne détient aucun cookie de victime : rien à protéger.
+    origine = request.headers.get("origin")
+    if origine is None:
+        return
+    if origine not in settings.allowed_origins:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="Origine refusée")

apps/backend/app/api/errors.py

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# Piège : la réponse 422 par défaut de FastAPI contient la clé `input`, c'est-à-dire la valeur
+# rejetée. Sur `/auth/login`, un corps malformé renverrait donc le mot de passe au client et le
+# déposerait dans les journaux d'erreur. `validation_error_handler()` ne laisse passer que le
+# champ fautif et le type d'erreur.
+
+import uuid
+from typing import Any
+
+from fastapi import FastAPI, Request, status
+from fastapi.exceptions import RequestValidationError
+from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
+
+from app.core.logging import get_logger
+
+logger = get_logger(__name__)
+
+
+async def validation_error_handler(_: Request, exception: RequestValidationError) -> JSONResponse:
+    champs: list[dict[str, Any]] = [
+        {
+            "champ": ".".join(str(element) for element in erreur["loc"]),
+            "type": erreur["type"],
+        }
+        for erreur in exception.errors()
+    ]
+    return JSONResponse(
+        status_code=status.HTTP_422_UNPROCESSABLE_CONTENT, content={"detail": champs}
+    )
+
+
+async def unhandled_error_handler(request: Request, exception: Exception) -> JSONResponse:
+    correlation = uuid.uuid4().hex
+    logger.exception(
+        "erreur non gérée correlation=%s methode=%s chemin=%s",
+        correlation,
+        request.method,
+        request.url.path,
+    )
+    return JSONResponse(
+        status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+        content={"detail": "Erreur interne", "correlation": correlation},
+    )
+
+
+def register_error_handlers(application: FastAPI) -> None:
+    application.add_exception_handler(RequestValidationError, validation_error_handler)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+    application.add_exception_handler(Exception, unhandled_error_handler)

apps/backend/app/api/middleware.py

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# Pourquoi : `SecurityHeadersMiddleware` ne pose ni HSTS ni CSP, et c'est délibéré.
+# L'application ignore si TLS termine devant elle, donc elle ne peut pas décider d'un HSTS ;
+# et une CSP sur une API JSON ne protège presque rien, celle qui compte protège la page
+# Angular. Les deux appartiennent au terminateur TLS.
+# Contrainte : `/docs` charge Swagger depuis un CDN, une CSP stricte ici casserait la
+# documentation sans rien sécuriser.
+
+from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable
+from typing import Final
+
+from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
+from starlette.requests import Request
+from starlette.responses import Response
+
+EN_TETES: Final[dict[str, str]] = {
+    "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
+    "X-Frame-Options": "DENY",
+    "Referrer-Policy": "no-referrer",
+}
+
+PREFIXE_AUTHENTIFICATION: Final = "/auth"
+
+
+class SecurityHeadersMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    async def dispatch(
+        self, request: Request, call_next: Callable[[Request], Awaitable[Response]]
+    ) -> Response:
+        response = await call_next(request)
+        for nom, valeur in EN_TETES.items():
+            response.headers.setdefault(nom, valeur)
+
+        # Une réponse d'authentification ne doit jamais être conservée par un intermédiaire.
+        if PREFIXE_AUTHENTIFICATION in request.url.path:
+            response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store"
+        return response

apps/backend/app/api/openapi.py

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+# Piège : `cookie_de_rafraichissement` est purement documentaire, d'où son `auto_error=False`.
+# Avec la valeur par défaut, FastAPI répondrait 403 avant d'atteindre `lit_le_cookie()`, et
+# `/auth/refresh` cesserait de rendre le 401 que le frontend attend.
+
+from typing import Any, Final
+
+from fastapi.security import APIKeyCookie
+
+from app.core.config import REFRESH_COOKIE_DEFAUT
+from app.schemas.errors import ErrorResponse, InternalErrorResponse, ValidationErrorResponse
+
+Reponses = dict[int | str, dict[str, Any]]
+
+SUMMARY: Final = "Collecte, analyse et restitution de séries temporelles énergétiques."
+
+DESCRIPTION: Final = """
+Toutes les routes sont préfixées par `/api/v1`.
+
+**Authentification.** Le jeton d'accès se présente dans l'en-tête `Authorization: Bearer ...`.
+Le jeton de rafraîchissement est un cookie `HttpOnly` que le code client ne voit jamais : il
+suffit d'émettre les requêtes avec les identifiants de session. `POST /auth/refresh` rend un
+nouveau jeton d'accès et fait tourner le cookie.
+
+**Rôles.** `lecteur`, puis `operateur`, puis `admin`. Chaque rôle couvre les droits du
+précédent.
+
+**Erreurs.** Le corps porte toujours une clé `detail`. Un `403` dont le `detail` vaut
+`password_change_required` n'est pas un refus de droits : il exige le changement du mot de passe
+provisoire avant toute autre action.
+
+Le parcours de session complet est décrit dans
+`docs/architecture/31-contrat-authentification.md`.
+"""
+
+TAGS: Final[list[dict[str, Any]]] = [
+    {
+        "name": "health",
+        "description": (
+            "Sondes d'infrastructure, publiques. `live` prouve que le processus répond, `ready` "
+            "que la base répond et que l'extension TimescaleDB est chargée."
+        ),
+    },
+    {
+        "name": "auth",
+        "description": (
+            "Ouverture, rotation et fermeture de session, et changement de son propre mot de passe."
+        ),
+    },
+    {
+        "name": "users",
+        "description": "Administration des comptes. Réservé au rôle `admin`.",
+    },
+    {
+        "name": "sites",
+        "description": "Consultation du parc de sites. Accessible à partir du rôle `lecteur`.",
+    },
+    {
+        "name": "alerts",
+        "description": "Consultation des alertes de consommation. Accessible à partir du rôle "
+        "`lecteur`.",
+    },
+    {
+        "name": "recommendations",
+        "description": (
+            "Consultation des recommandations issues des alertes. Accessible à partir du rôle "
+            "`lecteur`."
+        ),
+    },
+    {
+        "name": "stats",
+        "description": "Statistiques agrégées de consommation. Accessible à partir du rôle "
+        "`lecteur`.",
+    },
+    {
+        "name": "sensors",
+        "description": "État de santé des capteurs par site. Réservé au rôle `admin`.",
+    },
+]
+
+cookie_de_rafraichissement = APIKeyCookie(
+    name=REFRESH_COOKIE_DEFAUT,
+    scheme_name="Cookie de rafraîchissement",
+    description=(
+        "Cookie `HttpOnly` posé par `/auth/login` et tourné par `/auth/refresh`. Il prend le "
+        "préfixe `__Secure-` dès que l'API tourne derrière TLS, et n'est émis que vers "
+        "`/api/v1/auth`."
+    ),
+    auto_error=False,
+)
+
+# Le 422 n'est déclaré que sur les routes qui acceptent un corps ou un paramètre : ailleurs,
+# aucune validation ne peut échouer et l'annoncer serait faux.
+REPONSE_VALIDATION: Final[Reponses] = {
+    422: {
+        "model": ValidationErrorResponse,
+        "description": (
+            "Corps invalide. Le détail nomme le champ fautif et le type d'erreur, jamais la "
+            "valeur envoyée."
+        ),
+    },
+}
+
+REPONSE_SERVEUR: Final[Reponses] = {
+    500: {
+        "model": InternalErrorResponse,
+        "description": (
+            "Erreur interne. `correlation` identifie la trace côté serveur, qui n'est pas "
+            "renvoyée au client."
+        ),
+    },
+}
+
+REPONSE_INDISPONIBLE: Final[Reponses] = {
+    503: {
+        "model": ErrorResponse,
+        "description": "Base injoignable, ou extension TimescaleDB absente de la base.",
+    },
+}
+
+REPONSES_AUTHENTIFIEES: Final[Reponses] = {
+    401: {
+        "model": ErrorResponse,
+        "description": (
+            "Jeton absent, illisible, périmé, ou rendu caduc par un changement de rôle ou une "
+            "désactivation. L'en-tête `WWW-Authenticate` porte la cause dans `error=`."
+        ),
+    },
+}
+
+REPONSES_ADMIN: Final[Reponses] = {
+    **REPONSES_AUTHENTIFIEES,
+    403: {
+        "model": ErrorResponse,
+        "description": (
+            "Droits insuffisants, ou mot de passe provisoire à changer quand `detail` vaut "
+            "`password_change_required`."
+        ),
+    },
+}
+
+# `lecteur` est le rôle minimum : `require_role` n'y refuse jamais un 403 pour droits
+# insuffisants, seulement pour le mot de passe provisoire.
+REPONSES_LECTEUR: Final[Reponses] = {
+    **REPONSES_AUTHENTIFIEES,
+    403: {
+        "model": ErrorResponse,
+        "description": (
+            "Mot de passe provisoire à changer (`detail` vaut `password_change_required`)."
+        ),
+    },
+}
+
+REPONSE_ORIGINE_REFUSEE: Final[Reponses] = {
+    403: {
+        "model": ErrorResponse,
+        "description": "Origine non autorisée (protection CSRF de `require_trusted_origin`).",
+    },
+}

apps/backend/app/api/security.py

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# Pourquoi : `/metrics` est protégé par un jeton statique et non par un rôle applicatif. Coupler
+# la supervision au modèle d'utilisateurs casserait la collecte à chaque panne
+# d'authentification, c'est-à-dire précisément quand on a besoin des métriques. Le vrai contrôle
+# reste le réseau : Prometheus scrute sur le réseau interne et `/metrics` ne sort pas.
+
+import secrets
+
+from fastapi import HTTPException, Request, status
+
+from app.api.deps import SettingsDep
+
+
+def require_metrics_token(request: Request, settings: SettingsDep) -> None:
+    attendu = settings.metrics_token
+    if attendu is None:
+        return
+
+    presente = request.headers.get("authorization", "")
+    prefixe = "Bearer "
+    if not presente.startswith(prefixe) or not secrets.compare_digest(
+        presente[len(prefixe) :], attendu.get_secret_value()
+    ):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Jeton requis")

apps/backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/alerts.py

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+from fastapi import APIRouter
+
+from app.api.deps import AlertServiceDep, LecteurDep
+from app.api.openapi import REPONSE_VALIDATION
+from app.schemas.alert import AlertResponse, AlertSeverity
+
+router = APIRouter()
+
+
+@router.get(
+    "",
+    response_model=list[AlertResponse],
+    summary="Liste les alertes",
+    responses=REPONSE_VALIDATION,
+)
+async def list_alerts(
+    _: LecteurDep,
+    service: AlertServiceDep,
+    site_id: str | None = None,
+    severity: AlertSeverity | None = None,
+) -> list[AlertResponse]:
+    alertes = await service.list_all(site_id=site_id, severity=severity)
+    return [AlertResponse.model_validate(alerte) for alerte in alertes]

apps/backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+# Piège : le jeton de rafraîchissement ne quitte jamais le cookie httpOnly, et le jeton
+# d'accès ne va jamais dans un cookie. C'est ce qui réduit la surface CSRF aux trois routes de
+# ce module : partout ailleurs, le navigateur n'attache rien de lui-même.
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response, status
+
+from app.api.deps import (
+    AuthServiceDep,
+    CurrentPrincipalDep,
+    SettingsDep,
+    get_client_ip,
+    require_trusted_origin,
+)
+from app.api.openapi import (
+    REPONSE_ORIGINE_REFUSEE,
+    REPONSE_VALIDATION,
+    REPONSES_AUTHENTIFIEES,
+    Reponses,
+    cookie_de_rafraichissement,
+)
+from app.core.cookies import RefreshCookie, cookie_name
+from app.core.logging import get_logger
+from app.schemas.auth import (
+    LoginRequest,
+    PasswordChangeRequest,
+    PrincipalResponse,
+    TokenResponse,
+)
+from app.schemas.errors import ErrorResponse
+from app.services.auth import (
+    AuthenticatedSession,
+    InvalidCredentialsError,
+    RateLimitedError,
+    SessionRejectedError,
+)
+
+router = APIRouter()
+logger = get_logger(__name__)
+
+DETAIL_IDENTIFIANTS = "Identifiants invalides"
+DETAIL_SESSION = "Session invalide"
+
+REPONSES_LOGIN: Reponses = {
+    **REPONSE_VALIDATION,
+    401: {
+        "model": ErrorResponse,
+        "description": (
+            "Identifiants faux, compte inconnu ou compte désactivé. Le message est le même dans "
+            "les trois cas, et n'apprend donc rien sur l'existence du compte."
+        ),
+    },
+    429: {
+        "model": ErrorResponse,
+        "description": "Trop de tentatives sur cette fenêtre glissante.",
+        "headers": {
+            "Retry-After": {
+                "description": "Secondes à attendre avant une nouvelle tentative.",
+                "schema": {"type": "integer"},
+            }
+        },
+    },
+}
+
+REPONSES_REFRESH: Reponses = {
+    **REPONSE_ORIGINE_REFUSEE,
+    401: {
+        "model": ErrorResponse,
+        "description": (
+            "Cookie absent, session expirée, révoquée, ou jeton déjà tourné. Dans ce dernier cas "
+            "toute la famille de sessions est révoquée et le cookie est effacé avec la réponse."
+        ),
+    },
+}
+
+REPONSES_LOGOUT: Reponses = {**REPONSE_ORIGINE_REFUSEE}
+
+REPONSES_LOGOUT_ALL: Reponses = {**REPONSES_AUTHENTIFIEES, **REPONSE_ORIGINE_REFUSEE}
+
+REPONSES_MOT_DE_PASSE: Reponses = {
+    **REPONSE_VALIDATION,
+    **REPONSE_ORIGINE_REFUSEE,
+    401: {
+        "model": ErrorResponse,
+        "description": "Jeton d'accès invalide, ou mot de passe courant faux.",
+    },
+}
+
+
+def repond(
+    response: Response, settings: SettingsDep, session: AuthenticatedSession
+) -> TokenResponse:
+    response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store"
+    response.set_cookie(**RefreshCookie.build(settings, session.refresh_secret).as_kwargs())
+    return TokenResponse(
+        access_token=session.access_token,
+        expires_in=session.expires_in,
+        principal=PrincipalResponse.from_principal(session.principal),
+    )
+
+
+# Piège : une `HTTPException` construit sa propre réponse, donc tout en-tête posé sur la
+# `Response` injectée est perdu. L'effacement du cookie doit voyager avec l'exception,
+# sans quoi un navigateur garderait un cookie mort après une détection de réutilisation.
+def entete_de_suppression(settings: SettingsDep) -> str:
+    temoin = Response()
+    temoin.delete_cookie(**RefreshCookie.expired(settings).as_deletion_kwargs())
+    return temoin.headers["set-cookie"]
+
+
+def lit_le_cookie(request: Request, settings: SettingsDep) -> str:
+    secret = request.cookies.get(cookie_name(settings))
+    if not secret:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail=DETAIL_SESSION)
+    return secret
+
+
+@router.post(
+    "/login",
+    response_model=TokenResponse,
+    summary="Ouvre une session",
+    responses=REPONSES_LOGIN,
+)
+async def login(
+    payload: LoginRequest,
+    request: Request,
+    response: Response,
+    settings: SettingsDep,
+    service: AuthServiceDep,
+    client_ip: str | None = Depends(get_client_ip),
+) -> TokenResponse:
+    response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store"
+    agent = request.headers.get("user-agent")
+
+    try:
+        session = await service.authenticate(
+            email=payload.email, password=payload.password, client_ip=client_ip, user_agent=agent
+        )
+    except RateLimitedError as erreur:
+        logger.warning("auth.rate_limited email=%s ip=%s", payload.email, client_ip)
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+            detail="Trop de tentatives, réessayez plus tard",
+            headers={"Retry-After": str(erreur.retry_after)},
+        ) from erreur
+    except InvalidCredentialsError as erreur:
+        logger.warning("auth.login.failure email=%s ip=%s", payload.email, client_ip)
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail=DETAIL_IDENTIFIANTS
+        ) from erreur
+
+    logger.info("auth.login.success user_id=%s ip=%s", session.principal.id, client_ip)
+    return repond(response, settings, session)
+
+
+@router.post(
+    "/refresh",
+    response_model=TokenResponse,
+    summary="Fait tourner la session",
+    dependencies=[Depends(require_trusted_origin), Depends(cookie_de_rafraichissement)],
+    responses=REPONSES_REFRESH,
+)
+async def refresh(
+    request: Request,
+    response: Response,
+    settings: SettingsDep,
+    service: AuthServiceDep,
+    client_ip: str | None = Depends(get_client_ip),
+) -> TokenResponse:
+    response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store"
+
+    try:
+        session = await service.refresh(
+            secret=lit_le_cookie(request, settings),
+            client_ip=client_ip,
+            user_agent=request.headers.get("user-agent"),
+        )
+    except SessionRejectedError as erreur:
+        logger.warning("auth.refresh.rejected ip=%s", client_ip)
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+            detail=DETAIL_SESSION,
+            headers={
+                "Set-Cookie": entete_de_suppression(settings),
+                "Cache-Control": "no-store",
+            },
+        ) from erreur
+
+    return repond(response, settings, session)
+
+
+@router.post(
+    "/logout",
+    status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT,
+    summary="Ferme la session courante",
+    dependencies=[Depends(require_trusted_origin), Depends(cookie_de_rafraichissement)],
+    responses=REPONSES_LOGOUT,
+)
+async def logout(
+    request: Request, response: Response, settings: SettingsDep, service: AuthServiceDep
+) -> None:
+    response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store"
+    secret = request.cookies.get(cookie_name(settings))
+    if secret:
+        await service.logout(secret=secret)
+    response.delete_cookie(**RefreshCookie.expired(settings).as_deletion_kwargs())
+
+
+@router.post(
+    "/logout-all",
+    status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT,
+    summary="Ferme toutes les sessions du compte",
+    dependencies=[Depends(require_trusted_origin)],
+    responses=REPONSES_LOGOUT_ALL,
+)
+async def logout_all(
+    principal: CurrentPrincipalDep,
+    response: Response,
+    settings: SettingsDep,
+    service: AuthServiceDep,
+) -> None:
+    response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store"
+    revoquees = await service.logout_all(principal)
+    logger.info("auth.logout_all user_id=%s sessions=%s", principal.id, revoquees)
+    response.delete_cookie(**RefreshCookie.expired(settings).as_deletion_kwargs())
+
+
+@router.get(
+    "/me",
+    response_model=PrincipalResponse,
+    summary="Décrit le compte connecté",
+    responses=REPONSES_AUTHENTIFIEES,
+)
+async def me(principal: CurrentPrincipalDep) -> PrincipalResponse:
+    return PrincipalResponse.from_principal(principal)
+
+
+@router.post(
+    "/password",
+    response_model=TokenResponse,
+    summary="Change son propre mot de passe",
+    dependencies=[Depends(require_trusted_origin)],
+    responses=REPONSES_MOT_DE_PASSE,
+)
+async def change_password(
+    payload: PasswordChangeRequest,
+    principal: CurrentPrincipalDep,
+    request: Request,
+    response: Response,
+    settings: SettingsDep,
+    service: AuthServiceDep,
+    client_ip: str | None = Depends(get_client_ip),
+) -> TokenResponse:
+    response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store"
+
+    try:
+        session = await service.change_password(
+            principal=principal,
+            current_password=payload.current_password,
+            new_password=payload.new_password,
+            client_ip=client_ip,
+            user_agent=request.headers.get("user-agent"),
+        )
+    except InvalidCredentialsError as erreur:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail=DETAIL_IDENTIFIANTS
+        ) from erreur
+
+    logger.info("auth.password_changed user_id=%s", principal.id)
+    return repond(response, settings, session)

apps/backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/health.py

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, status
+from sqlalchemy import text
+from sqlalchemy.exc import SQLAlchemyError
+
+from app.api.deps import SessionDep, SettingsDep
+from app.api.openapi import REPONSE_INDISPONIBLE
+from app.core.logging import get_logger
+from app.schemas.health import LivenessStatus, ReadinessStatus
+
+logger = get_logger(__name__)
+router = APIRouter()
+
+TIMESCALEDB_VERSION = text("SELECT extversion FROM pg_extension WHERE extname = 'timescaledb'")
+
+
+@router.get("/live", summary="Sonde de vivacité")
+async def liveness(settings: SettingsDep) -> LivenessStatus:
+    return LivenessStatus(
+        status="ok",
+        service=settings.name,
+        version=settings.version,
+        environment=settings.env,
+    )
+
+
+@router.get("/ready", summary="Sonde de disponibilité", responses=REPONSE_INDISPONIBLE)
+async def readiness(session: SessionDep) -> ReadinessStatus:
+    try:
+        version: str | None = await session.scalar(TIMESCALEDB_VERSION)
+    # `# fmt: skip` contourne un bug de ruff format 0.16.7 : il retire les parenthèses de ce
+    # `except` à deux types, ce qui produit une syntaxe invalide (`except A, B:`).
+    except (SQLAlchemyError, OSError):  # fmt: skip
+        logger.exception("Base de données injoignable")
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_503_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+            detail="Base de données injoignable",
+        ) from None
+
+    if version is None:
+        logger.error("Extension TimescaleDB absente de la base")
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_503_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+            detail="Extension TimescaleDB absente",
+        )
+
+    logger.debug("Extension TimescaleDB en version %s", version)
+    return ReadinessStatus(status="ready", database="reachable", timescaledb="loaded")

apps/backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/recommendations.py

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, status
+
+from app.api.deps import LecteurDep, RecommendationServiceDep
+from app.api.openapi import REPONSE_VALIDATION, Reponses
+from app.schemas.errors import ErrorResponse
+from app.schemas.recommendation import RecommendationResponse
+from app.services.recommendation import RecommendationNotFoundError
+
+router = APIRouter()
+
+REPONSES_INTROUVABLE: Reponses = {
+    **REPONSE_VALIDATION,
+    404: {"model": ErrorResponse, "description": "Aucune recommandation ne porte cet identifiant."},
+}
+
+
+@router.get("", response_model=list[RecommendationResponse], summary="Liste les recommandations")
+async def list_recommendations(
+    _: LecteurDep, service: RecommendationServiceDep
+) -> list[RecommendationResponse]:
+    recommendations = await service.list_all()
+    return [RecommendationResponse.model_validate(r) for r in recommendations]
+
+
+@router.get(
+    "/{recommendation_id}",
+    response_model=RecommendationResponse,
+    summary="Décrit une recommandation",
+    responses=REPONSES_INTROUVABLE,
+)
+async def get_recommendation(
+    recommendation_id: int, _: LecteurDep, service: RecommendationServiceDep
+) -> RecommendationResponse:
+    try:
+        recommendation = await service.get_by_id(recommendation_id)
+    except RecommendationNotFoundError as erreur:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail="Recommandation introuvable"
+        ) from erreur
+    return RecommendationResponse.model_validate(recommendation)

apps/backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/sensors.py

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+from fastapi import APIRouter
+
+from app.api.deps import AdminDep, SensorServiceDep
+from app.schemas.sensor import SensorStatusResponse
+
+router = APIRouter()
+
+
+@router.get(
+    "/status",
+    response_model=SensorStatusResponse,
+    summary="État de santé des capteurs par site",
+)
+async def get_status(_: AdminDep, service: SensorServiceDep) -> SensorStatusResponse:
+    etat = await service.status()
+    return SensorStatusResponse.model_validate(etat)

apps/backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/sites.py

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, status
+
+from app.api.deps import LecteurDep, SiteServiceDep
+from app.api.openapi import REPONSE_VALIDATION, Reponses
+from app.schemas.errors import ErrorResponse
+from app.schemas.site import SiteResponse
+from app.services.site import SiteNotFoundError
+
+router = APIRouter()
+
+REPONSES_INTROUVABLE: Reponses = {
+    **REPONSE_VALIDATION,
+    404: {"model": ErrorResponse, "description": "Aucun site ne porte cet identifiant."},
+}
+
+
+@router.get("", response_model=list[SiteResponse], summary="Liste les sites")
+async def list_sites(_: LecteurDep, service: SiteServiceDep) -> list[SiteResponse]:
+    sites = await service.list_all()
+    return [SiteResponse.model_validate(site) for site in sites]
+
+
+@router.get(
+    "/{site_id}",
+    response_model=SiteResponse,
+    summary="Décrit un site",
+    responses=REPONSES_INTROUVABLE,
+)
+async def get_site(site_id: str, _: LecteurDep, service: SiteServiceDep) -> SiteResponse:
+    try:
+        site = await service.get_by_id(site_id)
+    except SiteNotFoundError as erreur:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail="Site introuvable"
+        ) from erreur
+    return SiteResponse.model_validate(site)

apps/backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/stats.py

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+from fastapi import APIRouter
+
+from app.api.deps import LecteurDep, StatsServiceDep
+from app.schemas.stats import StatsSummaryResponse
+
+router = APIRouter()
+
+
+@router.get(
+    "/summary",
+    response_model=StatsSummaryResponse,
+    summary="Résume la consommation instantanée du parc",
+)
+async def get_summary(_: LecteurDep, service: StatsServiceDep) -> StatsSummaryResponse:
+    resume = await service.summary()
+    return StatsSummaryResponse.model_validate(resume)

apps/backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/users.py

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+from uuid import UUID
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Response, status
+
+from app.api.deps import AdminDep, UserServiceDep
+from app.api.openapi import REPONSE_VALIDATION, Reponses
+from app.core.logging import get_logger
+from app.schemas.errors import ErrorResponse
+from app.schemas.user import (
+    TemporaryPasswordResponse,
+    UserCreateRequest,
+    UserResponse,
+    UserUpdateRequest,
+)
+from app.services.user import EmailAlreadyUsedError, LastAdminError, UserNotFoundError
+
+router = APIRouter()
+logger = get_logger(__name__)
+
+REPONSES_CREATION: Reponses = {
+    **REPONSE_VALIDATION,
+    409: {"model": ErrorResponse, "description": "Adresse déjà portée par un autre compte."},
+}
+
+REPONSES_INTROUVABLE: Reponses = {
+    **REPONSE_VALIDATION,
+    404: {"model": ErrorResponse, "description": "Aucun compte ne porte cet identifiant."},
+}
+
+REPONSES_MODIFICATION: Reponses = {
+    **REPONSES_INTROUVABLE,
+    400: {"model": ErrorResponse, "description": "Corps vide, aucune modification demandée."},
+    409: {
+        "model": ErrorResponse,
+        "description": (
+            "L'opération laisserait la plateforme sans administrateur actif, qu'il s'agisse de "
+            "rétrograder le dernier ou de le désactiver."
+        ),
+    },
+}
+
+
+@router.get("", response_model=list[UserResponse], summary="Liste les comptes")
+async def list_users(_: AdminDep, service: UserServiceDep) -> list[UserResponse]:
+    comptes = await service.list_all()
+    return [UserResponse.model_validate(compte) for compte in comptes]
+
+
+@router.post(
+    "",
+    response_model=TemporaryPasswordResponse,
+    status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED,
+    summary="Crée un compte avec un mot de passe provisoire",
+    responses=REPONSES_CREATION,
+)
+async def create_user(
+    payload: UserCreateRequest,
+    acteur: AdminDep,
+    service: UserServiceDep,
+    response: Response,
+) -> TemporaryPasswordResponse:
+    # Le mot de passe provisoire ne doit être conservé par aucun intermédiaire.
+    response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store"
+    try:
+        cree = await service.create(
+            actor=acteur,
+            email=payload.email,
+            role=payload.role,
+            full_name=payload.full_name,
+        )
+    except EmailAlreadyUsedError as erreur:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, detail="Adresse déjà utilisée"
+        ) from erreur
+
+    logger.info("user.created actor=%s target=%s", acteur.id, cree.user.id)
+    return TemporaryPasswordResponse(
+        user=UserResponse.model_validate(cree.user),
+        temporary_password=cree.temporary_password,
+    )
+
+
+@router.patch(
+    "/{user_id}",
+    response_model=UserResponse,
+    summary="Change le rôle ou l'activation",
+    responses=REPONSES_MODIFICATION,
+)
+async def update_user(
+    user_id: UUID,
+    payload: UserUpdateRequest,
+    acteur: AdminDep,
+    service: UserServiceDep,
+) -> UserResponse:
+    compte = None
+    try:
+        if payload.role is not None:
+            compte = await service.change_role(actor=acteur, user_id=user_id, role=payload.role)
+        if payload.is_active is not None:
+            compte = await service.set_active(
+                actor=acteur, user_id=user_id, is_active=payload.is_active
+            )
+    except UserNotFoundError as erreur:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail="Compte introuvable"
+        ) from erreur
+    except LastAdminError as erreur:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT,
+            detail="Dernier administrateur actif, l'opération le laisserait sans successeur",
+        ) from erreur
+
+    if compte is None:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail="Aucune modification demandée"
+        )
+    logger.info("user.updated actor=%s target=%s", acteur.id, user_id)
+    return UserResponse.model_validate(compte)
+
+
+@router.post(
+    "/{user_id}/password-reset",
+    response_model=TemporaryPasswordResponse,
+    summary="Réinitialise le mot de passe et ferme les sessions",
+    responses=REPONSES_INTROUVABLE,
+)
+async def reset_password(
+    user_id: UUID, acteur: AdminDep, service: UserServiceDep, response: Response
+) -> TemporaryPasswordResponse:
+    response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store"
+    try:
+        reinitialise = await service.reset_password(actor=acteur, user_id=user_id)
+    except UserNotFoundError as erreur:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail="Compte introuvable"
+        ) from erreur
+
+    logger.info("user.password_reset actor=%s target=%s", acteur.id, user_id)
+    return TemporaryPasswordResponse(
+        user=UserResponse.model_validate(reinitialise.user),
+        temporary_password=reinitialise.temporary_password,
+    )

apps/backend/app/api/v1/router.py

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+from fastapi import APIRouter
+
+from app.api.openapi import REPONSE_SERVEUR, REPONSES_ADMIN, REPONSES_LECTEUR
+from app.api.v1.endpoints import alerts, auth, health, recommendations, sensors, sites, stats, users
+
+api_router = APIRouter(responses=REPONSE_SERVEUR)
+api_router.include_router(health.router, prefix="/health", tags=["health"])
+api_router.include_router(auth.router, prefix="/auth", tags=["auth"])
+api_router.include_router(users.router, prefix="/users", tags=["users"], responses=REPONSES_ADMIN)
+api_router.include_router(sites.router, prefix="/sites", tags=["sites"], responses=REPONSES_LECTEUR)
+api_router.include_router(
+    alerts.router, prefix="/alerts", tags=["alerts"], responses=REPONSES_LECTEUR
+)
+api_router.include_router(
+    recommendations.router,
+    prefix="/recommendations",
+    tags=["recommendations"],
+    responses=REPONSES_LECTEUR,
+)
+api_router.include_router(stats.router, prefix="/stats", tags=["stats"], responses=REPONSES_LECTEUR)
+api_router.include_router(
+    sensors.router, prefix="/sensors", tags=["sensors"], responses=REPONSES_ADMIN
+)

apps/backend/app/cli.py

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+# Pourquoi : `create_admin()` est une commande et non une révision Alembic. Une révision qui
+# insérerait un compte graverait son empreinte dans Git pour toujours, et son mot de passe
+# serait connu de quiconque lit le dépôt. L'ADR 0001 pose par ailleurs qu'Alembic porte le
+# schéma, pas les données.
+# Piège : le mot de passe ne transite jamais par `argv`, visible de tout `ps`, ni par
+# l'historique du shell. Il est saisi par `getpass` ou tiré au sort par la commande.
+
+import argparse
+import asyncio
+import json
+import secrets
+import sys
+from getpass import getpass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+from pydantic import SecretStr
+
+from app.core.config import Settings, get_settings
+from app.core.hashing import build_hasher
+from app.core.roles import Role
+from app.db.session import get_session_factory
+from app.main import create_app
+from app.repositories.user import UserRepository
+
+LONGUEUR_MOT_DE_PASSE_GENERE = 24
+LONGUEUR_MINIMALE = 12
+CHEMIN_CONTRAT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "openapi.json"
+
+
+async def create_admin(
+    settings: Settings, *, email: str, password: str, force: bool
+) -> tuple[bool, str]:
+    hacheur = build_hasher(
+        time_cost=settings.argon2_time_cost,
+        memory_cost_kib=settings.argon2_memory_cost_kib,
+        parallelism=settings.argon2_parallelism,
+        max_concurrency=settings.argon2_max_concurrency,
+    )
+    empreinte = await hacheur.hash(password)
+
+    async with get_session_factory()() as session:
+        depot = UserRepository(session)
+
+        if not force and await depot.count_active_admins() > 0:
+            return False, "Un administrateur actif existe déjà, relancer avec --force pour forcer"
+
+        if await depot.get_by_email(email) is not None:
+            return False, f"Le compte {email} existe déjà"
+
+        await depot.create(
+            email=email,
+            password_hash=empreinte,
+            role=Role.ADMIN,
+            must_change_password=True,
+        )
+        await session.commit()
+
+    return (
+        True,
+        f"Administrateur {email.strip().lower()} créé, mot de passe à changer à la connexion",
+    )
+
+
+# Piège : le schéma ne doit dépendre ni du `.env` du poste ni des variables `APP_*`, sinon le
+# fichier versionné changerait de machine en machine et le test de dérive deviendrait un oracle
+# de configuration locale. Tout ce qui atteint le schéma est donc posé ici, `_env_file` compris.
+def settings_du_contrat() -> Settings:
+    return Settings(
+        _env_file=None,
+        name="EnerVision API",
+        version="0.1.0",
+        env="local",
+        api_prefix="/api/v1",
+        secret_key=SecretStr("contrat-openapi-sans-effet-sur-le-schema"),
+        database_url="postgresql+asyncpg://openapi:contrat@localhost:5432/enervision",
+    )
+
+
+def schema_du_contrat() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    schema: dict[str, Any] = create_app(settings_du_contrat()).openapi()
+    return schema
+
+
+def rend_le_contrat() -> str:
+    return json.dumps(schema_du_contrat(), indent=2, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n"
+
+
+def export_openapi(destination: Path) -> str:
+    destination.write_text(rend_le_contrat(), encoding="utf-8")
+    return f"Contrat OpenAPI écrit dans {destination}"
+
+
+def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="python -m app.cli", description="Outils EnerVision")
+    sous_commandes = parser.add_subparsers(dest="commande", required=True)
+
+    admin = sous_commandes.add_parser("create-admin", help="Crée le premier administrateur")
+    admin.add_argument("--email", required=True)
+    admin.add_argument(
+        "--generate", action="store_true", help="Tire un mot de passe au sort et l'affiche une fois"
+    )
+    admin.add_argument(
+        "--force", action="store_true", help="Crée le compte même si un administrateur existe"
+    )
+
+    contrat = sous_commandes.add_parser(
+        "export-openapi", help="Écrit le contrat OpenAPI sur disque"
+    )
+    contrat.add_argument("--output", default=str(CHEMIN_CONTRAT))
+    return parser
+
+
+def read_password(*, generate: bool) -> str:
+    if generate:
+        mot_de_passe = secrets.token_urlsafe(LONGUEUR_MOT_DE_PASSE_GENERE)
+        print(f"Mot de passe généré, il ne sera plus affiché : {mot_de_passe}")
+        return mot_de_passe
+
+    mot_de_passe = getpass("Mot de passe : ")
+    if len(mot_de_passe) < LONGUEUR_MINIMALE:
+        raise SystemExit(f"Le mot de passe doit faire au moins {LONGUEUR_MINIMALE} caractères")
+    if mot_de_passe != getpass("Confirmation : "):
+        raise SystemExit("Les deux saisies diffèrent")
+    return mot_de_passe
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    arguments = build_parser().parse_args(argv)
+
+    if arguments.commande == "export-openapi":
+        print(export_openapi(Path(arguments.output)))
+        return 0
+
+    mot_de_passe = read_password(generate=arguments.generate)
+
+    succes, message = asyncio.run(
+        create_admin(
+            get_settings(),
+            email=arguments.email,
+            password=mot_de_passe,
+            force=arguments.force,
+        )
+    )
+    print(message)
+    return 0 if succes else 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover
+    sys.exit(main())

apps/backend/app/core/config.py

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+from functools import lru_cache
+from typing import Literal, Self
+
+from pydantic import Field, SecretStr, model_validator
+from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict
+
+Environment = Literal["local", "dev", "staging", "prod"]
+SameSite = Literal["lax", "strict", "none"]
+
+SECRET_KEY_MIN_LENGTH = 32
+REFRESH_COOKIE_DEFAUT = "ev_refresh"
+SENTINELLES_INTERDITES = frozenset(
+    {"change_me", "changeme", "secret", "secret-de-test", "changez-moi", "todo"}
+)
+
+
+class Settings(BaseSettings):
+    model_config = SettingsConfigDict(
+        env_file=".env",
+        env_prefix="APP_",
+        env_file_encoding="utf-8",
+        extra="ignore",
+    )
+
+    name: str = "EnerVision API"
+    version: str = "0.1.0"
+    env: Environment = "local"
+    debug: bool = False
+    log_level: str = "INFO"
+    api_prefix: str = "/api/v1"
+    secret_key: SecretStr
+    cors_origins: str = ""
+    database_url: str = Field(validation_alias="DATABASE_URL")
+    database_pool_size: int = 5
+    database_max_overflow: int = 10
+
+    jwt_issuer: str = "enervision-api"
+    jwt_audience: str = "enervision-web"
+    access_token_ttl_seconds: int = Field(default=900, ge=60, le=3600)
+    refresh_token_ttl_seconds: int = Field(default=604800, ge=3600, le=2592000)
+
+    refresh_cookie_name: str = REFRESH_COOKIE_DEFAUT
+    cookie_path: str = "/api/v1/auth"
+    cookie_samesite: SameSite = "strict"
+    cookie_secure: bool | None = None
+
+    argon2_time_cost: int = Field(default=2, ge=1, le=10)
+    argon2_memory_cost_kib: int = Field(default=19456, ge=8192)
+    argon2_parallelism: int = Field(default=1, ge=1, le=4)
+    argon2_max_concurrency: int = Field(default=4, ge=1, le=32)
+
+    login_window_seconds: int = Field(default=900, ge=60)
+    login_max_failures_per_identifier_and_ip: int = Field(default=5, ge=1)
+    login_max_failures_per_ip: int = Field(default=20, ge=1)
+    login_max_failures_per_identifier: int = Field(default=50, ge=1)
+
+    trust_proxy_headers: bool = False
+    expose_api_docs: bool | None = None
+    metrics_token: SecretStr | None = None
+
+    @property
+    def allowed_origins(self) -> list[str]:
+        return [origin.strip() for origin in self.cors_origins.split(",") if origin.strip()]
+
+    @property
+    def is_production(self) -> bool:
+        return self.env == "prod"
+
+    @property
+    def cookies_are_secure(self) -> bool:
+        return self.env != "local" if self.cookie_secure is None else self.cookie_secure
+
+    @property
+    def api_docs_are_exposed(self) -> bool:
+        if self.expose_api_docs is not None:
+            return self.expose_api_docs
+        return self.env not in ("staging", "prod")
+
+    @model_validator(mode="after")
+    def _refuse_les_configurations_dangereuses(self) -> Self:
+        secret = self.secret_key.get_secret_value()
+        if len(secret) < SECRET_KEY_MIN_LENGTH:
+            raise ValueError(
+                f"APP_SECRET_KEY doit faire au moins {SECRET_KEY_MIN_LENGTH} caractères"
+            )
+        if secret.strip().lower() in SENTINELLES_INTERDITES:
+            raise ValueError("APP_SECRET_KEY est une valeur d'exemple, il faut en générer une")
+
+        # Piège : `create_app()` passe `debug` à FastAPI, qui renvoie alors la trace complète
+        # au client, et à l'engine, qui journalise le SQL et ses paramètres.
+        if self.debug and self.env in ("staging", "prod"):
+            raise ValueError("APP_DEBUG doit rester faux hors des environnements locaux")
+
+        if "*" in self.cors_origins:
+            raise ValueError("APP_CORS_ORIGINS n'accepte pas de joker, les origines sont listées")
+
+        # Sans origines, aucun middleware CORS n'est monté et la vérification d'`Origin` des
+        # routes d'authentification n'a plus de référentiel auquel comparer.
+        if self.env != "local" and not self.allowed_origins:
+            raise ValueError("APP_CORS_ORIGINS doit lister au moins une origine hors local")
+
+        if self.cookie_samesite == "none" and not self.cookies_are_secure:
+            raise ValueError("Un cookie SameSite=None est rejeté par les navigateurs sans Secure")
+
+        return self
+
+
+@lru_cache
+def get_settings() -> Settings:
+    return Settings()

apps/backend/app/core/cookies.py

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+# Piège : le cookie de suppression doit reprendre exactement le nom et le `Path` du cookie
+# posé, sinon le navigateur en garde une copie et la déconnexion n'est que cosmétique.
+# `RefreshCookie.expired()` existe pour que les deux ne puissent pas diverger.
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from typing import Any, Self
+
+from app.core.config import SameSite, Settings
+
+SECURE_PREFIX = "__Secure-"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class RefreshCookie:
+    key: str
+    value: str
+    max_age: int
+    path: str
+    secure: bool
+    httponly: bool
+    samesite: SameSite
+
+    @classmethod
+    def build(cls, settings: Settings, value: str) -> Self:
+        return cls(
+            key=cookie_name(settings),
+            value=value,
+            max_age=settings.refresh_token_ttl_seconds,
+            path=settings.cookie_path,
+            secure=settings.cookies_are_secure,
+            httponly=True,
+            samesite=settings.cookie_samesite,
+        )
+
+    @classmethod
+    def expired(cls, settings: Settings) -> Self:
+        return cls(
+            key=cookie_name(settings),
+            value="",
+            max_age=0,
+            path=settings.cookie_path,
+            secure=settings.cookies_are_secure,
+            httponly=True,
+            samesite=settings.cookie_samesite,
+        )
+
+    def as_kwargs(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+    def as_deletion_kwargs(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        # `Response.delete_cookie()` n'accepte ni `value` ni `max_age`, mais il exige le même
+        # nom, le même chemin et les mêmes attributs, sinon le navigateur garde le cookie.
+        arguments = asdict(self)
+        del arguments["value"], arguments["max_age"]
+        return arguments
+
+
+def cookie_name(settings: Settings) -> str:
+    if settings.cookies_are_secure:
+        return f"{SECURE_PREFIX}{settings.refresh_cookie_name}"
+    return settings.refresh_cookie_name

apps/backend/app/core/hashing.py

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+# Piège : `PasswordHasher.verify()` bloque 17 ms. Appelé tel quel dans un `async def`, il fige
+# la boucle d'événements et gèle toutes les requêtes en cours, pas seulement la connexion.
+# `Argon2Hasher` le pousse donc dans un fil, sous un `CapacityLimiter` : le pool par défaut
+# d'anyio accepte 40 fils, soit 40 x 19 Mio dans le pire cas sur une machine qui héberge aussi
+# PostgreSQL, Prometheus et Grafana.
+# Piège : `verify_dummy()` doit être appelé quand l'utilisateur est introuvable. Sans lui,
+# l'écart entre 2 ms et 17 ms est un oracle d'existence de compte, mesurable à distance.
+
+import secrets
+
+import anyio
+import anyio.to_thread
+from argon2 import PasswordHasher
+from argon2.exceptions import Argon2Error, InvalidHashError, VerificationError
+
+_ERREURS_DE_VERIFICATION = (VerificationError, InvalidHashError, Argon2Error)
+
+
+class Argon2Hasher:
+    def __init__(self, hasher: PasswordHasher, *, max_concurrency: int) -> None:
+        self._hasher = hasher
+        self._limiter = anyio.CapacityLimiter(max_concurrency)
+        self._leurre = hasher.hash(secrets.token_urlsafe(32))
+
+    async def hash(self, password: str) -> str:
+        return await anyio.to_thread.run_sync(self._hasher.hash, password, limiter=self._limiter)
+
+    async def verify(self, stored: str, password: str) -> bool:
+        return await anyio.to_thread.run_sync(self._verify, stored, password, limiter=self._limiter)
+
+    async def verify_dummy(self) -> None:
+        await self.verify(self._leurre, "")
+
+    def needs_rehash(self, stored: str) -> bool:
+        try:
+            return self._hasher.check_needs_rehash(stored)
+        except _ERREURS_DE_VERIFICATION:
+            return True
+
+    def _verify(self, stored: str, password: str) -> bool:
+        try:
+            return self._hasher.verify(stored, password)
+        except _ERREURS_DE_VERIFICATION:
+            return False
+
+
+def build_hasher(
+    *,
+    time_cost: int,
+    memory_cost_kib: int,
+    parallelism: int,
+    max_concurrency: int,
+) -> Argon2Hasher:
+    return Argon2Hasher(
+        PasswordHasher(
+            time_cost=time_cost,
+            memory_cost=memory_cost_kib,
+            parallelism=parallelism,
+            hash_len=32,
+            salt_len=16,
+        ),
+        max_concurrency=max_concurrency,
+    )

apps/backend/app/core/logging.py

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+# Pourquoi : `RedactingFilter` est la troisième ligne de défense, pas la première. La première
+# est de ne jamais passer un secret au logger, la deuxième de ne jamais mettre un jeton dans
+# une URL, que le journal d'accès enregistrerait de toute façon. Le filtre rattrape l'erreur
+# que personne n'a relue, notamment l'écho SQL quand `debug` est actif.
+
+import logging
+import re
+from logging.config import dictConfig
+from typing import Final
+
+from app.core.config import Settings
+
+CAVIARDAGE: Final = "[expurgé]"
+
+REMPLACEMENTS: Final[tuple[tuple[re.Pattern[str], str], ...]] = (
+    (re.compile(r"Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/-]{20,}=*"), f"Bearer {CAVIARDAGE}"),
+    (re.compile(r"eyJ[A-Za-z0-9._-]{20,}"), CAVIARDAGE),
+    (re.compile(r"\$argon2[a-z0-9]*\$\S+"), CAVIARDAGE),
+    (
+        re.compile(r'("?(?:password|mot_de_passe|secret|token)"?\s*[:=]\s*")[^"]*(")'),
+        rf"\1{CAVIARDAGE}\2",
+    ),
+    (
+        re.compile(r"((?:password|mot_de_passe|secret|token)[A-Za-z_]*=)[^&\s;\"]+"),
+        rf"\1{CAVIARDAGE}",
+    ),
+    (re.compile(r"(ev_refresh=)[^;\s]+"), rf"\1{CAVIARDAGE}"),
+)
+
+
+def redact(message: str) -> str:
+    for motif, remplacement in REMPLACEMENTS:
+        message = motif.sub(remplacement, message)
+    return message
+
+
+class RedactingFilter(logging.Filter):
+    def filter(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> bool:
+        message = record.getMessage()
+        expurge = redact(message)
+        if expurge != message:
+            record.msg = expurge
+            record.args = ()
+        return True
+
+
+def configure_logging(settings: Settings) -> None:
+    formatter = "json" if settings.is_production else "console"
+    dictConfig(
+        {
+            "version": 1,
+            "disable_existing_loggers": False,
+            "filters": {
+                "redaction": {"()": "app.core.logging.RedactingFilter"},
+            },
+            "formatters": {
+                "console": {
+                    "format": "%(asctime)s %(levelname)-8s %(name)s %(message)s",
+                },
+                "json": {
+                    "()": "pythonjsonlogger.json.JsonFormatter",
+                    "format": "%(asctime)s %(levelname)s %(name)s %(message)s",
+                },
+            },
+            "handlers": {
+                "default": {
+                    "class": "logging.StreamHandler",
+                    "formatter": formatter,
+                    "filters": ["redaction"],
+                    "stream": "ext://sys.stdout",
+                },
+            },
+            "root": {"handlers": ["default"], "level": settings.log_level},
+            "loggers": {
+                "uvicorn": {
+                    "handlers": ["default"],
+                    "level": settings.log_level,
+                    "propagate": False,
+                },
+                "uvicorn.access": {
+                    "handlers": ["default"],
+                    "level": settings.log_level,
+                    "propagate": False,
+                },
+                "sqlalchemy.engine": {"level": "WARNING"},
+            },
+        }
+    )
+
+
+def get_logger(name: str) -> logging.Logger:
+    return logging.getLogger(name)

apps/backend/app/core/principal.py

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# Pourquoi : tout le code métier dépend de `Principal` et jamais du modèle ORM ni des claims
+# du jeton. C'est ce qui garde la bascule vers un fournisseur OIDC locale à
+# `get_current_principal()` et à `AuthService.authenticate()`, au lieu de la répandre dans
+# chaque endpoint.
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from uuid import UUID
+
+from app.core.roles import AccountKind, Role
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class Principal:
+    id: UUID
+    email: str
+    role: Role
+    kind: AccountKind
+    must_change_password: bool

apps/backend/app/core/roles.py

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+from enum import StrEnum
+from typing import Final
+
+
+class Role(StrEnum):
+    # Contrainte : ces valeurs voyagent en base, en JSON et dans les jetons. Elles restent
+    # en ASCII, contrairement au libellé « opérateur » affiché à l'utilisateur.
+    LECTEUR = "lecteur"
+    OPERATEUR = "operateur"
+    ADMIN = "admin"
+
+
+class AccountKind(StrEnum):
+    HUMAIN = "human"
+    SERVICE = "service"
+
+
+ROLE_RANK: Final[dict[Role, int]] = {
+    Role.LECTEUR: 0,
+    Role.OPERATEUR: 1,
+    Role.ADMIN: 2,
+}
+
+
+def has_at_least(actual: Role, required: Role) -> bool:
+    return ROLE_RANK[actual] >= ROLE_RANK[required]

apps/backend/app/core/security.py

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+# Piège : `decode_access_token()` porte trois barrières indépendantes, et retirer l'une
+# d'elles ne casse aucun test évident. L'algorithme est épinglé, sinon un jeton forgé en
+# `alg: none` passerait. L'audience et l'émetteur sont vérifiés, sinon un jeton émis pour
+# un autre service serait accepté. Le claim `typ` est comparé, sinon un jeton de
+# rafraîchissement servirait de jeton d'accès, ce qui transformerait une fenêtre de
+# 15 minutes en fenêtre de 7 jours.
+# Contrainte : ce module ne lit jamais `get_settings()`, qui est mis en cache par
+# `lru_cache` et se contaminerait entre tests. Tout paramètre arrive par `TokenPolicy`.
+
+import hashlib
+import secrets
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+from typing import Final
+from uuid import UUID, uuid4
+
+import jwt
+
+ACCESS_TOKEN_TYPE: Final = "access"  # noqa: S105
+REFRESH_SECRET_BYTES: Final = 32
+
+_ALGORITHME: Final = "HS256"
+_CLAIMS_REQUIS: Final = ["iss", "aud", "sub", "iat", "exp", "jti", "typ", "role", "kind"]
+
+
+class TokenInvalidError(Exception):
+    pass
+
+
+class TokenExpiredError(TokenInvalidError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class TokenPolicy:
+    secret: str
+    issuer: str
+    audience: str
+    access_ttl: timedelta
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AccessClaims:
+    subject: UUID
+    role: str
+    kind: str
+    token_id: UUID
+    issued_at: datetime
+
+
+def encode_access_token(
+    policy: TokenPolicy,
+    *,
+    subject: UUID,
+    role: str,
+    kind: str,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    emis_a = now or datetime.now(UTC)
+    return jwt.encode(
+        {
+            "iss": policy.issuer,
+            "aud": policy.audience,
+            "sub": str(subject),
+            "iat": emis_a,
+            "exp": emis_a + policy.access_ttl,
+            "jti": str(uuid4()),
+            "typ": ACCESS_TOKEN_TYPE,
+            "role": role,
+            "kind": kind,
+        },
+        policy.secret,
+        algorithm=_ALGORITHME,
+    )
+
+
+def decode_access_token(policy: TokenPolicy, token: str) -> AccessClaims:
+    try:
+        charge = jwt.decode(
+            token,
+            policy.secret,
+            algorithms=[_ALGORITHME],
+            audience=policy.audience,
+            issuer=policy.issuer,
+            options={"require": _CLAIMS_REQUIS},
+        )
+    except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError as erreur:
+        raise TokenExpiredError("Jeton expiré") from erreur
+    except jwt.InvalidTokenError as erreur:
+        raise TokenInvalidError("Jeton invalide") from erreur
+
+    if charge["typ"] != ACCESS_TOKEN_TYPE:
+        raise TokenInvalidError("Type de jeton inattendu")
+
+    try:
+        sujet = UUID(charge["sub"])
+        identifiant = UUID(charge["jti"])
+    except (AttributeError, TypeError, ValueError) as erreur:
+        raise TokenInvalidError("Identifiants du jeton illisibles") from erreur
+
+    return AccessClaims(
+        subject=sujet,
+        role=str(charge["role"]),
+        kind=str(charge["kind"]),
+        token_id=identifiant,
+        issued_at=datetime.fromtimestamp(charge["iat"], tz=UTC),
+    )
+
+
+def generate_refresh_secret() -> str:
+    return secrets.token_urlsafe(REFRESH_SECRET_BYTES)
+
+
+# SHA-256 nu, pas Argon2id : 256 bits de CSPRNG n'ont ni dictionnaire ni préimage atteignable,
+# et une KDF lente coûterait 17 ms à chaque rafraîchissement pour aucun gain.
+def fingerprint_refresh(secret: str) -> bytes:
+    return hashlib.sha256(secret.encode("utf-8")).digest()

apps/backend/app/db/base.py

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+from sqlalchemy.orm import DeclarativeBase
+
+
+class Base(DeclarativeBase):
+    """Base déclarative commune à tous les modèles."""

apps/backend/app/db/session.py

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+from collections.abc import AsyncIterator
+from functools import lru_cache
+
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import (
+    AsyncEngine,
+    AsyncSession,
+    async_sessionmaker,
+    create_async_engine,
+)
+
+from app.core.config import get_settings
+
+
+@lru_cache
+def get_engine() -> AsyncEngine:
+    settings = get_settings()
+    return create_async_engine(
+        settings.database_url,
+        echo=settings.debug,
+        pool_pre_ping=True,
+        pool_size=settings.database_pool_size,
+        max_overflow=settings.database_max_overflow,
+    )
+
+
+@lru_cache
+def get_session_factory() -> async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]:
+    return async_sessionmaker(get_engine(), class_=AsyncSession, expire_on_commit=False)
+
+
+async def get_session() -> AsyncIterator[AsyncSession]:
+    async with get_session_factory()() as session:
+        yield session

apps/backend/app/main.py

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+from collections.abc import AsyncIterator
+from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
+
+from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI
+from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
+from prometheus_fastapi_instrumentator import Instrumentator
+
+from app.api.errors import register_error_handlers
+from app.api.middleware import SecurityHeadersMiddleware
+from app.api.openapi import DESCRIPTION, SUMMARY, TAGS
+from app.api.security import require_metrics_token
+from app.api.v1.router import api_router
+from app.core.config import Settings, get_settings
+from app.core.logging import configure_logging, get_logger
+from app.db.session import get_engine
+
+logger = get_logger(__name__)
+
+METHODES_AUTORISEES = ["GET", "POST", "PATCH", "PUT", "DELETE", "OPTIONS"]
+EN_TETES_AUTORISES = ["Authorization", "Content-Type"]
+
+
+@asynccontextmanager
+async def lifespan(_: FastAPI) -> AsyncIterator[None]:
+    settings = get_settings()
+    logger.info(
+        "Démarrage de %s %s en environnement %s", settings.name, settings.version, settings.env
+    )
+    yield
+    await get_engine().dispose()
+
+
+def create_app(settings: Settings | None = None) -> FastAPI:
+    resolved = settings or get_settings()
+    configure_logging(resolved)
+
+    documentee = resolved.api_docs_are_exposed
+    application = FastAPI(
+        title=resolved.name,
+        version=resolved.version,
+        summary=SUMMARY,
+        description=DESCRIPTION,
+        openapi_tags=TAGS,
+        debug=resolved.debug,
+        lifespan=lifespan,
+        docs_url="/docs" if documentee else None,
+        redoc_url="/redoc" if documentee else None,
+        openapi_url="/openapi.json" if documentee else None,
+    )
+
+    application.add_middleware(SecurityHeadersMiddleware)
+
+    if resolved.allowed_origins:
+        # Méthodes et en-têtes listés plutôt que joker : avec `allow_credentials`, la liste
+        # d'origines devient l'unique contrôle, autant documenter le contrat exact.
+        application.add_middleware(
+            CORSMiddleware,
+            allow_origins=resolved.allowed_origins,
+            allow_credentials=True,
+            allow_methods=METHODES_AUTORISEES,
+            allow_headers=EN_TETES_AUTORISES,
+            expose_headers=["Retry-After"],
+            max_age=600,
+        )
+
+    register_error_handlers(application)
+
+    Instrumentator().instrument(application).expose(
+        application,
+        endpoint="/metrics",
+        include_in_schema=False,
+        dependencies=[Depends(require_metrics_token)],
+    )
+    application.include_router(api_router, prefix=resolved.api_prefix)
+
+    # Piège : sans cette surcharge, une configuration passée à `create_app()` ne piloterait
+    # que la construction, et les dépendances continueraient de lire `get_settings()` depuis
+    # l'environnement. Un test « en production » ne testerait alors pas la production.
+    if settings is not None:
+        application.dependency_overrides[get_settings] = lambda: resolved
+
+    return application

apps/backend/app/models/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Piège : tout modèle absent de ce module reste invisible de `alembic revision
+# --autogenerate`, qui générerait alors un drop de sa table.
+
+from app.models.audit_log import AuditLog
+from app.models.energy import Alert, Dataset, Prediction, Reading, Recommendation, Site
+from app.models.login_attempt import LoginAttempt
+from app.models.refresh_token import RefreshToken
+from app.models.user import AppUser
+
+__all__ = [
+    "Alert",
+    "AppUser",
+    "AuditLog",
+    "Dataset",
+    "LoginAttempt",
+    "Prediction",
+    "Reading",
+    "Recommendation",
+    "RefreshToken",
+    "Site",
+]

apps/backend/app/models/audit_log.py

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# Pourquoi : `actor_id` ne porte volontairement aucune clé étrangère. Une contrainte
+# `ON DELETE SET NULL` déclencherait un UPDATE que le déclencheur d'ajout seul refuserait, donc
+# la suppression d'un compte échouerait ; une contrainte `NO ACTION` interdirait toute
+# suppression. `actor_email` et `actor_role` sont dénormalisés pour la même raison : le journal
+# dit ce qui était vrai au moment de l'acte, pas ce qui est vrai aujourd'hui.
+
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime
+from enum import StrEnum
+from typing import Any
+
+from sqlalchemy import BigInteger, CheckConstraint, DateTime, Identity, Index, Text, func
+from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import INET, JSONB
+from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import UUID as PG_UUID
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
+
+from app.db.base import Base
+
+
+class AuditOutcome(StrEnum):
+    SUCCES = "success"
+    ECHEC = "failure"
+
+
+class AuditAction(StrEnum):
+    COMPTE_CREE = "user.created"
+    COMPTE_ROLE_CHANGE = "user.role_changed"
+    COMPTE_DESACTIVE = "user.disabled"
+    COMPTE_ACTIVE = "user.enabled"
+    COMPTE_MOT_DE_PASSE_REINITIALISE = "user.password_reset_by_admin"
+    COMPTE_MOT_DE_PASSE_CHANGE = "user.password_changed"
+    REFRESH_REUTILISE = "auth.refresh_reuse_detected"
+    SESSIONS_REVOQUEES = "auth.all_sessions_revoked"
+    LIMITE_PAR_IDENTIFIANT = "auth.identifier_throttled"
+    ADMIN_AMORCE = "bootstrap.admin_created"
+
+
+ISSUES_AUTORISEES = ", ".join(f"'{issue.value}'" for issue in AuditOutcome)
+
+
+class AuditLog(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "audit_log"
+    __table_args__ = (
+        CheckConstraint(f"outcome in ({ISSUES_AUTORISEES})", name="ck_audit_log_outcome"),
+        Index("ix_audit_log_date", "occurred_at"),
+        Index("ix_audit_log_action_date", "action", "occurred_at"),
+    )
+
+    id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(BigInteger, Identity(always=True), primary_key=True)
+    occurred_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
+        DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now()
+    )
+    actor_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID | None] = mapped_column(PG_UUID(as_uuid=True), nullable=True)
+    actor_email: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=True)
+    actor_role: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=True)
+    action: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=False)
+    target_type: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=True)
+    target_id: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=True)
+    outcome: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=False)
+    client_ip: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(INET, nullable=True)
+    user_agent: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=True)
+    detail: Mapped[dict[str, Any]] = mapped_column(
+        JSONB, nullable=False, server_default=func.jsonb_build_object()
+    )

apps/backend/app/models/energy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+"""Tables du modèle de données EnerVision (CSV, API Mock et résultats ML)."""
+
+from datetime import datetime
+from decimal import Decimal
+from typing import Any
+
+from sqlalchemy import (
+    BigInteger,
+    Boolean,
+    CheckConstraint,
+    DateTime,
+    Double,
+    ForeignKey,
+    ForeignKeyConstraint,
+    Index,
+    Integer,
+    Numeric,
+    String,
+    Text,
+    UniqueConstraint,
+    func,
+    text,
+)
+from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import ARRAY, JSONB
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
+
+from app.db.base import Base
+
+
+class Dataset(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "dataset"
+    __table_args__ = (
+        CheckConstraint("dataset_id > 0", name="ck_dataset_positive_id"),
+        UniqueConstraint("archive_sha256", name="uq_dataset_archive_sha256"),
+    )
+
+    dataset_id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(BigInteger, primary_key=True, autoincrement=True)
+    dataset_name: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
+    archive_sha256: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(64))
+    storage_uri: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
+    source_timezone: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text)
+    # "metadata" est réservé par SQLAlchemy ; le nom SQL reste inchangé.
+    dataset_metadata: Mapped[dict[str, Any]] = mapped_column("metadata", JSONB(none_as_null=True))
+
+
+class Site(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "site"
+
+    site_id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text, primary_key=True)
+    site_name: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
+    site_type: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
+    location: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text)
+    capacity_kw: Mapped[float | None] = mapped_column(Double)
+    status: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text)
+
+
+class Reading(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "reading"
+    __table_args__ = (
+        CheckConstraint(
+            "source IN ('csv', 'api_current', 'api_history')", name="ck_reading_source"
+        ),
+        CheckConstraint(
+            "(source = 'csv' AND dataset_id IS NOT NULL) OR "
+            "(source IN ('api_current', 'api_history') AND dataset_id IS NULL)",
+            name="ck_reading_dataset_source",
+        ),
+        CheckConstraint(
+            "data_quality IS NULL OR data_quality IN ('good', 'partial', 'degraded', 'critical')",
+            name="ck_reading_quality",
+        ),
+        CheckConstraint(
+            "(imputed_values IS NULL AND imputation_method IS NULL) OR "
+            "(imputed_values IS NOT NULL AND imputation_method IS NOT NULL)",
+            name="ck_reading_imputation",
+        ),
+        Index("ix_reading_site_timestamp", "site_id", "timestamp"),
+        Index("ix_reading_dataset_id", "dataset_id"),
+    )
+
+    reading_id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(BigInteger, primary_key=True, autoincrement=True)
+    site_id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(
+        Text, ForeignKey("site.site_id", name="fk_reading_site", ondelete="RESTRICT")
+    )
+    timestamp: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), primary_key=True)
+    source: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
+    dataset_id: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(
+        BigInteger,
+        ForeignKey("dataset.dataset_id", name="fk_reading_dataset", ondelete="RESTRICT"),
+    )
+    consumption_kw: Mapped[float | None] = mapped_column(Double)
+    consumption_kwh: Mapped[float | None] = mapped_column(Double)
+    consumption_euros: Mapped[Decimal | None] = mapped_column(Numeric(14, 2))
+    voltage_v: Mapped[float | None] = mapped_column(Double)
+    current_a: Mapped[float | None] = mapped_column(Double)
+    power_factor: Mapped[float | None] = mapped_column(Double)
+    temperature_celsius: Mapped[float | None] = mapped_column(Double)
+    humidity_percent: Mapped[float | None] = mapped_column(Double)
+    solar_irradiance_wm2: Mapped[float | None] = mapped_column(Double)
+    is_working_hours: Mapped[bool | None] = mapped_column(Boolean)
+    data_quality: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text)
+    null_reasons: Mapped[list[str] | None] = mapped_column(ARRAY(Text))
+    imputed_values: Mapped[dict[str, Any] | None] = mapped_column(JSONB(none_as_null=True))
+    imputation_method: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text)
+    ingested_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
+        DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now()
+    )
+    raw_data: Mapped[dict[str, Any]] = mapped_column(JSONB(none_as_null=True))
+
+
+Index(
+    "uq_reading_source",
+    Reading.site_id,
+    Reading.timestamp,
+    Reading.source,
+    func.coalesce(Reading.dataset_id, text("0")),
+    unique=True,
+)
+
+
+class Prediction(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "prediction"
+    __table_args__ = (
+        UniqueConstraint("prediction_id", "site_id", name="uq_prediction_id_site"),
+        Index("ix_prediction_site_target", "site_id", "target_at"),
+        CheckConstraint(
+            "target_metric IN ('consumption_kwh', 'consumption_kw')",
+            name="ck_prediction_metric",
+        ),
+        CheckConstraint(
+            "period_minutes IS NULL OR period_minutes > 0", name="ck_prediction_period"
+        ),
+        CheckConstraint(
+            "target_metric <> 'consumption_kwh' OR period_minutes IS NOT NULL",
+            name="ck_prediction_energy_period",
+        ),
+        CheckConstraint(
+            "(status = 'available' AND predicted_value IS NOT NULL AND failure_reason IS NULL) OR "
+            "(status IN ('insufficient_data', 'error') AND predicted_value IS NULL "
+            "AND failure_reason IS NOT NULL)",
+            name="ck_prediction_status",
+        ),
+    )
+
+    prediction_id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(BigInteger, primary_key=True, autoincrement=True)
+    site_id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(
+        Text, ForeignKey("site.site_id", name="fk_prediction_site", ondelete="RESTRICT")
+    )
+    created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now())
+    target_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
+    target_metric: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
+    period_minutes: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(Integer)
+    predicted_value: Mapped[float | None] = mapped_column(Double)
+    model_reference: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
+    status: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
+    failure_reason: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text)
+
+
+class Alert(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "alert"
+    __table_args__ = (
+        UniqueConstraint("source", "site_id", "source_alert_id", name="uq_alert_source_reference"),
+        Index("ix_alert_site_timestamp", "site_id", "timestamp"),
+        ForeignKeyConstraint(
+            ["prediction_id", "site_id"],
+            ["prediction.prediction_id", "prediction.site_id"],
+            name="fk_alert_prediction_site",
+            ondelete="RESTRICT",
+        ),
+        CheckConstraint("source IN ('api_mock', 'enervision')", name="ck_alert_source"),
+        CheckConstraint(
+            "type IN ('spike', 'threshold', 'anomaly', 'outage', 'sensor')", name="ck_alert_type"
+        ),
+        CheckConstraint(
+            "severity IN ('low', 'medium', 'high', 'critical')", name="ck_alert_severity"
+        ),
+    )
+
+    alert_id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(BigInteger, primary_key=True, autoincrement=True)
+    source_alert_id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
+    site_id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(
+        Text, ForeignKey("site.site_id", name="fk_alert_site", ondelete="RESTRICT")
+    )
+    source: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
+    timestamp: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True))
+    type: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
+    severity: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
+    message: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
+    value: Mapped[float | None] = mapped_column(Double)
+    threshold: Mapped[float | None] = mapped_column(Double)
+    metric: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text)
+    prediction_id: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(BigInteger)
+    raw_data: Mapped[dict[str, Any]] = mapped_column(JSONB(none_as_null=True))
+
+
+class Recommendation(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "recommendation"
+    __table_args__ = (
+        UniqueConstraint("alert_id", "rule_reference", name="uq_recommendation_alert_rule"),
+    )
+
+    recommendation_id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(BigInteger, primary_key=True, autoincrement=True)
+    alert_id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(
+        BigInteger,
+        ForeignKey("alert.alert_id", name="fk_recommendation_alert", ondelete="RESTRICT"),
+    )
+    action: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
+    explanation: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
+    rule_reference: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
+    created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now())

apps/backend/app/models/login_attempt.py

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# Pourquoi : les tentatives vivent ici et non dans `audit_log`, qui est en ajout seul. Leur
+# volume est piloté par l'attaquant : une force brute y écrirait des millions de lignes
+# indestructibles. Cette table-ci se purge, et c'est aussi le compteur de la limitation.
+# Piège : la tentative est enregistrée même quand l'email est inconnu, sinon le 429 dirait
+# qu'un compte existe.
+
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime
+from enum import StrEnum
+
+from sqlalchemy import BigInteger, CheckConstraint, DateTime, Identity, Index, String, Text, func
+from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import INET
+from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import UUID as PG_UUID
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
+
+from app.db.base import Base
+
+
+class LoginOutcome(StrEnum):
+    SUCCES = "success"
+    IDENTIFIANTS_INVALIDES = "bad_credentials"
+    LIMITE = "throttled"
+    COMPTE_INDISPONIBLE = "inactive"
+
+
+ISSUES_AUTORISEES = ", ".join(f"'{issue.value}'" for issue in LoginOutcome)
+
+
+class LoginAttempt(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "login_attempt"
+    __table_args__ = (
+        CheckConstraint(f"outcome in ({ISSUES_AUTORISEES})", name="ck_login_attempt_outcome"),
+        Index("ix_login_attempt_email_date", "email_tried", "occurred_at"),
+        Index("ix_login_attempt_ip_date", "client_ip", "occurred_at"),
+    )
+
+    id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(BigInteger, Identity(always=True), primary_key=True)
+    occurred_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
+        DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now()
+    )
+    email_tried: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(320), nullable=False)
+    client_ip: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(INET, nullable=True)
+    outcome: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=False)
+    user_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID | None] = mapped_column(PG_UUID(as_uuid=True), nullable=True)

apps/backend/app/models/refresh_token.py

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# Pourquoi : un jeton de rafraîchissement est une chaîne opaque, jamais un JWT. Il doit être
+# révocable, donc cette ligne existe de toute façon ; le JWT n'ajouterait qu'un second chemin de
+# signature. Surtout, la séparation devient structurelle : un JWT ne figure dans aucune ligne,
+# une chaîne opaque échoue au décodage. Aucune confusion de type n'est possible.
+# Piège : `expires_at` est absolu et hérité du prédécesseur à chaque rotation. S'il glissait,
+# la promesse de sept jours serait fictive et une session active ne finirait jamais.
+
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime
+from enum import StrEnum
+
+from sqlalchemy import CheckConstraint, DateTime, ForeignKey, Index, LargeBinary, Text, func
+from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import INET
+from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import UUID as PG_UUID
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
+
+from app.db.base import Base
+
+
+class RevocationReason(StrEnum):
+    DECONNEXION = "logout"
+    ROTATION = "rotation"
+    REUTILISATION = "reuse_detected"
+    CHANGEMENT_MOT_DE_PASSE = "password_change"
+    ADMINISTRATION = "admin"
+
+
+MOTIFS_AUTORISES = ", ".join(f"'{motif.value}'" for motif in RevocationReason)
+
+
+class RefreshToken(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "refresh_token"
+    __table_args__ = (
+        CheckConstraint(
+            f"revoked_reason is null or revoked_reason in ({MOTIFS_AUTORISES})",
+            name="ck_refresh_token_revoked_reason",
+        ),
+        Index("ix_refresh_token_family", "family_id"),
+        Index("ix_refresh_token_user", "user_id"),
+        Index(
+            "ix_refresh_token_vivants",
+            "user_id",
+            postgresql_where="revoked_at is null and rotated_at is null",
+        ),
+    )
+
+    id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(
+        PG_UUID(as_uuid=True), primary_key=True, server_default=func.gen_random_uuid()
+    )
+    family_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(PG_UUID(as_uuid=True), nullable=False)
+    user_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(
+        PG_UUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("app_user.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), nullable=False
+    )
+    token_hash: Mapped[bytes] = mapped_column(LargeBinary, nullable=False, unique=True)
+    issued_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
+        DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now()
+    )
+    expires_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False)
+    rotated_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+    revoked_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+    revoked_reason: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=True)
+    replaced_by: Mapped[uuid.UUID | None] = mapped_column(PG_UUID(as_uuid=True), nullable=True)
+    client_ip: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(INET, nullable=True)
+    user_agent: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=True)

apps/backend/app/models/user.py

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+# Contrainte : la table s'appelle `app_user` et non `user`, qui est un mot réservé PostgreSQL,
+# raccourci de `CURRENT_USER`. Le nom rappelle aussi qu'il s'agit d'un compte applicatif, par
+# opposition au rôle PostgreSQL qui porte, lui, le cantonnement des accès.
+
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime
+
+from sqlalchemy import Boolean, CheckConstraint, DateTime, String, Text, func, text
+from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import UUID as PG_UUID
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
+
+from app.core.roles import AccountKind, Role
+from app.db.base import Base
+
+ROLES_AUTORISES = ", ".join(f"'{role.value}'" for role in Role)
+NATURES_AUTORISEES = ", ".join(f"'{nature.value}'" for nature in AccountKind)
+
+
+class AppUser(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "app_user"
+    __table_args__ = (
+        CheckConstraint("email = lower(email)", name="ck_app_user_email_minuscule"),
+        CheckConstraint(f"role in ({ROLES_AUTORISES})", name="ck_app_user_role"),
+        CheckConstraint(f"kind in ({NATURES_AUTORISEES})", name="ck_app_user_kind"),
+    )
+
+    id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(
+        PG_UUID(as_uuid=True), primary_key=True, server_default=func.gen_random_uuid()
+    )
+    email: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(320), unique=True, nullable=False)
+    password_hash: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=False)
+    role: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=False)
+    kind: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=False, server_default=text("'human'"))
+    is_active: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, server_default=text("true"))
+    must_change_password: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(
+        Boolean, nullable=False, server_default=text("false")
+    )
+    # Une seule colonne couvre le changement de mot de passe, le changement de rôle et la
+    # désactivation : tout jeton émis avant cet instant est périmé.
+    credentials_changed_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
+        DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now()
+    )
+    last_login_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+    full_name: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=True)
+    created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
+        DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now()
+    )
+    updated_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
+        DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, server_default=func.now(), onupdate=func.now()
+    )

apps/backend/app/repositories/alert.py

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+from collections.abc import Sequence
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.models.energy import Alert
+
+
+class AlertRepository:
+    def __init__(self, session: AsyncSession) -> None:
+        self._session = session
+
+    async def list_all(
+        self, *, site_id: str | None = None, severity: str | None = None
+    ) -> Sequence[Alert]:
+        requete = select(Alert).order_by(Alert.timestamp.desc(), Alert.alert_id.desc())
+        if site_id is not None:
+            requete = requete.where(Alert.site_id == site_id)
+        if severity is not None:
+            requete = requete.where(Alert.severity == severity)
+        return (await self._session.scalars(requete)).all()

apps/backend/app/repositories/audit_log.py

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# Piège : `detail` passe par une liste blanche de clés et jamais par un `dict(**kwargs)`. La
+# table est en ajout seul : une clé inattendue qui porterait un secret ou une donnée
+# personnelle ne pourrait plus en être retirée.
+
+from collections.abc import Mapping
+from typing import Any
+
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.core.principal import Principal
+from app.models.audit_log import AuditAction, AuditLog, AuditOutcome
+
+CLES_DE_DETAIL_AUTORISEES = frozenset(
+    {
+        "email",
+        "role_avant",
+        "role_apres",
+        "famille",
+        "motif",
+        "source",
+        "sessions_revoquees",
+    }
+)
+
+
+def assemble_detail(brut: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not brut:
+        return {}
+    return {cle: valeur for cle, valeur in brut.items() if cle in CLES_DE_DETAIL_AUTORISEES}
+
+
+class AuditLogRepository:
+    def __init__(self, session: AsyncSession) -> None:
+        self._session = session
+
+    async def record(
+        self,
+        *,
+        action: AuditAction,
+        outcome: AuditOutcome = AuditOutcome.SUCCES,
+        actor: Principal | None = None,
+        actor_label: str | None = None,
+        target_type: str | None = None,
+        target_id: str | None = None,
+        client_ip: str | None = None,
+        user_agent: str | None = None,
+        detail: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self._session.add(
+            AuditLog(
+                actor_id=actor.id if actor else None,
+                actor_email=actor.email if actor else actor_label,
+                actor_role=actor.role.value if actor else None,
+                action=action.value,
+                target_type=target_type,
+                target_id=target_id,
+                outcome=outcome.value,
+                client_ip=client_ip,
+                user_agent=user_agent,
+                detail=assemble_detail(detail),
+            )
+        )

apps/backend/app/repositories/login_attempt.py

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# Pourquoi : les trois compteurs tiennent en une seule requête, grâce aux clauses FILTER de
+# PostgreSQL. Trois `count(*)` séparés feraient trois allers-retours sur le chemin critique de
+# la connexion, qui est justement celui qu'un attaquant martèle.
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+from uuid import UUID
+
+from sqlalchemy import and_, func, select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.models.login_attempt import LoginAttempt, LoginOutcome
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class FailureCounts:
+    per_identifier_and_ip: int
+    per_ip: int
+    per_identifier: int
+
+
+class LoginAttemptRepository:
+    def __init__(self, session: AsyncSession) -> None:
+        self._session = session
+
+    async def record(
+        self,
+        *,
+        email: str,
+        client_ip: str | None,
+        outcome: LoginOutcome,
+        user_id: UUID | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self._session.add(
+            LoginAttempt(
+                email_tried=email.strip().lower(),
+                client_ip=client_ip,
+                outcome=outcome.value,
+                user_id=user_id,
+            )
+        )
+
+    async def count_recent_failures(
+        self, *, email: str, client_ip: str | None, window_seconds: int
+    ) -> FailureCounts:
+        identifiant = email.strip().lower()
+        meme_email = LoginAttempt.email_tried == identifiant
+        meme_ip = LoginAttempt.client_ip == client_ip
+
+        requete = select(
+            func.count().filter(and_(meme_email, meme_ip)),
+            func.count().filter(meme_ip),
+            func.count().filter(meme_email),
+        ).where(
+            LoginAttempt.outcome != LoginOutcome.SUCCES.value,
+            LoginAttempt.occurred_at > datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(seconds=window_seconds),
+            meme_email | meme_ip,
+        )
+
+        par_identifiant_et_ip, par_ip, par_identifiant = (
+            await self._session.execute(requete)
+        ).one()
+        return FailureCounts(
+            per_identifier_and_ip=par_identifiant_et_ip,
+            per_ip=par_ip,
+            per_identifier=par_identifiant,
+        )

apps/backend/app/repositories/reading.py

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+from collections.abc import Sequence
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.models.energy import Reading
+
+
+class ReadingRepository:
+    def __init__(self, session: AsyncSession) -> None:
+        self._session = session
+
+    async def latest_by_site(self) -> Sequence[Reading]:
+        # `.distinct(site_id)` compile en `DISTINCT ON (site_id)` sous PostgreSQL : une seule
+        # ligne par site, la plus récente grâce à l'ordre composite qui suit.
+        requete = (
+            select(Reading)
+            .distinct(Reading.site_id)
+            .order_by(Reading.site_id, Reading.timestamp.desc())
+        )
+        return (await self._session.execute(requete)).scalars().all()

apps/backend/app/repositories/recommendation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+from collections.abc import Sequence
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.models.energy import Recommendation
+
+
+class RecommendationRepository:
+    def __init__(self, session: AsyncSession) -> None:
+        self._session = session
+
+    async def list_all(self) -> Sequence[Recommendation]:
+        requete = select(Recommendation).order_by(Recommendation.recommendation_id)
+        return (await self._session.scalars(requete)).all()
+
+    async def get_by_id(self, recommendation_id: int) -> Recommendation | None:
+        requete = select(Recommendation).where(
+            Recommendation.recommendation_id == recommendation_id
+        )
+        recommendation: Recommendation | None = await self._session.scalar(requete)
+        return recommendation

apps/backend/app/repositories/refresh_token.py

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+# Piège : `claim_for_rotation()` est une seule instruction. Un SELECT puis un UPDATE
+# laisseraient une fenêtre où deux onglets réussissent la même rotation. Zéro ligne retournée
+# signifie donc, sans ambiguïté, que le jeton était déjà tourné, révoqué, expiré ou inconnu, et
+# c'est `inspect()` qui départage ensuite ces cas.
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime
+from uuid import UUID
+
+from sqlalchemy import func, select, update
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.models.refresh_token import RefreshToken, RevocationReason
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ClaimedToken:
+    id: UUID
+    family_id: UUID
+    user_id: UUID
+    expires_at: datetime
+
+
+class RefreshTokenRepository:
+    def __init__(self, session: AsyncSession) -> None:
+        self._session = session
+
+    async def create(
+        self,
+        *,
+        user_id: UUID,
+        family_id: UUID,
+        token_hash: bytes,
+        expires_at: datetime,
+        client_ip: str | None,
+        user_agent: str | None,
+    ) -> RefreshToken:
+        jeton = RefreshToken(
+            user_id=user_id,
+            family_id=family_id,
+            token_hash=token_hash,
+            expires_at=expires_at,
+            client_ip=client_ip,
+            user_agent=user_agent,
+        )
+        self._session.add(jeton)
+        await self._session.flush()
+        return jeton
+
+    async def claim_for_rotation(self, token_hash: bytes) -> ClaimedToken | None:
+        requete = (
+            update(RefreshToken)
+            .where(
+                RefreshToken.token_hash == token_hash,
+                RefreshToken.rotated_at.is_(None),
+                RefreshToken.revoked_at.is_(None),
+                RefreshToken.expires_at > func.clock_timestamp(),
+            )
+            .values(
+                rotated_at=func.clock_timestamp(),
+                revoked_at=func.clock_timestamp(),
+                revoked_reason=RevocationReason.ROTATION.value,
+            )
+            .returning(
+                RefreshToken.id,
+                RefreshToken.family_id,
+                RefreshToken.user_id,
+                RefreshToken.expires_at,
+            )
+        )
+        ligne = (await self._session.execute(requete)).one_or_none()
+        if ligne is None:
+            return None
+        return ClaimedToken(
+            id=ligne.id,
+            family_id=ligne.family_id,
+            user_id=ligne.user_id,
+            expires_at=ligne.expires_at,
+        )
+
+    async def inspect(self, token_hash: bytes) -> RefreshToken | None:
+        requete = select(RefreshToken).where(RefreshToken.token_hash == token_hash)
+        return (await self._session.execute(requete)).scalar_one_or_none()
+
+    async def link_replacement(self, ancien_id: UUID, nouveau_id: UUID) -> None:
+        await self._session.execute(
+            update(RefreshToken).where(RefreshToken.id == ancien_id).values(replaced_by=nouveau_id)
+        )
+
+    async def revoke_family(self, family_id: UUID, reason: RevocationReason) -> int:
+        resultat = await self._session.execute(
+            update(RefreshToken)
+            .where(RefreshToken.family_id == family_id, RefreshToken.revoked_at.is_(None))
+            .values(revoked_at=func.clock_timestamp(), revoked_reason=reason.value)
+            .returning(RefreshToken.id)
+        )
+        return len(resultat.all())
+
+    async def revoke_all_for_user(self, user_id: UUID, reason: RevocationReason) -> int:
+        resultat = await self._session.execute(
+            update(RefreshToken)
+            .where(RefreshToken.user_id == user_id, RefreshToken.revoked_at.is_(None))
+            .values(revoked_at=func.clock_timestamp(), revoked_reason=reason.value)
+            .returning(RefreshToken.id)
+        )
+        return len(resultat.all())

apps/backend/app/repositories/site.py

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+from collections.abc import Sequence
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.models.energy import Site
+
+
+class SiteRepository:
+    def __init__(self, session: AsyncSession) -> None:
+        self._session = session
+
+    async def list_all(self) -> Sequence[Site]:
+        requete = select(Site).order_by(Site.site_id)
+        return (await self._session.scalars(requete)).all()
+
+    async def get_by_id(self, site_id: str) -> Site | None:
+        requete = select(Site).where(Site.site_id == site_id)
+        site: Site | None = await self._session.scalar(requete)
+        return site

apps/backend/app/repositories/user.py

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+# Piège : `set_role()` et `set_active()` avancent `credentials_changed_at`. C'est ce qui rend
+# un changement de rôle ou une désactivation effectifs à la requête suivante au lieu d'attendre
+# l'expiration du jeton d'accès. Une mise à jour qui l'oublierait laisserait 15 minutes de
+# privilèges périmés.
+
+from collections.abc import Sequence
+from uuid import UUID
+
+from sqlalchemy import func, select, update
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.core.roles import AccountKind, Role
+from app.models.user import AppUser
+
+
+class UserRepository:
+    def __init__(self, session: AsyncSession) -> None:
+        self._session = session
+
+    async def get_by_email(self, email: str) -> AppUser | None:
+        requete = select(AppUser).where(AppUser.email == email.strip().lower())
+        return (await self._session.execute(requete)).scalar_one_or_none()
+
+    async def get_by_id(self, user_id: UUID) -> AppUser | None:
+        return await self._session.get(AppUser, user_id)
+
+    async def list_all(self) -> Sequence[AppUser]:
+        requete = select(AppUser).order_by(AppUser.email)
+        return (await self._session.execute(requete)).scalars().all()
+
+    async def count_active_admins(self) -> int:
+        requete = (
+            select(func.count())
+            .select_from(AppUser)
+            .where(AppUser.role == Role.ADMIN.value, AppUser.is_active.is_(True))
+        )
+        return (await self._session.execute(requete)).scalar_one()
+
+    async def create(
+        self,
+        *,
+        email: str,
+        password_hash: str,
+        role: Role,
+        kind: AccountKind = AccountKind.HUMAIN,
+        full_name: str | None = None,
+        must_change_password: bool = False,
+    ) -> AppUser:
+        compte = AppUser(
+            email=email.strip().lower(),
+            password_hash=password_hash,
+            role=role.value,
+            kind=kind.value,
+            full_name=full_name,
+            must_change_password=must_change_password,
+        )
+        self._session.add(compte)
+        await self._session.flush()
+        return compte
+
+    async def update_password(
+        self, user_id: UUID, password_hash: str, *, must_change_password: bool
+    ) -> None:
+        await self._session.execute(
+            update(AppUser)
+            .where(AppUser.id == user_id)
+            .values(
+                password_hash=password_hash,
+                must_change_password=must_change_password,
+                credentials_changed_at=func.clock_timestamp(),
+            )
+        )
+
+    async def rehash_password(self, user_id: UUID, password_hash: str) -> None:
+        # Un simple recalcul avec des paramètres Argon2 plus récents ne périme aucun jeton.
+        await self._session.execute(
+            update(AppUser).where(AppUser.id == user_id).values(password_hash=password_hash)
+        )
+
+    async def touch_last_login(self, user_id: UUID) -> None:
+        await self._session.execute(
+            update(AppUser).where(AppUser.id == user_id).values(last_login_at=func.now())
+        )
+
+    async def set_role(self, user_id: UUID, role: Role) -> None:
+        await self._session.execute(
+            update(AppUser)
+            .where(AppUser.id == user_id)
+            .values(role=role.value, credentials_changed_at=func.clock_timestamp())
+        )
+
+    async def set_active(self, user_id: UUID, *, is_active: bool) -> None:
+        await self._session.execute(
+            update(AppUser)
+            .where(AppUser.id == user_id)
+            .values(is_active=is_active, credentials_changed_at=func.clock_timestamp())
+        )

apps/backend/app/schemas/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+from app.schemas.health import LivenessStatus, ReadinessStatus
+
+__all__ = ["LivenessStatus", "ReadinessStatus"]

apps/backend/app/schemas/alert.py

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+from datetime import datetime
+from enum import StrEnum
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict
+
+
+class AlertType(StrEnum):
+    SPIKE = "spike"
+    THRESHOLD = "threshold"
+    ANOMALY = "anomaly"
+    OUTAGE = "outage"
+    SENSOR = "sensor"
+
+
+class AlertSeverity(StrEnum):
+    LOW = "low"
+    MEDIUM = "medium"
+    HIGH = "high"
+    CRITICAL = "critical"
+
+
+class AlertResponse(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(from_attributes=True)
+
+    alert_id: int
+    site_id: str
+    timestamp: datetime
+    type: AlertType
+    severity: AlertSeverity
+    message: str
+    value: float | None
+    threshold: float | None
+    metric: str | None
+    prediction_id: int | None

apps/backend/app/schemas/auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# Contrainte : le mot de passe est borné à 128 caractères. Sans plafond, une chaîne de dix
+# mégaoctets ferait travailler Argon2 gratuitement, à la charge du serveur.
+
+from typing import Literal, Self
+from uuid import UUID
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, EmailStr, Field
+
+from app.core.principal import Principal
+from app.core.roles import AccountKind, Role
+
+PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH = 12
+PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH = 128
+
+
+class LoginRequest(BaseModel):
+    email: EmailStr
+    password: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH)
+
+
+class PasswordChangeRequest(BaseModel):
+    current_password: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH)
+    new_password: str = Field(min_length=PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH, max_length=PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH)
+
+
+class PrincipalResponse(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(from_attributes=True)
+
+    id: UUID
+    email: str
+    role: Role
+    kind: AccountKind
+    must_change_password: bool
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_principal(cls, principal: Principal) -> Self:
+        return cls.model_validate(principal)
+
+
+class TokenResponse(BaseModel):
+    access_token: str
+    token_type: Literal["bearer"] = "bearer"  # noqa: S105
+    expires_in: int
+    principal: PrincipalResponse

apps/backend/app/schemas/errors.py

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# Piège : ces modèles ne décrivent rien, ils publient. Ce sont eux que Swagger montre, donc ils
+# doivent suivre `validation_error_handler()` et `unhandled_error_handler()` d'`app/api/errors.py`
+# à la lettre. Un champ renommé là-bas sans l'être ici rend la documentation fausse en silence.
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel
+
+
+class ErrorResponse(BaseModel):
+    detail: str
+
+
+class FieldError(BaseModel):
+    champ: str
+    type: str
+
+
+class ValidationErrorResponse(BaseModel):
+    detail: list[FieldError]
+
+
+class InternalErrorResponse(BaseModel):
+    detail: str
+    correlation: str

apps/backend/app/schemas/health.py

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+from typing import Literal
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel
+
+
+class LivenessStatus(BaseModel):
+    status: Literal["ok"]
+    service: str
+    version: str
+    environment: str
+
+
+# Contrainte : la sonde ne publie pas la version de TimescaleDB. Une version exacte de
+# composant, servie sans authentification, est de la reconnaissance gratuite pour qui
+# cherche une CVE. Elle part dans le journal, où elle sert au diagnostic.
+class ReadinessStatus(BaseModel):
+    status: Literal["ready"]
+    database: Literal["reachable"]
+    timescaledb: Literal["loaded"]

apps/backend/app/schemas/recommendation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+from datetime import datetime
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict
+
+
+class RecommendationResponse(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(from_attributes=True)
+
+    recommendation_id: int
+    alert_id: int
+    action: str
+    explanation: str
+    rule_reference: str
+    created_at: datetime

apps/backend/app/schemas/sensor.py

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+from datetime import datetime
+from typing import Literal
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field
+
+
+class SensorDiagnosticResponse(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(from_attributes=True)
+
+    status: Literal["ok", "failing"]
+    since: datetime | None = Field(
+        description=(
+            "Horodatage de la dernière lecture reçue pour ce site. Ce n'est pas le début de la "
+            "panne : l'historique ne permet pas de le dater sans requête supplémentaire."
+        )
+    )
+
+
+class SiteSensorsResponse(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(from_attributes=True)
+
+    consumption: SensorDiagnosticResponse
+    electrical: SensorDiagnosticResponse
+    temperature: SensorDiagnosticResponse
+    humidity: SensorDiagnosticResponse
+    network: SensorDiagnosticResponse
+
+
+class SiteSensorStatusResponse(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(from_attributes=True)
+
+    site_id: str
+    site_name: str
+    sensors: SiteSensorsResponse
+    overall: Literal["ok", "degraded", "critical"]
+
+
+class SensorStatusResponse(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(from_attributes=True)
+
+    timestamp: datetime
+    sites: list[SiteSensorStatusResponse]

apps/backend/app/schemas/site.py

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict
+
+
+class SiteResponse(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(from_attributes=True)
+
+    site_id: str
+    site_name: str
+    site_type: str
+    location: str | None
+    capacity_kw: float | None
+    status: str | None

apps/backend/app/schemas/stats.py

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+from datetime import datetime
+from typing import Literal
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict
+
+
+class SiteSummaryResponse(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(from_attributes=True)
+
+    site_id: str
+    site_name: str
+    current_consumption_kw: float | None
+    capacity_kw: float
+    load_percent: float | None
+    data_quality: Literal["good", "partial", "degraded", "critical"]
+
+
+class StatsSummaryResponse(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(from_attributes=True)
+
+    timestamp: datetime
+    total_sites: int
+    total_consumption_kw: float
+    total_capacity_kw: float
+    average_load_percent: float
+    sites: list[SiteSummaryResponse]

apps/backend/app/schemas/user.py

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# Contrainte : les schémas de lecture et d'écriture sont séparés. Un modèle unique laisserait
+# passer `role` ou `is_active` depuis un corps de requête, et renverrait `password_hash` en
+# réponse. C'est l'attribution de masse, API3 du top 10 API.
+
+from datetime import datetime
+from uuid import UUID
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, EmailStr, Field
+
+from app.core.roles import AccountKind, Role
+
+
+class UserCreateRequest(BaseModel):
+    email: EmailStr
+    role: Role
+    full_name: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=200)
+
+
+class UserUpdateRequest(BaseModel):
+    role: Role | None = None
+    is_active: bool | None = None
+
+
+class UserResponse(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(from_attributes=True)
+
+    id: UUID
+    email: str
+    role: Role
+    kind: AccountKind
+    is_active: bool
+    must_change_password: bool
+    full_name: str | None
+    last_login_at: datetime | None
+    created_at: datetime
+
+
+class TemporaryPasswordResponse(BaseModel):
+    # Affiché une seule fois : l'empreinte seule est conservée côté serveur.
+    user: UserResponse
+    temporary_password: str

apps/backend/app/services/alert.py

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+from collections.abc import Sequence
+
+from app.models.energy import Alert
+from app.repositories.alert import AlertRepository
+
+
+class AlertService:
+    def __init__(self, *, alerts: AlertRepository) -> None:
+        self._alerts = alerts
+
+    async def list_all(
+        self, *, site_id: str | None = None, severity: str | None = None
+    ) -> Sequence[Alert]:
+        return await self._alerts.list_all(site_id=site_id, severity=severity)

apps/backend/app/services/auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
+# Piège : les compteurs de limitation sont lus AVANT le hachage Argon2. Dans l'autre ordre,
+# chaque requête rejetée coûterait quand même 17 ms de processeur et 19 Mio de mémoire, et la
+# protection deviendrait l'amplificateur de déni de service qu'elle est censée empêcher.
+# Piège : quand l'email est inconnu, `verify_dummy()` consomme le même temps qu'une
+# vérification réelle. Sans lui, l'écart de temps de réponse est un oracle d'existence.
+# Piège : la tentative échouée est validée en base AVANT que l'erreur ne soit levée.
+# `get_session()` ne valide pas de lui-même, donc la preuve disparaîtrait avec la transaction.
+# Piège : dans `refresh()`, un jeton expiré ne révoque PAS la famille, un jeton déjà tourné si.
+# La rotation ne protège de rien par elle-même : elle rend la réutilisation détectable, et
+# c'est la détection qui termine le vol.
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+from typing import NoReturn, Protocol
+from uuid import UUID, uuid4
+
+from app.core.hashing import Argon2Hasher
+from app.core.principal import Principal
+from app.core.roles import AccountKind, Role
+from app.core.security import (
+    TokenPolicy,
+    encode_access_token,
+    fingerprint_refresh,
+    generate_refresh_secret,
+)
+from app.models.audit_log import AuditAction, AuditOutcome
+from app.models.login_attempt import LoginOutcome
+from app.models.refresh_token import RevocationReason
+from app.repositories.audit_log import AuditLogRepository
+from app.repositories.login_attempt import LoginAttemptRepository
+from app.repositories.refresh_token import RefreshTokenRepository
+from app.repositories.user import UserRepository
+
+
+class Transaction(Protocol):
+    async def commit(self) -> None: ...
+
+
+class AuthError(Exception):
+    pass
+
+
+class InvalidCredentialsError(AuthError):
+    pass
+
+
+class SessionRejectedError(AuthError):
+    pass
+
+
+class RateLimitedError(AuthError):
+    def __init__(self, retry_after: int) -> None:
+        super().__init__("Trop de tentatives")
+        self.retry_after = retry_after
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class LoginPolicy:
+    window_seconds: int
+    max_failures_per_identifier_and_ip: int
+    max_failures_per_ip: int
+    max_failures_per_identifier: int
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AuthenticatedSession:
+    principal: Principal
+    access_token: str
+    expires_in: int
+    refresh_secret: str
+
+
+class AuthService:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        users: UserRepository,
+        attempts: LoginAttemptRepository,
+        refresh_tokens: RefreshTokenRepository,
+        audit: AuditLogRepository,
+        hasher: Argon2Hasher,
+        transaction: Transaction,
+        token_policy: TokenPolicy,
+        login_policy: LoginPolicy,
+        refresh_ttl: timedelta,
+    ) -> None:
+        self._users = users
+        self._attempts = attempts
+        self._refresh = refresh_tokens
+        self._audit = audit
+        self._hasher = hasher
+        self._transaction = transaction
+        self._token_policy = token_policy
+        self._login_policy = login_policy
+        self._refresh_ttl = refresh_ttl
+
+    async def authenticate(
+        self, *, email: str, password: str, client_ip: str | None, user_agent: str | None
+    ) -> AuthenticatedSession:
+        await self._refuse_si_limite(email=email, client_ip=client_ip, user_agent=user_agent)
+
+        compte = await self._users.get_by_email(email)
+        if compte is None:
+            await self._hasher.verify_dummy()
+            await self._echoue(email, client_ip, LoginOutcome.IDENTIFIANTS_INVALIDES)
+
+        if not await self._hasher.verify(compte.password_hash, password):
+            await self._echoue(
+                email, client_ip, LoginOutcome.IDENTIFIANTS_INVALIDES, user_id=compte.id
+            )
+
+        if not compte.is_active or compte.kind != AccountKind.HUMAIN.value:
+            await self._echoue(
+                email, client_ip, LoginOutcome.COMPTE_INDISPONIBLE, user_id=compte.id
+            )
+
+        if self._hasher.needs_rehash(compte.password_hash):
+            await self._users.rehash_password(compte.id, await self._hasher.hash(password))
+
+        await self._users.touch_last_login(compte.id)
+        await self._attempts.record(
+            email=email, client_ip=client_ip, outcome=LoginOutcome.SUCCES, user_id=compte.id
+        )
+        secret = await self._ouvre_une_famille(
+            user_id=compte.id, client_ip=client_ip, user_agent=user_agent
+        )
+        await self._transaction.commit()
+
+        return self._session(self._en_principal(compte), secret)
+
+    async def refresh(
+        self, *, secret: str, client_ip: str | None, user_agent: str | None
+    ) -> AuthenticatedSession:
+        empreinte = fingerprint_refresh(secret)
+        revendique = await self._refresh.claim_for_rotation(empreinte)
+        if revendique is None:
+            await self._traite_rotation_refusee(empreinte, client_ip, user_agent)
+
+        compte = await self._users.get_by_id(revendique.user_id)
+        if compte is None or not compte.is_active:
+            await self._refresh.revoke_family(revendique.family_id, RevocationReason.ADMINISTRATION)
+            await self._transaction.commit()
+            raise SessionRejectedError("Session révoquée")
+
+        nouveau_secret = generate_refresh_secret()
+        nouveau = await self._refresh.create(
+            user_id=revendique.user_id,
+            family_id=revendique.family_id,
+            token_hash=fingerprint_refresh(nouveau_secret),
+            expires_at=revendique.expires_at,
+            client_ip=client_ip,
+            user_agent=user_agent,
+        )
+        await self._refresh.link_replacement(revendique.id, nouveau.id)
+        await self._transaction.commit()
+
+        return self._session(self._en_principal(compte), nouveau_secret)
+
+    async def logout(self, *, secret: str) -> None:
+        ligne = await self._refresh.inspect(fingerprint_refresh(secret))
+        if ligne is not None:
+            await self._refresh.revoke_family(ligne.family_id, RevocationReason.DECONNEXION)
+        await self._transaction.commit()
+
+    async def change_password(
+        self,
+        *,
+        principal: Principal,
+        current_password: str,
+        new_password: str,
+        client_ip: str | None,
+        user_agent: str | None,
+    ) -> AuthenticatedSession:
+        compte = await self._users.get_by_id(principal.id)
+        if compte is None or not await self._hasher.verify(compte.password_hash, current_password):
+            raise InvalidCredentialsError("Identifiants invalides")
+
+        await self._users.update_password(
+            principal.id, await self._hasher.hash(new_password), must_change_password=False
+        )
+        # Toutes les sessions tombent, puis on en rouvre une : l'appareil courant reste
+        # connecté et tous les autres sont déconnectés.
+        revoquees = await self._refresh.revoke_all_for_user(
+            principal.id, RevocationReason.CHANGEMENT_MOT_DE_PASSE
+        )
+        secret = await self._ouvre_une_famille(
+            user_id=principal.id, client_ip=client_ip, user_agent=user_agent
+        )
+        await self._audit.record(
+            action=AuditAction.COMPTE_MOT_DE_PASSE_CHANGE,
+            actor=principal,
+            target_type="app_user",
+            target_id=str(principal.id),
+            client_ip=client_ip,
+            user_agent=user_agent,
+            detail={"sessions_revoquees": revoquees},
+        )
+        await self._transaction.commit()
+
+        rafraichi = await self._users.get_by_id(principal.id)
+        return self._session(self._en_principal(rafraichi or compte), secret)
+
+    async def logout_all(self, principal: Principal) -> int:
+        revoquees = await self._refresh.revoke_all_for_user(
+            principal.id, RevocationReason.DECONNEXION
+        )
+        await self._audit.record(
+            action=AuditAction.SESSIONS_REVOQUEES,
+            actor=principal,
+            detail={"sessions_revoquees": revoquees},
+        )
+        await self._transaction.commit()
+        return revoquees
+
+    def _session(self, principal: Principal, refresh_secret: str) -> AuthenticatedSession:
+        jeton = encode_access_token(
+            self._token_policy,
+            subject=principal.id,
+            role=principal.role.value,
+            kind=principal.kind.value,
+        )
+        return AuthenticatedSession(
+            principal=principal,
+            access_token=jeton,
+            expires_in=int(self._token_policy.access_ttl.total_seconds()),
+            refresh_secret=refresh_secret,
+        )
+
+    def _en_principal(self, compte: object) -> Principal:
+        return Principal(
+            id=compte.id,  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+            email=compte.email,  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+            role=Role(compte.role),  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+            kind=AccountKind(compte.kind),  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+            must_change_password=compte.must_change_password,  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        )
+
+    async def _ouvre_une_famille(
+        self, *, user_id: UUID, client_ip: str | None, user_agent: str | None
+    ) -> str:
+        secret = generate_refresh_secret()
+        await self._refresh.create(
+            user_id=user_id,
+            family_id=uuid4(),
+            token_hash=fingerprint_refresh(secret),
+            expires_at=datetime.now(UTC) + self._refresh_ttl,
+            client_ip=client_ip,
+            user_agent=user_agent,
+        )
+        return secret
+
+    async def _traite_rotation_refusee(
+        self, empreinte: bytes, client_ip: str | None, user_agent: str | None
+    ) -> NoReturn:
+        ligne = await self._refresh.inspect(empreinte)
+        if ligne is None:
+            raise SessionRejectedError("Session inconnue")
+
+        if ligne.expires_at <= datetime.now(UTC):
+            raise SessionRejectedError("Session expirée")
+
+        # Présenter un jeton déjà tourné est une preuve de compromission, pas un accident : toute
+        # la famille tombe, y compris la session encore vivante du voleur ou de la victime.
+        revoquees = await self._refresh.revoke_family(
+            ligne.family_id, RevocationReason.REUTILISATION
+        )
+        await self._audit.record(
+            action=AuditAction.REFRESH_REUTILISE,
+            outcome=AuditOutcome.ECHEC,
+            target_type="refresh_token",
+            target_id=str(ligne.family_id),
+            client_ip=client_ip,
+            user_agent=user_agent,
+            detail={"famille": str(ligne.family_id), "sessions_revoquees": revoquees},
+        )
+        await self._transaction.commit()
+        raise SessionRejectedError("Session révoquée")
+
+    async def _refuse_si_limite(
+        self, *, email: str, client_ip: str | None, user_agent: str | None
+    ) -> None:
+        politique = self._login_policy
+        compteurs = await self._attempts.count_recent_failures(
+            email=email, client_ip=client_ip, window_seconds=politique.window_seconds
+        )
+
+        depasse = (
+            compteurs.per_identifier_and_ip >= politique.max_failures_per_identifier_and_ip
+            or compteurs.per_ip >= politique.max_failures_per_ip
+            or compteurs.per_identifier >= politique.max_failures_per_identifier
+        )
+        if not depasse:
+            return
+
+        await self._attempts.record(email=email, client_ip=client_ip, outcome=LoginOutcome.LIMITE)
+        # Un blocage déclenché par l'identifiant seul signe une attaque distribuée : lui seul
+        # mérite une trace durable, les échecs ordinaires restent dans `login_attempt`.
+        if compteurs.per_identifier >= politique.max_failures_per_identifier:
+            await self._audit.record(
+                action=AuditAction.LIMITE_PAR_IDENTIFIANT,
+                outcome=AuditOutcome.ECHEC,
+                actor_label=email.strip().lower(),
+                client_ip=client_ip,
+                user_agent=user_agent,
+                detail={"motif": "seuil par identifiant depasse"},
+            )
+        await self._transaction.commit()
+        raise RateLimitedError(politique.window_seconds)
+
+    async def _echoue(
+        self,
+        email: str,
+        client_ip: str | None,
+        outcome: LoginOutcome,
+        *,
+        user_id: UUID | None = None,
+    ) -> NoReturn:
+        await self._attempts.record(
+            email=email, client_ip=client_ip, outcome=outcome, user_id=user_id
+        )
+        await self._transaction.commit()
+        raise InvalidCredentialsError("Identifiants invalides")

apps/backend/app/services/recommendation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+from collections.abc import Sequence
+
+from app.models.energy import Recommendation
+from app.repositories.recommendation import RecommendationRepository
+
+
+class RecommendationError(Exception):
+    pass
+
+
+class RecommendationNotFoundError(RecommendationError):
+    pass
+
+
+class RecommendationService:
+    def __init__(self, *, recommendations: RecommendationRepository) -> None:
+        self._recommendations = recommendations
+
+    async def list_all(self) -> Sequence[Recommendation]:
+        return await self._recommendations.list_all()
+
+    async def get_by_id(self, recommendation_id: int) -> Recommendation:
+        recommendation = await self._recommendations.get_by_id(recommendation_id)
+        if recommendation is None:
+            raise RecommendationNotFoundError(recommendation_id)
+        return recommendation

apps/backend/app/services/sensor.py

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import UTC, datetime
+from typing import Literal
+
+from app.models.energy import Reading, Site
+from app.repositories.reading import ReadingRepository
+from app.repositories.site import SiteRepository
+
+CapteurStatus = Literal["ok", "failing"]
+OverallStatus = Literal["ok", "degraded", "critical"]
+
+QUALITES_CONNUES: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"good", "partial", "degraded", "critical"})
+
+RAISON_VERS_CAPTEUR: dict[str, str] = {
+    "consumption_sensor_failure": "consumption",
+    "electrical_sensor_failure": "electrical",
+    "temperature_sensor_failure": "temperature",
+    "humidity_sensor_failure": "humidity",
+    "network_loss": "network",
+}
+
+CHAMPS_PAR_CAPTEUR: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
+    "consumption": ("consumption_kw",),
+    "electrical": ("voltage_v", "current_a", "power_factor"),
+    "temperature": ("temperature_celsius",),
+    "humidity": ("humidity_percent",),
+}
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class DiagnosticCapteur:
+    status: CapteurStatus
+    since: datetime | None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class SanteCapteurs:
+    consumption: DiagnosticCapteur
+    electrical: DiagnosticCapteur
+    temperature: DiagnosticCapteur
+    humidity: DiagnosticCapteur
+    network: DiagnosticCapteur
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class SanteSite:
+    site_id: str
+    site_name: str
+    sensors: SanteCapteurs
+    overall: OverallStatus
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class EtatCapteurs:
+    timestamp: datetime
+    sites: list[SanteSite]
+
+
+class SensorService:
+    def __init__(self, sites: SiteRepository, readings: ReadingRepository) -> None:
+        self._sites = sites
+        self._readings = readings
+
+    async def status(self) -> EtatCapteurs:
+        sites = await self._sites.list_all()
+        dernieres = {lecture.site_id: lecture for lecture in await self._readings.latest_by_site()}
+
+        return EtatCapteurs(
+            timestamp=datetime.now(UTC),
+            sites=[_sante_site(site, dernieres.get(site.site_id)) for site in sites],
+        )
+
+
+def _sante_site(site: Site, derniere: Reading | None) -> SanteSite:
+    if derniere is None:
+        return SanteSite(
+            site_id=site.site_id,
+            site_name=site.site_name,
+            sensors=_tout_en_echec(since=None),
+            overall="critical",
+        )
+
+    qualite = derniere.data_quality if derniere.data_quality in QUALITES_CONNUES else "critical"
+    overall = _overall_depuis_qualite(qualite)
+
+    if overall == "critical":
+        return SanteSite(
+            site_id=site.site_id,
+            site_name=site.site_name,
+            sensors=_tout_en_echec(since=derniere.timestamp),
+            overall="critical",
+        )
+
+    raisons_signalees = {
+        RAISON_VERS_CAPTEUR[raison]
+        for raison in (derniere.null_reasons or [])
+        if raison in RAISON_VERS_CAPTEUR
+    }
+
+    return SanteSite(
+        site_id=site.site_id,
+        site_name=site.site_name,
+        sensors=SanteCapteurs(
+            consumption=_diagnostic("consumption", derniere, raisons_signalees),
+            electrical=_diagnostic("electrical", derniere, raisons_signalees),
+            temperature=_diagnostic("temperature", derniere, raisons_signalees),
+            humidity=_diagnostic("humidity", derniere, raisons_signalees),
+            network=_diagnostic("network", derniere, raisons_signalees),
+        ),
+        overall=overall,
+    )
+
+
+def _overall_depuis_qualite(qualite: str) -> OverallStatus:
+    if qualite == "good":
+        return "ok"
+    if qualite in ("partial", "degraded"):
+        return "degraded"
+    return "critical"
+
+
+def _diagnostic(capteur: str, derniere: Reading, raisons_signalees: set[str]) -> DiagnosticCapteur:
+    champs = CHAMPS_PAR_CAPTEUR.get(capteur, ())
+    en_echec = capteur in raisons_signalees or any(
+        getattr(derniere, champ) is None for champ in champs
+    )
+    return DiagnosticCapteur(
+        status="failing" if en_echec else "ok",
+        since=derniere.timestamp if en_echec else None,
+    )
+
+
+def _tout_en_echec(since: datetime | None) -> SanteCapteurs:
+    echec = DiagnosticCapteur(status="failing", since=since)
+    return SanteCapteurs(
+        consumption=echec, electrical=echec, temperature=echec, humidity=echec, network=echec
+    )

apps/backend/app/services/site.py

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+from collections.abc import Sequence
+
+from app.models.energy import Site
+from app.repositories.site import SiteRepository
+
+
+class SiteError(Exception):
+    pass
+
+
+class SiteNotFoundError(SiteError):
+    pass
+
+
+class SiteService:
+    def __init__(self, *, sites: SiteRepository) -> None:
+        self._sites = sites
+
+    async def list_all(self) -> Sequence[Site]:
+        return await self._sites.list_all()
+
+    async def get_by_id(self, site_id: str) -> Site:
+        site = await self._sites.get_by_id(site_id)
+        if site is None:
+            raise SiteNotFoundError(site_id)
+        return site

apps/backend/app/services/stats.py

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import UTC, datetime
+from typing import Literal
+
+from app.models.energy import Reading, Site
+from app.repositories.reading import ReadingRepository
+from app.repositories.site import SiteRepository
+
+DataQuality = Literal["good", "partial", "degraded", "critical"]
+
+QUALITES_CONNUES: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"good", "partial", "degraded", "critical"})
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class SiteConsumption:
+    site_id: str
+    site_name: str
+    current_consumption_kw: float | None
+    capacity_kw: float
+    load_percent: float | None
+    data_quality: DataQuality
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ConsumptionSummary:
+    timestamp: datetime
+    total_sites: int
+    total_consumption_kw: float
+    total_capacity_kw: float
+    average_load_percent: float
+    sites: list[SiteConsumption]
+
+
+class StatsService:
+    def __init__(self, sites: SiteRepository, readings: ReadingRepository) -> None:
+        self._sites = sites
+        self._readings = readings
+
+    async def summary(self) -> ConsumptionSummary:
+        sites = await self._sites.list_all()
+        dernieres = {lecture.site_id: lecture for lecture in await self._readings.latest_by_site()}
+
+        resumes = [self._resume_site(site, dernieres.get(site.site_id)) for site in sites]
+        consommation_totale = sum(r.current_consumption_kw or 0 for r in resumes)
+        capacite_totale = sum(r.capacity_kw for r in resumes)
+
+        return ConsumptionSummary(
+            timestamp=datetime.now(UTC),
+            total_sites=len(resumes),
+            total_consumption_kw=consommation_totale,
+            total_capacity_kw=capacite_totale,
+            average_load_percent=(
+                consommation_totale / capacite_totale * 100 if capacite_totale > 0 else 0
+            ),
+            sites=resumes,
+        )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _resume_site(site: Site, derniere: Reading | None) -> SiteConsumption:
+        capacite = site.capacity_kw or 0
+        # Piège : `data_quality` est nul dès qu'un site n'a jamais reçu de lecture, ou que le
+        # producteur n'a pas su la qualifier. Le contrat frontend n'a pas de valeur pour ce cas,
+        # `critical` est la seule des quatre qui n'induit pas une confiance qu'on n'a pas.
+        qualite: DataQuality = "critical"
+        consommation = None
+        if derniere is not None and derniere.data_quality in QUALITES_CONNUES:
+            qualite = derniere.data_quality  # type: ignore[assignment]
+            consommation = derniere.consumption_kw
+
+        charge = (
+            consommation / capacite * 100 if consommation is not None and capacite > 0 else None
+        )
+
+        return SiteConsumption(
+            site_id=site.site_id,
+            site_name=site.site_name,
+            current_consumption_kw=consommation,
+            capacity_kw=capacite,
+            load_percent=charge,
+            data_quality=qualite,
+        )

apps/backend/app/services/user.py

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+# Piège : `change_role()` et `set_active()` refusent de toucher au dernier administrateur actif.
+# Sans cette garde, un administrateur peut se rétrograder ou se désactiver lui-même, et plus
+# personne ne peut administrer la plateforme sans repasser par `psql`.
+
+import secrets
+from collections.abc import Sequence
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Protocol
+from uuid import UUID
+
+from app.core.hashing import Argon2Hasher
+from app.core.principal import Principal
+from app.core.roles import Role
+from app.models.audit_log import AuditAction
+from app.models.refresh_token import RevocationReason
+from app.models.user import AppUser
+from app.repositories.audit_log import AuditLogRepository
+from app.repositories.refresh_token import RefreshTokenRepository
+from app.repositories.user import UserRepository
+
+LONGUEUR_MOT_DE_PASSE_TEMPORAIRE = 18
+
+
+class Transaction(Protocol):
+    async def commit(self) -> None: ...
+
+
+class UserError(Exception):
+    pass
+
+
+class UserNotFoundError(UserError):
+    pass
+
+
+class EmailAlreadyUsedError(UserError):
+    pass
+
+
+class LastAdminError(UserError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class CreatedUser:
+    user: AppUser
+    temporary_password: str
+
+
+class UserService:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        users: UserRepository,
+        refresh_tokens: RefreshTokenRepository,
+        audit: AuditLogRepository,
+        hasher: Argon2Hasher,
+        transaction: Transaction,
+    ) -> None:
+        self._users = users
+        self._refresh = refresh_tokens
+        self._audit = audit
+        self._hasher = hasher
+        self._transaction = transaction
+
+    async def list_all(self) -> Sequence[AppUser]:
+        return await self._users.list_all()
+
+    async def create(
+        self, *, actor: Principal, email: str, role: Role, full_name: str | None
+    ) -> CreatedUser:
+        if await self._users.get_by_email(email) is not None:
+            raise EmailAlreadyUsedError(email)
+
+        provisoire = secrets.token_urlsafe(LONGUEUR_MOT_DE_PASSE_TEMPORAIRE)
+        compte = await self._users.create(
+            email=email,
+            password_hash=await self._hasher.hash(provisoire),
+            role=role,
+            full_name=full_name,
+            must_change_password=True,
+        )
+        await self._audit.record(
+            action=AuditAction.COMPTE_CREE,
+            actor=actor,
+            target_type="app_user",
+            target_id=str(compte.id),
+            detail={"email": compte.email, "role_apres": role.value},
+        )
+        await self._transaction.commit()
+        return CreatedUser(user=compte, temporary_password=provisoire)
+
+    async def change_role(self, *, actor: Principal, user_id: UUID, role: Role) -> AppUser:
+        compte = await self._exige(user_id)
+        if compte.role == role.value:
+            return compte
+
+        await self._refuse_si_dernier_admin(compte, futur_role=role, futur_actif=compte.is_active)
+        avant = compte.role
+        await self._users.set_role(user_id, role)
+        await self._refresh.revoke_all_for_user(user_id, RevocationReason.ADMINISTRATION)
+        await self._audit.record(
+            action=AuditAction.COMPTE_ROLE_CHANGE,
+            actor=actor,
+            target_type="app_user",
+            target_id=str(user_id),
+            detail={"role_avant": avant, "role_apres": role.value},
+        )
+        await self._transaction.commit()
+        return await self._exige(user_id)
+
+    async def set_active(self, *, actor: Principal, user_id: UUID, is_active: bool) -> AppUser:
+        compte = await self._exige(user_id)
+        if compte.is_active == is_active:
+            return compte
+
+        await self._refuse_si_dernier_admin(
+            compte, futur_role=Role(compte.role), futur_actif=is_active
+        )
+        await self._users.set_active(user_id, is_active=is_active)
+        if not is_active:
+            await self._refresh.revoke_all_for_user(user_id, RevocationReason.ADMINISTRATION)
+        await self._audit.record(
+            action=AuditAction.COMPTE_ACTIVE if is_active else AuditAction.COMPTE_DESACTIVE,
+            actor=actor,
+            target_type="app_user",
+            target_id=str(user_id),
+        )
+        await self._transaction.commit()
+        return await self._exige(user_id)
+
+    async def reset_password(self, *, actor: Principal, user_id: UUID) -> CreatedUser:
+        compte = await self._exige(user_id)
+        provisoire = secrets.token_urlsafe(LONGUEUR_MOT_DE_PASSE_TEMPORAIRE)
+
+        await self._users.update_password(
+            user_id, await self._hasher.hash(provisoire), must_change_password=True
+        )
+        await self._refresh.revoke_all_for_user(user_id, RevocationReason.CHANGEMENT_MOT_DE_PASSE)
+        await self._audit.record(
+            action=AuditAction.COMPTE_MOT_DE_PASSE_REINITIALISE,
+            actor=actor,
+            target_type="app_user",
+            target_id=str(user_id),
+            detail={"email": compte.email},
+        )
+        await self._transaction.commit()
+        return CreatedUser(user=await self._exige(user_id), temporary_password=provisoire)
+
+    async def _exige(self, user_id: UUID) -> AppUser:
+        compte = await self._users.get_by_id(user_id)
+        if compte is None:
+            raise UserNotFoundError(str(user_id))
+        return compte
+
+    async def _refuse_si_dernier_admin(
+        self, compte: AppUser, *, futur_role: Role, futur_actif: bool
+    ) -> None:
+        etait_admin = compte.role == Role.ADMIN.value and compte.is_active
+        reste_admin = futur_role is Role.ADMIN and futur_actif
+        if not etait_admin or reste_admin:
+            return
+        if await self._users.count_active_admins() <= 1:
+            raise LastAdminError(str(compte.id))

apps/backend/pyproject.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+[project]
+name = "enervision-backend"
+version = "0.1.0"
+description = "API EnerVision : exposition des series temporelles energetiques"
+requires-python = ">=3.14,<3.15"
+dependencies = [
+    "fastapi>=0.141.1",
+    "uvicorn[standard]>=0.53.0",
+    "pydantic[email]>=2.13.5",
+    "pydantic-settings>=2.15.0",
+    "sqlalchemy[asyncio]>=2.0.52",
+    "asyncpg>=0.31.0",
+    "alembic>=1.20.0",
+    "prometheus-fastapi-instrumentator>=8.1.0",
+    "python-json-logger>=4.2.0",
+    "pyjwt>=2.10",
+    "argon2-cffi>=23.1",
+    "anyio>=4.0",
+]
+
+[dependency-groups]
+dev = [
+    "ruff>=0.16.7",
+    "mypy>=2.3.1",
+    "pytest>=9.1.1",
+    "pytest-asyncio>=1.4.0",
+    "pytest-cov>=7.1.0",
+    "httpx>=0.28.1",
+]
+
+[build-system]
+requires = ["hatchling>=1.32.0"]
+build-backend = "hatchling.build"
+
+[tool.hatch.build.targets.wheel]
+packages = ["app"]
+
+[tool.ruff]
+line-length = 100
+target-version = "py314"
+src = ["app", "tests"]
+extend-exclude = ["alembic/versions"]
+
+[tool.ruff.lint]
+select = [
+    "E", "W",
+    "F",
+    "I",
+    "N",
+    "UP",
+    "B",
+    "C4",
+    "SIM",
+    "TID",
+    "RUF",
+    "ASYNC",
+    "S",
+    "PT",
+]
+ignore = ["B008"]
+
+[tool.ruff.lint.per-file-ignores]
+# S105 à S107 signalent les secrets en dur, qui sont justement la matière des tests d'auth.
+"tests/**/*.py" = ["S101", "S105", "S106", "S107"]
+
+[tool.ruff.lint.isort]
+known-first-party = ["app"]
+
+[tool.ruff.format]
+quote-style = "double"
+
+[tool.mypy]
+python_version = "3.14"
+strict = true
+warn_unreachable = true
+plugins = ["pydantic.mypy"]
+exclude = ["^alembic/"]
+
+[[tool.mypy.overrides]]
+module = ["tests.*"]
+disallow_untyped_defs = false
+
+[tool.pytest.ini_options]
+testpaths = ["tests"]
+asyncio_mode = "auto"
+asyncio_default_fixture_loop_scope = "function"
+addopts = "-q --strict-markers -m 'not integration' --cov=app --cov-report=term-missing"
+markers = ["integration: requiert une base PostgreSQL joignable, hors `make test`"]
+
+[tool.coverage.run]
+source = ["app"]
+branch = true
+omit = ["alembic/*"]
+
+[tool.coverage.report]
+show_missing = true

apps/backend/tests/api/test_alerts.py

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+from collections.abc import Callable, Iterator
+from datetime import UTC, datetime
+from uuid import uuid4
+
+import pytest
+from fastapi import FastAPI
+from httpx import AsyncClient
+
+from app.api.deps import get_alert_service, get_current_principal
+from app.core.principal import Principal
+from app.core.roles import AccountKind, Role
+from app.models.energy import Alert
+from app.schemas.alert import AlertSeverity
+
+
+def principal(role: Role = Role.LECTEUR) -> Principal:
+    return Principal(
+        id=uuid4(),
+        email=f"{role.value}@enervision.fr",
+        role=role,
+        kind=AccountKind.HUMAIN,
+        must_change_password=False,
+    )
+
+
+def alert(alert_id: int = 1, site_id: str = "site-1", severity: str = "high") -> Alert:
+    return Alert(
+        alert_id=alert_id,
+        source_alert_id=f"ALR-{alert_id}",
+        site_id=site_id,
+        source="enervision",
+        timestamp=datetime(2026, 9, 16, tzinfo=UTC),
+        type="threshold",
+        severity=severity,
+        message="Dépassement du seuil configuré",
+        value=812.5,
+        threshold=720.0,
+        metric="consumption_kw",
+        prediction_id=None,
+        raw_data={},
+    )
+
+
+class FauxService:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.alert = alert()
+        self.appels: list[tuple[str | None, str | None]] = []
+
+    async def list_all(
+        self, *, site_id: str | None = None, severity: str | None = None
+    ) -> list[Alert]:
+        self.appels.append((site_id, severity))
+        return [self.alert]
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def lecteur_connecte(app: FastAPI) -> Iterator[None]:
+    app.dependency_overrides[get_current_principal] = lambda: principal()
+    yield
+    app.dependency_overrides.pop(get_current_principal, None)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def servi(app: FastAPI, lecteur_connecte: None) -> Iterator[Callable[[], FauxService]]:
+    def installe() -> FauxService:
+        service = FauxService()
+        app.dependency_overrides[get_alert_service] = lambda: service
+        return service
+
+    yield installe
+    app.dependency_overrides.pop(get_alert_service, None)
+
+
+async def test_list_alerts_returns_the_alerts(
+    servi: Callable[[], FauxService], client: AsyncClient
+) -> None:
+    servi()
+
+    response = await client.get("/api/v1/alerts")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    corps = response.json()
+    assert corps == [
+        {
+            "alert_id": 1,
+            "site_id": "site-1",
+            "timestamp": "2026-09-16T00:00:00Z",
+            "type": "threshold",
+            "severity": "high",
+            "message": "Dépassement du seuil configuré",
+            "value": 812.5,
+            "threshold": 720.0,
+            "metric": "consumption_kw",
+            "prediction_id": None,
+        }
+    ]
+
+
+async def test_list_alerts_transmits_the_site_id_filter(
+    servi: Callable[[], FauxService], client: AsyncClient
+) -> None:
+    service = servi()
+
+    await client.get("/api/v1/alerts?site_id=site-1")
+
+    assert service.appels == [("site-1", None)]
+
+
+async def test_list_alerts_transmits_the_severity_filter(
+    servi: Callable[[], FauxService], client: AsyncClient
+) -> None:
+    service = servi()
+
+    await client.get("/api/v1/alerts?severity=critical")
+
+    assert service.appels == [(None, AlertSeverity.CRITICAL)]
+
+
+async def test_list_alerts_returns_422_for_an_unknown_severity(
+    servi: Callable[[], FauxService], client: AsyncClient
+) -> None:
+    servi()
+
+    response = await client.get("/api/v1/alerts?severity=invalide")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 422
+
+
+async def test_list_alerts_returns_an_empty_list_when_there_is_nothing(
+    lecteur_connecte: None, fake_session: Callable[..., None], client: AsyncClient
+) -> None:
+    fake_session(result=[])
+
+    response = await client.get("/api/v1/alerts")
+
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    assert response.json() == []